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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Joke and the Bare Wall: Taking Seriously the Insult 
 Karl Marx (1818-1883) pointed to a convergence that he did not completely 
develop. He expanded upon the Hegelian dictum: “Pure light is pure darkness,” by 
foreseeing an intimate connection, a form of affective link between political economy 
and theology. Yet he treated it as an expression of something else, as a symptom of what 
political economy and theology cannot think about. Political economy and theology 
ignore their negative knowledge; through their explanations they express the radical 
anguish produced by ignorance. The treatment of the relationship between political 
economy and theology becomes an exploration of something that has to be clarified from 
the outside.   
For Marx, linking theology and political economy was a way to show the 
inconsistencies or shortcomings of political economy. In introducing this subterranean 
relationship he was not proposing a metonymy but creating a gap through a joke. Indeed, 
for Marx the relationship between political economy and theology were laughable. 
Political economy and theology are ridiculous to him for one reason: their origins or, 
more precisely the problem of their origin, remains hidden from them and they cannot 
recognize its weakness. Accordingly they insist on prolonging the practice of theology 
and political economy without understanding their limits and viciousness. The question 
of the unknown origins does not leave space for the truth of the joke:  
We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-
value is made, and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of 
capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic 
production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable 
masses of capital and of labour power in the hands of producers of commodities. 
2 
 
The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we 
can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of 
Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result 
of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point.
1
 
 
Henceforth, what has to be resolved is the “vicious circle” expressed in the 
ignorance about the origins. There is a break in the chain: what are the origins of Capital? 
In order to reconstruct capital’s entire movement it becomes necessary to interrogate its 
suppositions. Marx’s judgment is that one of fundamental tasks of the critique of political 
economy is to reveal its madness, fissures, and irredeemable ridiculousness. For Marx, 
the farce is a moment that must be overcome through analytical procedures. He indeed 
proceeds to enter into the realms of the farce. Nevertheless, his assumption is that there is 
a distinction or abyss between the truth of political economy and its own mechanisms of 
functioning. Therefore the farce of political economy and theology only creates 
emptiness. Through his comparison Marx creates a vacuum that has to be explored.  
The farce is horrendous because it condenses and expresses truth in such a way 
that cannot be believed.  In order to emphasize the farce of political economy Marx has to 
turn to theology: “This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same 
part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human 
race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past.”2 
Since political economy cannot reasonably explain the historical conditions through 
which capital is produced, it is located instead within the ambit of theological 
explanations. Marx’s joke does not have to be dismissed, neither do its antecedents. The 
                                                          
1
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1977 [1867]), 873. 
 
2
 Ibid. 
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joke persists for the satire wants to demolish false assumptions and bring light. Adam’s 
apple and the primitive accumulation of wealth are shadows that share ways of 
proceeding: 
Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of 
institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are 
artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this they 
resemble theologians, who likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion 
which is not theirs is an invention of men, while their own is an emanation from 
God.
3
 
 
Once again the simplifications of the “economists” are explained as 
fundamentally theological. In this case, Marx refers to similar procedures and 
differentiations. Both economists and theologians achieve their political objectives 
through an identical process of naturalization and virtualization. Then Marx continues 
deploying notions, notions such as that invention and emanation appear to be the 
antipodes of a practical comprehension of historical dynamics. The purpose of the joke is 
to affirm and extend his distance from these procedures. Marx’s joke expresses a 
contention with naturalization, invention and, emanation in order to suggest a different 
order of explanation.  
There is a secret that has to be revealed in order to fully access history, economy, 
and nature. Marx looks at political economy and theology as a torment that threatens to 
destroy their limits. In a letter to Will Grohmann (1887-1968), Wassily Kandinsky (1866-
1944) wrote, “I want people to see finally what lies behind my paintings.”4 Marx had a 
similar desire. He assumed that there was something behind what was being introduced 
                                                          
3
 Karl Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” in Karl Marx/Frederick Engels Collected Works, Vol. 
6: 1845-1848 (New York: International Publishers, 1976 [1847]), 174. 
 
4
 Kandinsky Complete Writings on Art, ed. Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo (Boston:  Da 
Capo Press, 1982), v. Emphasis in the original. 
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by the similitudes of political economy with theology. The evident commonalities 
between their procedures did not explain anything fundamental about political economy 
and theology with the exception of their epistemic weaknesses. The notion of there being 
something behind or occluded by normal sight introduces the need for a different kind of 
knowledge or, more precisely, some sort of meta-theoretical position or, to the contrary, 
the rehabilitation of an unavoidable relation.
5
 
The relationship between political economy and theology required, according to 
Marx, the creation of a method capable of undermining its futility. Kandinsky’s essay 
“Bare Wall” points to Marx’s understanding of the common ground of political economy 
and theology: “The bare wall!...That ideal wall, where nothing stands, against which 
nothing leans on which no picture hangs, where nothing is to be seen. The egocentric 
wall, living “in and for itself”, self-assertive, chaste.”6 Indeed, for Marx nothing stands in 
the relationship between political theology and economy; there is nothing to be seen but 
the manifestation of a presence without walls. Even more a disfiguration of a nucleus that 
his trying to grasp. Yet the bare wall stands and something exists because of its pure 
physicality. Marx presents theology and political economy as egocentric practices that are 
incapable of understanding their lacks. The bare wall expresses its self, not ideas or 
arguments about something beyond it. As Andrey Tarkovsky (1932-1986) says about the 
image, “It does not signify life or symbolize it, but embodies it, expressing its 
                                                          
5
 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hanna Arendt 
(New York: Schocken Books, 2007 [1955]), 253. 
 
6
 Kandinsky Complete Writings on Art, 732. 
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uniqueness.”7 The bare-wall accumulates life. However, Marx laughs and promises a 
destruction that can give us access to what is behind the wall.  
In times long gone by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, 
and, above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and 
more, in riotous living. The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly 
how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the 
history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is 
by no means essential. Never mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort 
accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own 
skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, 
despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the 
few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work. Such 
insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the defence of property.
8
 
 
The original sin of theology and economics’ original sin tell us about the 
metabolism between theology and political economy. There is a direct and ridiculous 
connection between these two forms of explanation. This type of direct connection 
cannot be reserved for the metaphorical
9
 use of theology within political economy or vice 
versa. The fact that people have to sell “their own skins” can be properly though not 
completely explained from within theology and economic theory. Strictly put, political 
economy theorizes from within theology. It is not its extension or “secular actualization” 
because theology itself carries economic positions. When reflecting about the capacity of 
Greek arts and epic, Marx says that their capacity to still give us artistic pleasure can be 
explained by affirming that in certain respects to say that “they count as [the] norm and as 
                                                          
7
 Andrey Tarkovsky, Sculpting Time: The Great Russian Filmmaker Discusses His Art, trans. 
Kitty Hunter-Blair (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 111. 
 
8
 Karl Marx, Capital, 873-874. 
 
9
 Enrique Dussel, Las metáforas teológicas de Marx (Estella: Verbo Divino, 1993), 163-170. 
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an unattainable model”10 is to suggest a path to the relocate the relationship between 
political economy and theology.  
Yet, I argue that we have to follow his first approach. We have to return to his 
humor and sarcasm. Thus, we have to pay attention to the ridiculous bare wall. Marx’s 
jokes about the theological character of political economy are in fact serious insights. In 
this case, there is nothing more serious than the joke and nothing more suggestive than 
the disfigured suspires of theology. The obscurities of theology are no less than the 
shadows of political economy. Frederick Engels (1820-1895) coined an insult that is one 
of his basic insights. For him, Adam Smith (1723-1790)
11
 was an economic Luther
12
 by 
which Engels anticipated Marx’s jokes. Nonetheless, Engel’s insult is the angle from 
which the humor of the critique of political economy has to be taken. Marx demonstrated 
an early agreement with Engels: “Engels was therefore right to call Adam Smith the 
Luther of Political Economy.”13 I would like to insist that we should take very seriously 
all these jokes, insults, and ridicule.  
A Serious Joke: Theology/Economy/Flesh 
Several studies from the first decades of the last century to the present make more 
than plausible the thesis that there are internal commonalities between theological 
economy and political economy. These commonalities are condensed and expressed not 
                                                          
10
 Karl Marx, Grundisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. 
Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin Books, 1993 [1857-58]), 111. 
 
11
 Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 
2010). 
 
12
 Frederick Engels, “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy,” in Karl Marx/Frederick Engels 
Collected Works, Vol. 3: 1843-1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1975 [1843]), 422. 
 
13
 Ibid., 290. 
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as forms of explicit legitimation or vulgar instrumentation of theological notions or 
imaginary. These commonalities and metabolism are both diachronic and synchronic, and 
thus are part of a trajectory that manifests itself specifically and with variations in 
response to contextual particularities. Moreover, the transformation of modes of 
production does not eradicate the theological which provides political economy with a 
context of argumentation and imagination.
14
 Also political economy means either 
expanding or suppressing certain themes, modes of operation, and language of 
theological economy. What occurs is a tense metabolism or interaction that disseminates 
and is reinforced by practices that occur in everyday life. The debates about the nature of 
flesh, from Arius (c. 256-336) to the Council of Chalcedon (451), have distinguished 
between the natures of Christ and have focused on Christ’s immune flesh.15 Even from 
theopaschism
16
 to recent interpretations
17
  the question of the reaches and implications of 
the notion of flesh are still debatable. The various antecedents of these theological 
debates also show the importance and viscosity of the question of flesh.
18
 These debates 
are intrinsically political
19
 and their implications must not be overlooked as they shape 
                                                          
14
 Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2009 [1947]). 
 
15
 “The letter of Pope Leo to Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, about Eutyches,” in Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils, Vol. 1 (Nicaea I – Lateran V, ed. Norman P. Tanner, S.J (London and Washington, 
D.C: Georgetown/Sheed & Ward, 1990), 77-82. 
 
16
 I am thinking particularly of Gregory of Nazianzus (330-390) Five Theological Orations. See  
The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, ed. Arthur James Mason (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1899). 
 
17
 Virginia Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Jennifer Glancy, Corporal Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
18
 Hanneke Reuling, After Eden: Church Fathers and Rabbis on Genesis 3:16-21 (Leiden/Boston: 
Brill, 2006); Lorenzo Scornaienchi, Sarx und Soma bei Paulus: Der Mensch zwischen Destruktivität und 
Konstructivität (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008). 
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and give reason to forms of organization, distribution of power, and knowledge. There 
are traditions within Christianity that have affirmed that the human body is constructed 
like the world itself,
20
 and that study of the human body constitutes one of the basic 
questions of theology. At the core of this understanding is one idea: carcer est totum 
corpus tenebroso inhorrens situ; nisi oculorum iluminetur aspectu.
21
 Thus, the 
theological reflection on the body and flesh is understood as a way to overcome its 
horrendousness and to secure oneself against the arbitrariness of flesh.
22
 Theology wants 
to be a light that illuminates the dark and filthy prison that we are. Nonetheless, there are 
other traditions in which fragility and fall are thought of as opportunities for the 
development of human arts and science. Even the most basic activities of human 
economy are also explained based on our physical indigence;
23
 this indigence creates the 
possibility for an economy of cooperation:  
Because of the arts and sciences and the useful things to which they lead, we have 
mutual need for one another. And because we need one another, we come 
together into one place in large numbers, and share with each other the necessities 
of our life, in common intercourse. To this human assemblage and cohabitation 
we have given the name of city […] For man is a naturally sociable animal, and 
made for citizenship. No single person is in all ways self-sufficient.
24
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19
 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, VII, 5. For the concept  political see Helio Gallardo, Elementos de 
política en América Latina (San José: DEI, 1986); Fundamentos de formación política: análisis de 
coyuntura (San José: DEI, 1988). 
 
20
 Ambrose, Hexaemeron, VI,  9 
 
21
 Ibid., IX, 55. 
 
22
 Augustine, Sermones, 163, 6; Sermones, 344, 1; Enarrationes in Psalmos, 136, 1. 
 
23
 Nemesius of Emesa, “On the Nature of Man,” in Cyril of Jerusalen and Nemesius of Emesa, ed. 
William Telfer (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), 238-257. 
  
24
 Ibid., 243. 
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Theological anthropology is thought to be the foundation of economic exchange 
and sociability. Economic theory thus belongs to theological reflection after the fall. In 
this case economy combines gift and labor. Economy is also presented as a permanent 
struggle within and against the limits of our nature and our natural environment.  The 
connection between flesh and economic activities hence is considered to be at the heart of 
theology.  
The question of the unity of the spiritual body as an economic problem has been a 
central problematic for theology since the epoch of the “Church Fathers”.25 Moreover, the 
comprehension and development of the notion of an economic body constituted one of 
the central elements of the complex of practices that were oriented to constitute both a 
personal and a common body at the time that these bodies were imagined as a part of the 
Body of Christ. This discussion introduced interrogations and norms about the 
constitution and distribution of authority, government, wealth, and belonging as well as 
its origins. Along with the discussion about authority and power came a detailed analysis 
of flesh, bodies, and dreams.  Although the notion of the Body of Christ has evident 
cosmological implications, it was typically restricted to an understanding of economy and 
specifically of wealth since the fourth century of the Common Era.
26
 The remarkable 
importance of materiality, in Late Medieval European types of Christianity,
27
 is also an 
important aspect used to understand a concept of economy that certainly surpassed 
                                                          
25
 Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: l'eucharistie et l'Église au Moyen âge. Étude historique 2 
éd., rev. et augm (Paris: Aubier, 1948). 
26
 Peter Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of 
Christianity in the West, 350-550 AD (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
27
 Caroline Walker Bynum, Christian Materiality: An Essay on Religion (New York: Zone Books, 
2011). 
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another fundamentally related to wealth or labor especially in the context of the 
expansion of imperialism and colonialism.
28
 The important studies of Jacques Le Goff
29
 
(b.1924), Giacomo Todeschini
30
 (b.1950), and more recently Eduardo Grüner
31
 have 
shown through detailed lexicographical, philosophical and historical investigations the 
theological provenance of modern occidental economic thinking as well as its particular 
transformations within regions and schools. Le Goff’s and Todeschini’s studies have also 
prompted recent important developments like the study by Valentina Toneatto about the 
origins of the theological-economical
32
 lexicon. In her book, Toneatto demonstrates that 
in order to comprehend the theology/economy conundrum one has to establish an 
approach that is capable of going through a merely genealogical approximation. The 
alternative to this approach is made explicit when Toneatto explains how some of the 
most important Christian motifs and problems were rendered using economic language 
                                                          
28
 Walter D. Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial 
Options (Durham and London: 2011), 8; 184; 262. 
 
29
 Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages trans. Patricia Ranum. 
(New York : Zone Books, 1988 [1986]); Marchands et banquiers du Moyen Âge (Paris : PUF, 2001). 
 
30
 Un trattato francescano di economia politica: il De emptionibus et venditionibus, De usuris, De 
restitutionibus di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 1980.); La 
ricchezza degli ebrei. Merci e denaro nella riflessione ebraica e nella definizione cristiana dell'usura alla 
fine del Medioevo (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 1989); Il prezzo della salvezza. 
Lessici medievali del pensiero economico (Roma: La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1994); I mercanti e il 
tempio. La società cristiana e il circolo virtuoso della ricchezza fra medioevo ed età moderna (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 2002). 
 
31
 Eduardo Grüner, La oscuridad y las luces: Capitalismo, cultura y revolución (Buenos Aires: 
Edhasa, 2010).  
 
32
 Valentina Toneatto, Les banquiers du seigneur, évêques et moines face à la richesse (IVe-début 
IXe siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012) ; Élites et rationalité économique. Les 
lexiques de l’administration monastique du Haut Moyen Âge», dans Les élites et la richesse au haut Moyen 
Âge, Actes du Colloque International de Bruxelles (13-15 mars 2008), Turnhout, 2010) ,71-96. 
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and imagery (theological economy). This use was not merely metaphorical, rhetorical
33
 
or instrumental; on the contrary, it had constitutive implications. What her argument 
affirms is that there is a mutual interpenetration that resulted in creating language, 
procedures, and argumentative foundations. It is not that “economy” spawns a theology 
or that “theology” provided economy with its substratum. The growing importance of the 
relationship between theology and economy highlights internal aspects of them that are 
not strictly ethical or of secondary order. One of the most important aspects of Toneatto’s 
investigation for my own research is her discussion of the relationship between how 
certain monastic traditions understood the language of carnalitas.
34
 The carnal level of 
existence in the reduced economy of monasticism required a series of precise and 
quotidian practices of economization. Flesh was clearly not just a metaphysical notion 
but referred both to an aspect of the human constitution and also to a criterion for the 
creation of political and economic bodies. Besides the political power of the institutional 
Church, often referred to in order to explain the interlacing of theology and the political 
economy, there is the elasticity of its modes of communication as they were expressed 
within economic activities; even more, they themselves form part of specific forms of 
economy.  
Theology/economy must be adequately comprehended as a relationship that 
expresses mutual tensions and interferences: theology was a form of practice composed 
by a certain economical lexicon and problems. In the development and establishment of a 
theological language orientated to resolve problems of administration, government, and 
                                                          
33
 James A. Harris, “Hume's Use of the Rhetoric of Calvinism,” in Impressions of Hume ed. M. 
Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 141-160. 
34
 Valentina Toneatto, Les banquiers du seigneur, évêques et moines face à la richesse, 129-135. 
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authority within religious movements, theological practices return and are a presence that 
heightens the language and mechanisms of expression and foundation of political 
economy. Some of these mechanisms and returns have been recently discussed by 
Patricia Ranft. Her investigation is valuable above all because of one her hypotheses: she 
affirms that the doctrine of incarnation has had a decisive role in the constitution of 
“modern Western culture.”35 Such an argument requires several refinements: first, 
incarnation is not a doctrine what can shape a given society but the social processes of 
exchange, reception, and distribution of such a doctrine within the various fields that 
compose society; second, the doctrine does not shape a society. Instead it is part of the 
various forces that dispute the hegemony of reality; third, the relationship between 
Christian doctrines and political and economic practices has to be studied on different 
levels. For a deeper explanation, it is not sufficient to concentrate on the relationship 
between doctrines or what can be called the history of intellectual reception. 
The Ugly Theology: Theoretical Antecedents  
One of the most important contributions of Latin American Liberation Theologies 
has been the development of the question of the connection between theology and 
economy. Although there are several and recognized antecedents to them,
36
 the 
importance of these liberation theologies for this question is fundamental and they are 
thus also a central aspect of my own research. Economic dependence and, more widely 
the Theology/Economy relationship, did not stop these theologies from considering the 
socio-existential upheaval that produced mechanized relationships or awkwardly 
                                                          
35
 Patricia Ranft, How the Doctrine of the Incarnation Shaped Western Culture (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2013). 
 
36
 See Hugo Assmann, La idolatría del mercado (San José: DEI, 1997), 30-76. 
 
13 
 
oligarchical, militaristic, racist, heterosexist and clerical.
37
  The practices of 
desegregation and ethnic brutality such theologies understood as both economic and 
theologically informed. Latin American Liberation Theologies did not consider 
“economic dependence” as if it were exterior to everyday life production.38 This allows 
us to rediscover the centrality of the carnal being as the criteria by which to assess every 
socio-historical practice. Also, this re-encounter implies we must re-read the Semite and 
Judeo-Christian traditions
 
according to the importance that these traditions assign to the 
flesh,
39
 its needs, tensions, and dreams.  The concept of economy employed is not 
reductively economic;
40
 instead, Latin American Liberation theologies understand 
economy as human activity that allows the production and reproduction of structural and 
situational life and also the distribution of death.  These theologies understood that the 
regimes of National Security,
41
 formalization of democracy, neoliberalism
42
, and surplus-
repression were an integral part of political economy and theological economy. Within 
Latin American dependent capitalism, its brutal militarism, paramilitarism, and the 
importance of the emotive and utopic load of the massive media, the program could not 
                                                          
37
 Franz Hinkelammert, Democracia y totalitarismo (San José: DEI, 1987); Sacrificios humanos y 
sociedad occidental: Lucifer y la bestia (San José: DEI, 1991). 
 
38
 José Porfirio Miranda, El Ser y el Mesías (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1973), 98-100.  
 
39
 María Clara Bingemer, “La trinidad a partir de la perspectiva de la mujer. Algunas pautas para 
la reflexión,” en  El rostro femenino de la teología. San José: DEI, 1986; Franz Hinkelammert, La fe de 
Abraham y el Edipo occidental (San José: DEI, 1991); Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
 
40
 See Diego Soto, “Cartografías del poder en las Teologías Latinoamericanas de la Liberación (I): 
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be exclusively economic, that is to say, reductively economic or political.
43
 It could not 
be, and it is not.  At the same time, this reflection supposed the necessity of beginning a 
critique of the concept of violence and also of peace. From these roots has been 
developed a theology of life, as form of life. This is, a theology that does not allow the 
separation between form and way of life; which instead affirms that in every way of life 
the same possibility of life is played out, and that precisely for that reason, it is 
understood as a practice of caring for flesh. 
Unfolding this characteristic supposes a consideration of democracy, and of 
diverse forms of life, that include a semiotic or economy of the signs in the cultural 
industry and new technologies.  Within this thematic field it has to be explained the 
relationship between neoliberalism, the reversion of human rights, and the weakening 
and/or rupture of world consensus that impede the permanent recurrence of the state of 
exception. Liberation theologies had signaled that, with the association between 
neoliberalism and restrictive democracies, we suffer a permanent rupture of juridical or 
constitutional order.
44
 This is developed as a critique of the law. Also of as affirmation of 
social and cultural mobilizations that confront the irrationality of law. In the same way 
are developed the psychic and affective foundations of political economy.
45
 This has 
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taken the shape of different analysis of the social institutions, which includes the critique 
of health, and the repression and formation institutions.  
Within this type of analysis are unfolded approaches towards biotechnologies, 
natural, and computational sciences since these are central, and will become even more 
so, in the epistemological and political structuring of the world.  These discussions are 
connected to the colonial womb from where our present is gestated.  All of that is not to 
deny the effective and worthy contributions of these sciences for a good life on our 
planet, but rather to insert them in an economy based upon the care of flesh. One aspect 
that is also central is the limits of the gift and along with that, the ambivalence and the 
contradictions of every human project.
46
  This reflection on the gift has allowed the 
ability to outline the option for the impoverished as a start or wager that signals that 
whoever opts has also noticed his or her own impoverishment.  Opting for the 
impoverished and that they opt for themselves does not guarantee more than the event of 
mutual recognition that authorizes us not to become deprived of space and time. It is 
about bringing out the option for the impoverished from the moral demands or that which 
diverts it from a divine foundation and welcomes it as an excess, something that, because 
of its radicalism, breaks all expectations: a messianic irruption.  
That is why the concept of praxis does not refer exclusively to the betterment of 
economic dependence but instead also to the interrogation of political economy’s 
understanding of life and death and its mythic frameworks.
47
 Then, the analysis of Latin 
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American Liberation theologies is social and economic because there are no analyses that 
are not social and do not possess economic ideals. That is to say, every theology 
expresses social traumas and enjoyments and tries to transform or reproduce them.  What 
is central, then, is the discernment of theological economy and political economy from 
the criteria of carnal life and not simply the possession of the means of production or the 
rise of productivity, even though these discussions are also offered and important.   I 
offer my discussion on the economy of the flesh as both specification and deepening of 
the practical space instituted by Latin American Liberation Theologies. My investigation 
has an ex post facto position with these theologies: I offer a reading that supposes their 
contributions in order to develop a response to the theological weight that we carry in our 
skin.   
There are other discussions and debates that can be considered complementary or 
parallel to those offered by Latin American Liberation Theologies. Some of those other 
debates introduce suggestive questions
48
 that were made possible by important 
contributions
49
 that concentrated on historical and epistemological problems. The 
discussion of such topics has usually continued to clarify the epistemic nature of theology 
and economics.
50
 Also, there have been attempts to trace the historical trajectories of 
political economy from the perspective of its theological character.
51
 More recently there 
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have been attempts to reposition the question of the relationship between theology and 
economics through a wider understanding of economy
52
 that nevertheless does not 
develop fully the implications of the metabolism of political economy and theology. 
Where there is an attempt to embrace the contributions of Latin American Liberation 
Theologies the discussion is better situated and has important insight for the local 
discussions in United States.
53
 There are studies
54
 that have focused on the relationship 
between theology, class, race, land, and colonialism that should be considered 
fundamental to the consideration of the economy of the flesh. These studies show an 
adequate comprehension of the constitutive links that give form to the “all-
encompassing” process through which God, the market, and the nation-state devour flesh 
in order to satisfy their desire for death and wealth.   
 
The Joke’s Space: David Hume and Adam Smith 
This investigation is a study of the relationship between theories of nature and 
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political economy
55
 in the philosophies of David Hume (1711-1776)
56
 and Adam Smith.  In 
the context of their philosophies there appear modes of creation of truth and re-
characterization of power and humanity that condense and express the result of long 
historical transitions, and which make possible the emergence of specific ideals of 
fidelity, modes of individuation, and civilization. For theology this study has importance 
on a fundamental level. This investigation requires us to ask a set of questions: What is 
the theological? What and how is it possible to become incorporated into a collectivity? 
What are the relationships between flesh and economy? From these questions a 
fundamental theological question arises:  from which positions is it possible to 
interrogate the notion of flesh? My study attempts to understand how these questions 
were directly and indirectly addressed. The study shows the immanent functioning of the 
philosophical device that configures sets of responses with its distinctions, methods, and 
aims. 
The relationship of nature and economy delineates and reinforces modes of 
production of a world whose density and dissemination require a pause in our thinking. 
The exploration of how the concept of nature and economy are established as a 
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theoretical configuration of an epoch and its heterogeneous components allows us to 
think about the descent or spirit of the ways in which we inscribe our activities in the 
world. Thus, what is presented here is a double confrontation: first with the particularity 
that that relationship acquired in the eighteenth century, and second with a field of 
notions that exceed the specificity of that historical period. It has to be said that the 
development of the economy of the flesh is part of a process in which the invisible God 
reveals itself: 
The beginning and end of the paradox that is gnostic religion is the unknown God 
himself who, unknowable on principle, because the “other” to everything Known, 
is yet the object of a Knowledge and even asks to be known. He as much invites 
as he thwarts the quest for knowing him; in the failure of reason and speech 
becomes revealed; and the very account of the failure yields the language for 
naming him.
57
 
 Hume and Smith effectively developed their philosophies from within the space 
opened by this God who completely reveals itself to become an object of knowledge. 
Hume and Smith understood that God was fully present in the social dynamics and 
historical trajectories of their societies. Their God was entirely subsumed by the 
epistemic, political, and economic mechanisms that made possible commercial society. 
They requested entire faith in this God, a faith that cannot be accessed or negated through 
reason. As part of this faith they required obedience and the willingness to die.  Their 
philosophy was understood as a form through which to secure society and God. They 
argued that any attempt to transform society was a direct offense against God. The 
reverse is also true: embracing the given organization of life implied a full relationship 
with God. Knowing society and “the human nature” thus was understood as the study of 
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general and particular providence
58
 and the manifestation of eternity within history. Then, 
with Hume and Smith the dictum: “Sed mortem carnis homo timet, mortem animae 
pauci”59 transforms into its opposite: no one has to be particularly concerned with the 
death of flesh. Nevertheless, Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy is not merely a rejection of 
flesh and embracing of spirit. Their project consists of incorporating flesh within the 
multiplicity of spirited bodies that constitute commercial society. Hence, instead of an 
absolute dualism Hume and Smith propose a subsumed duality in which flesh wants to be 
assumed and not simply wasted or left behind. 
1.        Economy of the Flesh. The Economic Object: The field of notions 
mentioned above must be revisited as a part of the intention to interrupt and/ or prolong 
the gestures, dispositions, and techniques that for us mark divisions, limits, and, in the 
end, the general area of the possible and impossible. If this investigation is dedicated to 
the elaboration of this discussion, it is because I consider that, within the relationship of 
nature and economy in David Hume and Adam Smith, a notion and procedure exists 
which is partially unnoticed or unattended and that must be investigated as a part of the 
theological activity. I am referring to the notion and procedure of the economy of the 
flesh. Throughout this study I present the economy of flesh as notion and as procedure. 
By notion I am referring to the fact that in spite of its dense presence within the 
discussions offered here, economy of the flesh remains diluted and not completely 
exposed. The notional use of economy of the flesh shows that it is possible to approach 
written devices and apparatus from it. My claim is that economy and flesh is presented as 
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a set of categories that, in their articulation, can help me to grasp some of the densest 
aspects of political economy and theology. The context that is discussed here presents an 
important moment in which flesh is integrated, even if not completely, within economy. 
As procedure economy of the flesh refers to social, cultural, and political practices that 
have flesh as their economic object.  
2.  Economy of the Flesh. The Economization of Dispersion and Chaos:   The 
conjunction of a theory of understanding and a theory of human sentiments that includes 
aspects of “sciences of life” and of economic theory produces an unstable figure. While 
heterogeneous in its composition it is certainly still recognizable and graspable. For the 
administration of that which is considered human as a producer of value, more precisely 
the creation of humans themselves, an economy with a more precise and more radical 
focus is fundamental. This foundational economy is an economy of the flesh; that is to 
say an economy of the dispersion, chaos, and abyss that is imagined to be at the root of 
the constitution of humans. This imaginary is related to theological proposals
60
 that 
identified human nature and social government and thus identified rebellion or 
discomfort with “civil government” with carnal hybris.   That imagined root is what is 
explored by and through the relationship between nature and economy in David Hume 
and Adam Smith. Economy of the flesh is expressed through theological gestures. Those 
which are more significant are exposed within the interstices of the relationship between 
nature and economy. 
3.        Economy of the Flesh. Happiness and Enjoyment:  Through the notion 
economy of the flesh it is possible to grasp a sui generis presentation of the plasticity and 
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hardness of social relationships. I shall mention two interrelated components of this 
figure. First, this economy implies the contention of the State as a power that directly 
intervenes in common life. I argue that in the economy of flesh what is primordial for the 
commonwealth or enjoyment of social life is a permanent process of self-knowledge or 
personal introspection in order to adjust oneself to the traditions that structure and make 
common and personal existence possible. The agent, spectator, or producer has to create 
itself in community and through the traditions of its community and its only possibility to 
achieve it is through the acceptance of its nature. With that the intervention of the State--
its naked power--is contained. While the subject is open to and actually does take care of 
herself, to subsume her flesh into her body, it establishes limits to “direct politics” of 
control. Second, the care that I referred to before is in itself a form of government and 
individuation. 
4.     Economy of the Flesh. Terror and Prisons: The lack or absence of will 
and desire to practice this form of care (development of life) permits or justifies the 
operation of institutions whose purpose is to protect and immunize the general economy 
of society from madmen, bare man, and savages. In this case these direct operations are 
not considered an abnormality, but rather are understood as a fundamental component of 
civilization. Hence, the Imperial expansion toward “uncivilized” territories follows, at 
least to some extent, under the pretext of human protection. That is to say that expansion, 
in its broadest sense, is a constitutive feature of the economy of flesh. In order to 
radically limit this expansion, at least in territories constituted by beings considered 
humans, focal webs were created that prepared and made possible the execution of the 
techniques and regulations that conform the nature of humanity. These webs or networks 
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could be discontinued or affected in important ways, but their essence, expressed in and 
throughout the most elemental everyday practices, is disseminated and established in 
such a way that, even when ruptures happen, its scars or dense residuum remain. 
5.      Economy of the Flesh. The Fabric of Life: Thus, it is in the production of 
oneself where the sedimentation of the relationship between nature and economy is 
expressed with most intensity. More precisely, and in the case of David Hume and Adam 
Smith, the privileged ambit to discuss this relationship is inside the ambiguities and 
paradoxes that are implied in notions like agent, woman, or human. Furthermore, what is 
implied is an interrogation about what can be considered as a life, as well as the 
possibilities of internally and externally modifying that life. 
6.      Economy of the Flesh. The Knit: The path followed in this investigation 
makes it possible to emphasize, create, or recreate problems for theological activity. This 
is an exercise that requires theology to interrogate itself. It is clear that what is necessary 
is to call into question the categories, modes of creation, sedimentation, and semiotic 
communication within which theology is developed and expressed. It is necessary to 
examine hegemonic uses of language and categories, their processes of formation and 
expansion, in order at the very least to locate the conditions of possibility to reopen the 
world. What is important in the discussion proposed here is to locate the form in which 
those social processes from the eighteenth century were thought and exposed; hence this 
investigation concentrates on the elucidation of the basic characters of the theoretical 
form through which those processes were thought. The investigation shows that for a 
radical comprehension of eighteenth-century economic theory it becomes necessary to go 
through a configuration formed by the notions nature and economy. Economic theory 
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expresses its most elemental consequences when it is studied as an epistemic formulation 
of experiences composed by different catalysts. 
For Hume and Smith, although it has specific characteristics economic theory is 
not a discrete area within their inquiries on human understanding and sentiments, for 
instance. Both, Hume and Smith produced interventions in which understanding, 
morality, critique of religion, passions, and market commerce, are assumed to be 
relatively continuous. By relative continuity is meant that their institution is radically 
related and that their functionality requires each other, that these “differentiated 
practices” form part of a unity.  My research traces how, in Hume and Smith, this 
configuration operates, how problems are created and resolved within it, and what are 
their strategies or procedures of sedimentation. Regarding the latter, I ask: How do these 
authors understand transitions between nature and economy? What are the bridges that 
allow them to move between the elements of this configuration in spite of the contentions 
that each element implies for the other? In this configuration each element confers to the 
other expansive possibilities as well as contentions or interruptions. 
The Humean critique of metaphysics and Smith's theory of moral sentiments has a 
tense relationship with their economic theory; they try to resolve this tension in different 
ways over the course of their writings. I show here the motives of these tensions, the 
ways in which they are expressed, and their provisional resolutions. The rise of the 
political economy corresponds or belongs to a larger context and movement in which one 
of its most important features is the creation of that which is considered human and the 
production of criteria to give death. If humans are also an epistemic presentation, then it 
is important to trace its location within the longue durée through which this presentation 
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becomes intelligible and acquires the status of tradition. How is a relationship possible 
between Hume´s philosophy of identity and Smith´s thought on human affectivity given 
their respective theories of commerce? Moreover, in their philosophies, how do they 
approach the constrictions that the “division of labor” causes in humans? 
For the discussion of the two previous questions it is of fundamental importance 
to think about the trajectory and internal articulation of three notions that delineate the 
philosophical context of the political economy of Hume and Smith. I am referring to the 
notions of spirit, the wretched, and suicide. From the consideration of these notions and 
other notions one can notice that there are several theoretical connections that make 
possible the transition from a radically affective imaginary, in which instability 
predominates, to a form of organization that requires constancy, rhythm, and permanent 
intensity. The division of labor, as Smith presents it, is possible just through the 
recognition of implicit agreements or covenants in which “things,” spaces, and times are 
considered as inert or disposable. 
The notions of common life and agent are the philosophical counterparts of the 
notions of division and thing. This question delimits a problem: if division and thing are 
in relative contradiction with fluidity and affection, it is necessary to think about in which 
ways they are philosophically inserted or subsumed in order to coexist. Is it perhaps that 
Hume's and Smith's understandings of happiness and commonwealth allow them to create 
an alternative to resolve the contradiction between radical affection, ranks and division of 
labor? 
If for Hume and Smith “subjectivity” is fundamentally the condition of being 
sensually affected by the permanent flux of phenomena over which one does not possess 
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control, it is necessary to investigate which is the philosophical gesture from where both 
authors bring the idea of a subject that participates in the market economy as producer, 
seller, and consumer. This question is related to a specific problematic: if freedom is, for 
Hume and Smith, above all related to movement it is necessary to think about to what 
extent the market's subject is able to move. Hume had developed intense metaphors to 
express his comprehension of freedom as disclosure or openness. Moreover, for Hume 
freedom of necessity implies the idea of expansion without direction. The legal figure of 
the prisoner and the economic figure of the market's subject if read together bring 
together elements to elucidate the relationship between the critique of epistemic 
predominance of the subject and the affirmation of the subject that is necessary within the 
division of labor. 
Hume and Smith specify repeatedly that the human or agent lacks intrinsic 
possibilities that allow it to control itself. Hence, it is also unable to take possession of the 
world which permanently affects it. The human agent must, if it aspires to have a basic 
level of stability, acknowledge its precariousness and criticize its epistemic 
representations. What is important here is not the epistemological contradiction implied 
in this explanation but rather the question of how these authors put aside this abysmal 
human agent? What I see as a problem in this question are the elemental assumptions that 
fulfill the vacuum between a weak comprehension of subjectivity and the other's (the 
market's subject) incandescence. 
From the previous question I estimate that it is possible to: 1) reconstruct the 
internal scheme in which these figures of “subjectivity” are mobilized, 2) relate them 
with their context of elaboration in order to show their historical productivity, 3) establish 
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criteria that make connections between thematic fields in order to demonstrate the 
contours of the economy of the flesh. In Hume and Smith the activity of thinking 
presupposes a set of conditions that are intimately related to “sentimental education:” 
literacy, sobriety, worldly asceticism, and elegance. These conditions are, at the same 
time, connected to the division of labor, slavery, and commercial society. What is the 
reverse (residuum that is philosophically canceled) in this education? This question 
points to a new problematic: if the thinking activity arises from the “sentimental 
education,” then it is fundamentally a form of cleaning of a “soil” that has been partially 
pulverized.  It is necessary to think how and under what conditions that thinking can 
become a sort of cleaning or immunizing device. Which other forms of thinking are 
present even in Hume and Smith? I suggest that in both authors there are mechanisms of 
tempering that are never fully developed. Within the relationship of nature and economy, 
these mechanisms offer analytical insights to think about the economy of the flesh. 
Organization of Chapters 
The first chapter reconstructs the basic contents of the economic theory, theory of 
nature, and theological proposals of the eighteenth century. Thus, it highlights the 
disputes, agreements, and programs that constitute the “economic field” and, at the same 
time, points to the aspects that remain within its limits. What is important to show is how 
this field was established, what were its rules, and its functioning as a field of knowledge. 
Next I discuss the argument that affirms that in the eighteenth century, economy was a 
form of knowledge dedicated to the clarification of the conditions of possibility for the 
production and reproduction of life. That is the reason why its most important variables 
are health/disease, population/fertility, and desire/passions and death. The center of these 
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variables is the concept of life.  
Thus, economic theory was established as knowledge about and for life. It is 
precisely this understanding that eighteenth-century economic theory and theories of 
nature. The investigations of Hume and Smith are contextualized within this 
understanding of economy; they modify and expand it. The second part of the chapter 
presents the debates that surrounded and gave shape to the notion of nature at the end of 
the seventeenth century (Boyle) and during the eighteenth century. Three fundamental 
tendencies are discussed. First, the tendency that criticizes the presentation of nature as 
an independent agent, capable of controlling itself, and being self-explanatory. This 
tendency affirms, at the same time, that laws structure nature but that these laws are 
independent from nature's phenomenology. The second tendency, which can be 
synthesized under the notion “animal oeconomy,” presented and analyzed the 
composition of bodies, the relationship between its components, and its proper care. 
Finally, the notion of nature is considered as it was expressed within theological 
interventions. In this case nature designates more than a thematic content, a history of 
nature. Within theological discussions nature was thought of as an effect whose 
consequences could be known and judged. 
The last part of the chapter offers a contextualization of some literary and 
theological motifs that were of great influence throughout the eighteenth century.  I am 
referring specifically to the motif of the pilgrim and its reverse in Hume’s biography. I 
argue that Hume’s autobiography and its reception by Adam Smith is a key to 
understanding their philosophical ideals and its economy of the flesh.  
The second chapter concentrates on discussing three notions: spirit, woman, and 
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flesh. I read Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy in continuity with the concepts of “Spiritual 
Police” and “Spiritual Empire.” Thus, I suggest that their philosophies are guardians of the 
Spirit’s condensations and actualizations. At its deepest level their philosophies belong to the 
struggle between spirit and flesh. The notions of woman and spirit I read within the 
analytical space opened by Hume’s and Smith’s understanding of their epoch as 
culmination of all historical possibilities.
 
Through the discussion of these notions it will 
be possible to understand the stages of development of the notion of nature and economy 
in David Hume and Adam Smith. Nature does not refer uniquely to human nature but to 
the entire realm of biological life as it is also an actualization of the spirit. Regarding the 
notion of women, the chapter follows a strategy of explanation that could be called 
genetic. The strategy consists of showing how this notion appears as a counterpoint to 
discussions on, for instance, security, law, and manners. In this way the term woman is 
grasped both as a political, economic, and a biological concept that expresses the danger 
of disorder, non-productivity, and unregulated imagination. Nature, in this context, is 
equivalent to constancy and organization. Woman has different levels of significance. 
This chapter focuses on the imaginary that presents the woman as a producer of 
operations that are necessary for the survival of society.  
The third chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents a 
methodological discussion in which I propose a way to read Hume. I show how there is 
a fundamental tension within Hume’s philosophy, particularly in his considerations of 
selfhood and the conditions that make sociability possible.  Hume’s philosophical 
tension introduces the conditions that made economy of the flesh necessary. Those 
conditions are eminently practical and oriented to the protection and security of common 
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life. My reading emphasizes that, although it is important to understand political 
economy, it is insufficient to understand Hume as proposing an ethical or an economic 
theory with hidden metaphysical components. Instead, Hume’s philosophy is 
constitutively theological. Following this thesis, the second part of the chapter reviews 
and discusses the importance of Christian practices in Hume’s thinking. I argue that 
Hume did not try to depart from Christianity in order to construct his philosophy. 
Moreover, his philosophical project remained within the ambit opened by certain 
Christian motifs and questions. In order to present Hume’s economy of the flesh, in the 
third part of the chapter I offer a reading of the question of suicide. Hume’s treatment of 
the question of suicide reinforces and develops his theological discussions as well as 
connects them to his economic thinking.  
Furthermore, his entire philosophical enterprise is possible because of the 
internal connections that he makes between subjects such as suicide and true philosophy. 
This is so because Hume’s science of man has the pretention of incorporating every 
aspect of human existence within a matrix, including commercial society and its division 
of labor and ranks. Hume believes and longs for a type of universality that does not 
negate the participation of an Almighty creator. 
Throughout Chapter Four, I demonstrate that there is no contradiction between 
moral and economic theory. Furthermore, I show that the continuity of morality and 
economy is possible due to Smith’s understanding of God. Smith’s project effectively has 
as its center the assumption of God’s immanent participation in history. From this 
assumption comes his proposal of an economy of the flesh. I argue that Smith’s 
understanding of flesh presents a fundamental interpenetration of theology and economic 
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theory. For him, flesh is a vicious element that must be incarnated within the human body 
and the social and political body.  
One of Smith’s basic ideas is that human beings naturally tend to surpass or 
overcome the limits of their nature. Although this can appear at first sight to be a 
contradiction, for Smith nature is in permanent digression with itself. The eccentricity of 
human nature, its rebellion against itself, is what makes it possible even for the “greatest 
ruffian” to experience a discomfort within himself. This natural discomfort is the result of 
a “clash:” while trying to affirm and preserve its own life, human nature also at the same 
time manifests “sorrow from the sorrow of others.”  Human nature splits itself, tries to 
affirm its individuality but, at the same time, moves itself towards the other by attempting 
to carry itself beyond its “own person.” Thus this clash and division is experienced by the 
person as a manifestation of the tendencies of his or her nature. The person does not have 
control of these movements that modify his or her existence from its core. 
In the last chapter I reflect on a theology of the flesh, which, I maintain, continues 
to have a primary role in the constitution and development of economic, political, and 
social practices. One of the objectives of this chapter is to offer a thorough discussion of 
the most basic elements of a theology of the flesh. The concept that organizes and guides 
my presentation is birth, a presentation that departs from and is a response to Hume’s and 
Smith’s economy of the flesh. My response takes into account a complex of questions 
that come from their philosophy. First, Hume’s and Smith’s economy of the flesh 
expresses a judgment about the value of live. Throughout their philosophies Hume and 
Smith distinguish between forms of life in order to create the conditions and limits of 
recognizability. Thus, at the heart of their theories is not just the question of nature and 
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wealth but the instauration of a frame to determine whether or not something can become 
life or, more precisely, when something can be recognized as another being both equal 
and different. Both of them insist that barbarians, savages, madmen, criminals, and 
“hysterics” should not be recognized as fully human but nevertheless economically 
important sometimes.  
Second, within this question of the institution of humanity and civilization there is 
a moment of positive affirmation: both Hume and Smith developed their philosophies 
within the imaginary realm of a theologically grounded and oriented world. Because of 
this, they sanctioned that the presence of God, its incarnation in their society, functions 
also as a judgment about social relationships and political projects. As a result of this they 
tend to equalize God’s economy, nature’s economy, and humanity. The acceptance or 
negation of social identifications is understood by Hume and Smith as a theological 
problem.  
Third, in order to be recognized and integrated within civilized society it is 
indispensable to focus of oneself and economize the surplus life that exceeds the basic 
and necessary requirements of the productive body. The enemy of a civilized person is 
within oneself. Therefore, one has to exercise a permanent vigilance over oneself in order 
to remain within the limits of the theological society. It is important to say that this 
requirement of keeping watch over oneself is not presented as a purely repressive 
mechanism. On the contrary, Hume and Smith present this mechanism as one of the 
conditions of possibility for the achievement of social and personal satisfaction. 
Fourth, Hume and Smith do not merely reject or suppress flesh. Both of them 
acknowledge that a fleshless physicality cannot be fully productive. Therefore, it is 
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considered to be a damaged and useless life. Hume and Smith propose the empire of the 
body over the flesh.  
Fifth, the economic circuit of production and distribution has to be understood as 
a relationship between bodies that fully embrace their social identifications and ranks. 
The affirmation of the body and its materiality are part of Hume’s and Smith’s idea of the 
nature of faith. Being a useful, productive, sympathetic, and healthy body is one of the 
conditions for entering the Kingdom of God.  
In Hume and Smith I found a mode of thinking that subsumes theological 
procedures and categories in order to overcome the uncertainty and mobility of the world. 
They reemphasize the idea that flesh is a constitutive part of human beings that should be 
studied, controlled, and put to the service of a transcendence that makes possible the 
production and reproduction of both biological and social life. Flesh is that moveable 
force and element that is both universal and particular. It expresses itself in individuals 
and institutions. Its movements and trajectories are, at their core, opposed to God’s will 
and economy. This position has served as a framework to display theoretical positions 
that make equivalences between justice and punishment, economic wellness and 
starvation, and domination and happiness. Nevertheless, Hume and Smith also present 
their tensions and longings. Their philosophy does not hide its passion and political 
limits. Throughout their discussions there are several openings and cuts that enable ways 
to develop their labyrinths. Both of them introduce a struggle in which nature fights 
against itself. Indeed, flesh is confronted with nature’s economy in order to accelerate 
exchange, self-interest, and courage. Also, one has to encrypt the intensity of one's 
sentimentality for the sake of being a God’s creature. Thus, being a subject presupposes 
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being under God’s punishment and enjoying it.  
Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy introduces the dream of consolation and the 
desire of retaining the most prominent features of commercial society, the vulnerability 
and contradictions of the flesh. Even when they affirm their society with is subterranean 
horrors and bloody wars, there is an explicit questioning about their own fantasies that 
even if is not completely developed, gives us a glimpse about the interstices and ruptures 
of their paradise. There are several subtractions that Hume and Smith cannot completely 
grasp and normalize. Colonization and social domination are partially exposed by them, 
despite their intentions. There is a sense of terror and comedy in Hume’s and Smith’s 
philosophy that informs the present dissertation. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
               The Subversion of the Pilgrim: Hume’s Flesh  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct the basic content of economic theory 
in eighteenth-century European contexts, particularly in England and Scotland. This 
reconstruction highlights the disputes, agreements, and programs that constitute the 
“economic field” and, at the same time, points to some of related the aspects that remain 
outside of its limits.  Most important, I show how this field was established, its rules, and 
its functioning as a field of knowledge. My intention is not to establish the influence of 
Hume's and Smith's theories but to trace their contexts of development. 
 Following that, I plan to discuss the argument which affirms that in the eighteenth 
century economy was a form of knowledge dedicated to the clarification of the conditions 
of possibility for the production and reproduction of life or, more precisely, particular 
styles of living life and the requisites of its reproduction. That is the reason why three of 
its most important variables are soul, spirit, and sin. The heart of one of these variables is 
the assumption that economy as an organization of the land, population, exchange, 
industries, time, space, needs, and goods requires a previous economic act whose 
operation is in part made possible through theological categories. Thus, economic theory 
was established as knowledge about and for life, a knowledge that was contiguous with 
theological traditions.1 
 I shall differentiate my argument from one founded in Edmund Burke (1729-
                                                          
1
 Franz  Hinkelammert, Las armas ideológicas de la muerte (San José: DEI, 1981); Hugo 
Assmann, A idolatria do mercado. Um ensaio sobre economia e teologia; Giorgio Agamben, Il regno e la 
Gloria: Per una genealogia teologica dell´economia e del governo. Homo Sacer II, 2 (Torino: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 2009); Nanine Charbonnel, Comme une seul homme: Corps Politique & Corps Mystique, 2 
Volumes (Lons-Le-Sauner: Aréopage, 2010). 
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1797) in which religion is described as being necessary in order to settle and develop 
civil government. His approach has as a basic assumption that religion is merely an 
instrument of political and economic practices, something that can be used or dismissed 
according to autonomous volition.2 It is not just the instrumentation of religion or 
theological categories that I show and discuss here but an assemblage of categories, 
practices, and imaginations.   
 It is precisely this understanding that links economic theory and theories of nature 
in the eighteenth century. The investigations of Hume and Smith are contextualized 
within this understanding of economy; they modify and expand it. 
 The second part of the chapter presents the debates that surrounded and gave 
shape to the notion of nature from the end of the seventeenth century and during the 
eighteenth century. The question of nature, its definition, appropriation, and multiple 
representations3 was in itself a determinant factor in the shaping of the new worlds that 
came with the conquest and invention of the Americas.4 
 Three fundamental tendencies will be discussed. First, I discuss the tendency that 
criticizes the presentation of nature as an independent agent, capable of controlling itself, 
                                                          
2      Edmund Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society or, A view of the Miseries and Evils arising 
to Mankind from Every Species of Artificial Society. In a Letter to Lord by a late Noble Writer, The Second 
Edition with a New Preface (London: Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, in Pall-Mall; and Sold by M. Cooper, 
in Pater-noster-row, 1757). 
 
3      René Sigrist, La Nature à l' épreuve: Les débuts de l'expérimentation à Genève (Paris: 
Classiques Garnier, 2011);  David  J. Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of 
Enlightenment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005); Guillermo Bonfil Batalla,  México 
profundo: Una civilización negada (México, D.F: Grijalbo-Conaculta, 1990); Luis Rivera Pagán, 
Evangelización y violencia: La conquista de América (San Juan: Ediciones Cemí, 1990). 
 
4      Antonello Gerbi, La nature delle Indie Nova: Da Cristoforo Colombo a Gonzalo Fernández 
de Oviedo (Milan: Ricardo Ricciardi, 1975); La disputa del Nuovo Mondo. Storia di una polemica. 1750-
1900 (Milano-Napoli: Ricardo Ricciardi, 1955), Edmundo O'Gorman, La invención de América (México, 
D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995 [1958]); Andrea Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American 
Indian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005). 
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and being self-explanatory. This tendency affirms, at the same time, that laws structure 
nature but that these laws are independent of nature's phenomenology. 
 The second tendency that can be synthesized under the notion “animal oeconomy 
presented and analyzed the composition of bodies, concentrating on the relationship 
between their components and their proper care. 
 Finally, the chapter considers the notion of nature as it was expressed using 
explicitly theological categories. In this case, nature designates more than content, but 
also history. That is to say that within theological discussions nature was thought of as an 
effect whose consequences could be known and judged. This entire section of the chapter 
is not only informative but also argumentative. In it I demonstrate that an idea such as 
that of eighteenth-century science, in its multiple expressions, was completely separated 
from other modes of understanding that do not constitute knowledge about the period nor 
its dynamics.5 
 I also demonstrate that an adequate understanding of Hume and Smith's theories 
as well as an understanding of the transition from the previous sections of the chapter 
requires a consideration of its location within its material conditions of possibility, its 
relationship with different forms of time, space, body administration, domesticity, and 
“private life”. These conditions are a permanent and dense presence throughout Hume 
and Smith's considerations.  They offer a horizon and delineate the boundaries of their 
compromises. In demonstrating this, I affirm that occupation, domination, and certain 
forms of freedom have been an integral part of observation and reflection, part of the 
creation of modes of measurement and verification, specifically being instruments or 
                                                          
5     Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London-New York: Verso, 2000 
[1974]). 
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cognitive schemata that describe or measure them. To Denis Diderot´s (1713-1784) 
distinction between two forms or expressions of philosophy, the experimental and the 
rational,6 I incorporate a necessity: reason and experiment are processes of 
experimentation and reasoning, activities linked to larger and more intricate dynamisms 
and conflicts.7 
 I shall discuss one particular question within this part of the chapter, namely the 
form in which biographies are arranged to match or fulfill ideals about nature and 
economy. By this I mean that the biographical accounts offered by Hume and Smith are 
effectuations of the relationship between nature and economy as will be described in the 
successive chapters. In their biographical accounts, it is possible to recognize patterns and 
tensions that are proper to the economic movements that I shall name economy of the 
flesh. 
1. Political anatomy, arithmetic, and souls 
 The gravitational center of William Petty's varied writings (1623-1687)8 is 
theological. Thus, in his Some Essays in Political Arithmetick9, as a footnote to Robert 
                                                          
6     Diderot, “L' Interpétration de la nature (1753-1765). Idées III,” in Oeuvres Complètes Tome IX 
ed. critique et annotée, présentée par Jean Varloot (Paris: Hermann, 1975), 27ff. 
 
7     As it is also demonstrated by Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism: A Counter-History trans. 
Gregory Elliot (London-New York: Verso, 2011 [2006]). 
 
8    For an introduction of Petty's importance for 18th Century political economy see Shigemi 
Muramatsu, “Andrew Fletcher's criticism of commercial civilization and his plan for European federal 
union” The Rise of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment ed. Tatsuya Sakamoto and Hideo 
Tanaka (London-New York: Routledge, 2003), 8-21. 
 
9    The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty. Together with the Observations upon the Bills of 
Mortality more probably by Captain John Graunt. Ed. Charles Henry Hull. Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1899), 466ff. Originally printed for Robert Clavel at the Peacock, and Henry Mortlock at 
the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church Yard. 1699. About Political Arithmetic Adam Smith said, in a letter to 
George Chalmers, that: “You Know that I have little faith in Political Arithmetic” The Correspondence of 
Adam Smith, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross 2nd Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1987), 288. 
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Southwell (1635-1702), an explanation appears of the interconnections between abstract 
calculation, statistics, and the theological theme of resurrection. Moreover, his 
understanding of his own activity as a writer is that of service to God.   This service has a 
specific characteristic: it does not include a division between “arithmetic,” the study of 
the history of population, and religious doctrine. 
 For Petty it is necessary and possible to demonstrate that there is no contradiction 
between the study of such phenomena as population and “what the Holy Scriptures have 
delivered.”10 Through tables, numbers, and measurements the earth is enlarged to be 
capable of receiving what is invisible, promised, and incalculable.  The resurrection of 
the dead is inscribed in another economy (“arithmetick”); furthermore political arithmetic 
becomes a component of the Christian economy: a new economic ambit is created 
through this procedure; calculus became necessary to embrace resurrection. 
 Outside the habits of the complex of operations that Petty developed to attack 
“some Scepticks,”11 the invisible and unreachable appear to lose significance or potency.  
At the same time however, political arithmetic loses its body without the invisible. It is 
important to mention another aspect of these operations: economics understood now as 
the space in which salvation and measurement intercept each other, makes the creation of 
taxonomies, projections, and comparisons about populations necessary; this focus on 
population, having as a background the resurrection of the dead, results in a question 
about the subsistence of the commonwealth.12 The resurrection of the dead, the 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 478. Emphasis in the original. 
 
11 Ibid., 466. Emphasis in the original. 
 
12 “A Treatise of Ireland, 1687” Ibid., 545ff. 
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preparation of the earth in order to receive God's promise, creates the necessity for a 
rigorous and detailed production and administration of lives or, as Petty said, souls.  This 
idea is fully explained in his earlier work A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions.13 This 
text shows that political economy, since its early development, has acknowledged that 
money, soul, and territory are intimately connected: 
A third branch of the Publick Charge is, that of the Pastorage of men Souls, and 
the guidance of their Consciences; which, one would think (because it respects 
another world, and but the particular interest of each man there) should not be a 
publick Charge in this: Nevertheless, if we consider how easie it is to elude the 
Laws of man, to commit unproveable crimes, to corrupt and divert Testimonies, to 
wrest the sense and meaning  of the Laws, etc. there follows a necessity of 
contributing towards a publick Charge, wherewith to have men instructed in the 
Laws of God, that take notice of evil thoughts and designs, and much more of 
secret deeds, and that punisheth eternally in another world, what man can but 
slightly chastise in this.14 
 
What is at stake here is not just a theory of taxation but recognition of the 
immanent characterof theology that serves a transcendent order: the existent world is 
understood as having a constitution that requires security, protection, and maintenance. 
The Christian practices, and not only their theological manifestations are presented as 
security and productive devices; whose function can depend on the public because they 
themselves are part of the conditions of possibility for the existence of the public or 
commonwealth. 
 The care of human souls must be considered as having two constitutive elements. 
                                                          
13
 A Treatise of Taxes & Contributions, shewing the Nature and Measures of Crown Lands, 
Assessments, Customs, Poll-Money, Lotteries, Benevolence, Penalties, Monopolies, Offices, Tythes, Raising 
of Coins, Harth-Money, Excize, etc. With several intersperst Discourses and Digressions concerning 
Warres, The Church, Universities, Rents & Purchases, Usury & Exchange, Banks & Lombards, Registries 
for Conveyances, Beggars, Ensurance, Exportation of Money & Wool, Free-ports, Coins, Housing, Liberty 
of Conscience, etc. The Same being frequently applied to the present State and Affairs of Ireland (London: 
Printed for N. Brooke, at the Angel in Cornhill, 1662). 
14   Ibid., 2-3. 
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First, as I mentioned previously, theological themes have more than a metaphorical place 
within Petty's work. This implies that the care of the soul is a not just a technique but a 
field of knowledge,15 and with him, intrinsically part of discussions about commerce and 
trade.  Here the notion of soul designates both individual and social manners, 
dispositions, and tendencies that are tangible and measurable (bodies) and at the same 
time intangible (evil thoughts). In Petty, the Christian guiding and caring of souls and 
economy share a common economic principle: the providential intervention of God 
condenses and manifests itself, although not entirely, in the order of laws that organize 
and sanction the activities of the city. 
 The expenditure required to produce souls is one of the axes of the tension 
between immanent and transcendental orders that cannot be resolved through 
measurements or statistics alone. The mathematical construction necessitates a 
transcendent or providential impulse. Second, for Petty this impulse is not merely 
instrumental, it is actually a call that communicates the following message: the 
government of heaven, allegedly presented in the Scriptures, incarnates itself not as a 
singular person or institution but in the anatomy of a new type of body16, a body that 
originates in the conjunction of the political and the biological bodies. Economy has as 
one of its most important tasks the increment or betterment of the soul of the body. 
                                                          
15 Fernando Vidal, Les sciences de l´ âme XVIe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Éditions Champion, 2006). 
 
16 William Petty, Political Survey of Ireland with the Eftablifhment of that Kingdom, when the late 
Duke of Ormond was Lord Lieutenant ; And alfo an exa^ LIST of the prefent Peers, Members of 
Parliament, and principal Officers of State. To which is addeJ, An Account of the Wealth and expences of 
England, and the Methodof raifing taxes in the moft equal manner; Shewing likewife that England can bear 
the Charge offour Millions per Ann. when the occaflons of the Government require it, The Second Edition, 
carefully correfted, with Additions (London: Printed for D. Browne, at the Black Swan, W. Mears, at the 
Lamb; F. Clay, at the Bible and Star, all without Temple- Bar; and F. Hooke at Flower-de- Luce, against St. 
Dunfants Church in Fleet Freet, 1719). See Preface. 
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Economy's calculations include the presupposition that the conservation of life, in so far 
as it does not contradict resurrection, must include the care of the soul. 
2. Economy, Spirit, and the Will of Death 
 If with Petty economy is clearly established as a form of knowledge that must 
combine mathematics and theology and is understood as an explanatory intervention 
about the incarnation of God's government in the world, then with James Steuart (1713-
1780) political economy17 becomes fundamentally a method by which to know and 
produce spirit in order to govern.18 According to Steuart, the spirit of a people is 
condensed and manifested in three principal spheres: morals, government, and manners. 
The explanation of Steuart’s political intentions is expressed as follows: 
In turning and working upon the spirit of a people, nothing is impossible to an 
able statesman. When people can be engaged to murder their wives and children, 
and to burn themselves, rather than submit to a foreign enemy; when they can be 
brought to give their most precious effects, their ornaments of gold and silver, for 
the support of a common cause; when women are brought to give their hair to 
make ropes, and the most decrepit old men to mount the walls of a town for its 
defence [sic]; I think I may say, that by properly conducting and managing the 
spirit of a people, nothing is impossible to be accomplished.19 
  
The Christological motif of substitution and redemptive suffering is a consequent 
movement from Petty's idea of incarnation. The people, considered as children of the 
statesman,20 offer themselves without reserve. It is crucially important to understand that 
                                                          
17 In a letter from September 3, 1772 Adam Smith says that “Without once mentioning it [Steuart's 
Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy], I flatter myself, that every false principle in it, will meet 
a clear and distinct confutation in mine” The Correspondence of Adam Smith, 164. 
 
18 The Works, Political, Metaphysical, and Chronological of the Late Sir James Steuart of 
Coltness, Bart. Now First Collected by General Sir James Steuart, Bart, his son. In Six Volumes. Vol I 
(London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. Davies, Strand, 1805), 1-22. Originally published in 1767. 
 
19 Ibid., 15. 
 
20 Ibid., 2. 
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the statesman or governor is a figura more than an individual. This figura contrasts with 
that of God, by only superficially manifesting itself as a governor.21 Here, the government 
of the people takes a decisive form: it is a tense reunion of procedures, traditions, and 
aspirations whose purpose can be achieved only through the ability to make the children 
be ready always to die or lose themselves in the movement of the people's spirit. This is 
political economy at its most radical, when it involves expenditure without return or 
recompense. If with Petty the care of souls is concentrated in the fulfillment of the law 
and its preoccupation is that of self-preservation, Steuart creates the knowledge and 
modeling of the spirit as a weapon of death. Spirit refers not only to sentimentality or 
passions but directly to a pneumatological formula: that the same Spirit, in descending or 
taking possession of disperse individuals, will be able to create a people. One Spirit, one 
people, one governor: this is not a mathematical calculation but a dream whose question 
is: How can we all die together? How can we all, without hesitation, offer ourselves to 
banishment? Who is worth enough to die for? 
 The administration of death and not the accumulation of money or prestige is the 
matrix to this understanding of spirit. In its distinct moments it implies: a) the rupture of 
the household economy, its most fundamental rules as well as its character of nucleus of 
primordial relationships. More precisely, the actions of killing wives and children and 
burning oneself confirm that a major form of sociability and government comes out of the 
sacrifice of the traditional forms of belonging and affection. The disappearance or 
annihilation of intimate ties appears to be a productive destruction for the satisfaction of 
                                                          
 21 I do not consider Steuart's political oeconomy as fictional but as theological, this is precisely 
the main difference between my analysis and that of Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy: 
Mediating Value in Eighteenth-and Nineteenth Century Britain (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), 
124-143. 
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“the people”. Men, children, women and their different performances are distinguished 
from the people that, at their core, are presented in the multiple bodies of the governor; b) 
to the notion of spirit it is necessary to oppose that of enemy; in Steuart's case he 
specifies or delimits it as foreign enemy. This opposition is based primarily on a clash of 
spirits. The enemy is the incarnation of and thus communication and expansion of a 
different spirit; a distinct way to dispose of bodies, memories, and longings. Strictly 
considered, the spirit of people cannot fully manifest itself without the battle with an 
enemy; in this battle nonetheless the expression of potency radiates from expenditure, 
pure losing. The spirit imposes itself in the act of losing its children, the victory is 
condensed in the passing off of burned bodies and absent treasures; c) the body is literally 
transformed into an offering to the spirit, and the body is in its most material form 
possible, the temple of the spirit, its absolute property. 
 The body becomes a weapon; its beauty is expressed in its decomposition as well 
as in its mutilation. The old bodies recover their usefulness as they are integrated and 
incarnated into the circuit of protection and defense; d) without paradox Steuart 
understood this process of spiritualizing the condition of the possibility of becoming a 
subject. Hence, it is necessary to expand the following definition of political economy: 
“In order to communicate an adequate idea of what I understand by political economy, I 
have explained the term, by pointing out the object of the art; which is, to provide food, 
other necessities, and employment to every one of the society.”22  This definition contains 
solely the goal of political economy but obliterates its mechanisms of production: I affirm 
that it is the relationship between spirit and subject that is actually the origin and goal of 
                                                          
22The Works, Political, Metaphysical, and Chronological of the Late Sir James Steuart of Coltness, 
Bart., 19-20. 
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political economy. That is to say that without the sedimentation of this relationship it will 
be impossible, within Steuart's political economy, to be a practice concentrated in the 
satisfaction of necessities and the coordination of labor. What moves and allows the 
permanent reproduction of political economy are not the procedures or techniques of the 
production of goods but the assumption of specific social relationships that manifest 
themselves constantly and in every quotidian situation. Instead of being just an “art” that 
attempts to provide the means of subsistence, political economy is a pneumatological 
practice that achieves the impossible within the ambit of limitations. In this regard what 
political economy provides is a space of self-identification that creates the hand,23 that 
element which makes the appropriation of nature possible. In order to reach this form of 
appropriation it is necessary to establish a common willingness to die. 
3. Bernard Mandeville: Original Sin and Fall 
 The economic field is established in both Petty and Steuart as a reflection about 
the conditions that are necessary in order to produce a soul and spirit capable of 
conducting the production of all that is required to sustain the life of a certain population. 
For these authors the economic field is an expression and development of a previous 
economic act: the administration of energies, passions, and interests24. This primeval act 
contains within itself, as one of its artifacts, theological standpoints and catalysts for 
social cohesiveness. The horizon of these authors was not to create an autonomous agent 
with the capacities to determine its own existence through the use of reason. Neither was 
                                                          
23 Karl Marx, Grundisse, 85. 
 
  24 For a broader discussion about this see Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: 
Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph Twentieth Anniversary Edition (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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it to guarantee the expression of everyone's inclinations and dreams, at least not outside 
society or against the spirit of the people. Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) introduces a 
different tone to the economic field. This difference consists basically in a proposal for a 
relationship with the spirit that pays attention to the productivity of contradictions or so 
called abnormalities. Mandeville does not negate the necessity of a spirit25 but 
understands its dynamic as the permanent disruption of itself; this dynamism is what 
permits the flourishing of the best characteristics of society. There is a celebration of 
corruption and fall, in its theological sense, but not because it reveals an autonomous 
consciousness. What is of importance for him is that the fall supposes a limit that cannot 
be evaded; at the profundities of vices there is the necessary reserve of richness to expand 
the commonwealth. The notion of noble sin,26 used to make reference to prodigality, is 
not a metaphor or image used to describe actions outside a theological realm. This type of 
sin, as Mandeville explained, is noble because it calls for permanent action, acceleration, 
and expenditure, all understood as fundamental features of civilization. In Mandeville 
there is a realistic interpretation of fall and original sin that is not a mystery:27 by biting 
the apple the “human race” becomes possible: 
One of the greatest reasons why so few people understand themselves, is, that 
most  writers are always teaching men what they should be, and hardly ever 
trouble their heads with telling them what they really are. As for my part, without 
any compliment to the courteous reader, or my self, I believe man (besides skin, 
flesh, bones, etc that are obvious to the eye) to be a compound of various 
passions, that all of them, as they are provoked and come uppermost, govern him 
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by turns, whether he will or not.28 
 
 The procedure followed by Mandeville starts with the assumption that there is a 
self that can be accessed through a taxonomy of passions. Now, at the opening of his text 
he establishes a connection with knowledge: the economic field depends on a relationship 
with oneself to the point that understanding is turned into an exercise of introspection. 
The ability to know oneself is located at the core of a chain of operations that includes a 
social and political consideration of morals and also a theological assertion. An Inquiry 
into the Origin of Moral Virtue29 is a theological enterprise in a delimited form: it does 
not acknowledge theology or religion to have the productive capacity to create 
civilization; humans, virtue.  When Mandeville writes about knowledge of the self he is 
not creating or trying to create a theology of human nature; moreover according to his 
position the invention of moral determination strictly obeys political practices and not 
theological exigencies.  
Nevertheless, this dismissal of the capacities of theology and religion does not 
imply a rupture with a theological disposition in Mandeville's theory: evil, a result of the 
fall, refers to a theology of history that recognizes that the world is conducted by 
humanity since it still has a “tincture”30 of the perfect knowledge that belongs to the 
divinity. Hence, Mandeville espouses an understanding of history as human production 
that, because of sin, is contradictory. Allowing contradictions and noble sin to arise is 
how the movement of history is able to continue and even to increase. 
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 Human beings are sinners that have to create and give themselves a world in the 
midst of their constitutive damage. It is not just medicine31 that constitutes the distinction 
between skin and passions; neither a mere concentration on the ability of politicians32 to 
separate and unite, but rather an act of God. In this case, the understanding of passions as 
somehow independent forces or energies has economic importance in itself. This position 
also has a restriction or, more exactly, specifications regarding what to do with the 
passions and energies of the “multitude of laborious poor.”33 For them, regarded as an 
amorphous mass, it is enough to understand one important economic rule: “To make the 
society happy and people easy under the meanest circumstances, it is required that a great 
numbers of them should be ignorant as well as poor. Knowledge both enlarges and 
multiplies our desires, and the fewer things a man wishes for, the more easily his 
necessities may be supplied”34 Mandeville continues to specify that the working poor 
should know just the necessary to reproduce themselves in order to perform their 
occupations and never extend themselves beyond their calling. The main and sole 
concern for the working poor must be their physical subsistence. 
 In short what Mandeville proposes is that economy arises as a practice to 
administrate the fallen world. Part of this administration means developing and 
economizing the energies, dreams, desires, and brains of the working poor, as Mandeville 
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clarifies in his essay An Essay on Charity and Charity Schools. For them a rigorous and 
non-negotiable effect of sin is established: they must work till they drop for the welfare 
and felicity for the State. Neither vice nor enthusiasm is permitted the working poor,35 not 
even self-recognition or the right to organize themselves as workers.36 
 From Petty to Mandeville the constitution of the economic field is understood as a 
moral science37 and politic of life38 but also as an arrangement of categories that have as a 
focal interest the creation of the conditions of possibility that necessitate a theological 
impulse of life. Categories such as soul, spirit, and sin are treated as economic categories 
because they satisfy the need for spirit39--a space to deal with human nature, one without 
which the most elemental goals of economy could not occur. The working poor require, 
in order to perform their work, a system of intelligibility, an organization that these 
authors found within the theological tradition. Notwithstanding, what they did was not 
just to extrapolate or accommodate theology; those categories were productive for them 
due to the fact that they were, according to their interpretation, in themselves economic: 
soul, spirit, sin refer all of them, to both the character and administration of the different 
yet integrated components of the human. These categories are primarily related to what 
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was considered as the most interior and intimate. In this regard it is possible to consider 
the economic field as a series of intersections or procedures that try to model the most 
intricate vestiges of human nature at the same time as they create it. 
4. Nature and the Omnipotent Hand 
 With his inquiry about the vulgarly received notion of nature, Robert Boyle 
(1627-1691) announces a project that reveals tension and eagerness. It was necessary to 
precisely locate the common use of language.  This ambit was also part of a theological 
enterprise;40 Boyle, by suspending what he calls “mere revelation,”41 introduces a critique 
of the idea of nature's paternity that opens space for God's agency along with the 
interrogation about spirits and alchemy.42 If nature is not a parent it becomes a thing; 
certainly not an ordinary one but one that expresses the wisdom of God. Nature is an 
organized whole whose activities always express aspects of God's intelligence and 
purposes. This has, nevertheless, a limit or context of interpretation: “I must freely 
observe that, to speak properly, a law being but a notional rule of acting according to the 
declared will of a superior, it is plain that nothing but an intellectual being can be 
properly capable of receiving and acting by law.”43 In short, God's action is not intended 
to be an absolute regulation of the intellectual being but the provision of the capability to 
act according to law.   
                                                          
40 Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the 
Shaping of Modernity 1680-1760 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 30-40. 
 
41 Robert Boyle, A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature ed. Edward B. Davis 
and Michael Hunter (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1686]), 4. 
 
42 Paul Kréber Monod, Solomon's Secret Arts. The Occult in the Age of Enlightenment (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), 99-101. 
 
43 Robert Boyle, A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, 25. 
 
51 
 
 External stimulants and impulses are necessary to achieve certain behaviors in 
intellectual beings. Nature and economy are part of a tension that must be resolved solely 
by “the light of reason;”44 a notion of reason whose definition that has to be found within 
a theological clarification that says that the world is an act of pure of freedom, an act of 
pure expenditure from God. Nature is a donation that does not limit God's own reality. 
Nature's economy is not pure donation but also concealment and refraction. There are 
secrets of nature that are not accessible to human reason; therein nature appears as both 
the disclosure and closure of rational patrons that instigate human activity.  The explicit 
elicitation of rational structures and constant laws has the social function of prefigured 
uses and ends for the different bodies that populate the world. This is to say that 
according to this scheme contingencies are rare or, more precisely, extraordinary: 
Upon these grounds, if we set aside the consideration of miracles as things 
supernatural,  and of those instances wherein the providence of the great rector of 
the universe and human affairs is pleased peculiarly to interpose, it may be 
rationally said that God […]  did, by virtue of it, clearly discern what would 
happen in consequence of the laws by him established in all the possible 
combinations of them and in all junctures of circumstances wherein concerned in 
them may be found.45 
 
Boyle refers to laws established by God as even including social, political, and 
economic ends46 which are part of the complex of actions of intellectual beings. Through 
human reason, which is just a residuum of God's, it is possible to understand that 
economy, and its different components, levels, and modes of expression, expresses nature 
in one fundamental way: every human activity is imbued with God's wisdom and 
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legislation. Boyle's understanding of nature affirms the intrinsic rationality of human 
works. Although incomplete, social, economic, and political forms of organization are, in 
principle, a condensation and expression of laws that are beyond one's own complete 
control or understanding,47 he would say. Nature refers to both bodies and also to 
practices, institutions, rational activities, and their multiple relationships.  Without 
constituting an interruption or detour from his discussion about the “vulgar notions of 
nature” Boyle's intervention should be regarded as an argument about providence that 
admits the existence of incompleteness mainly associated with the composition of the 
human body. This, for Boyle, was not a “watch or hand mill,”48 but a combination of 
stable and fluid parts, the latter being what incorporates complexity to the task of 
extending God's work in the world. Boyle had elaborated a notion of nature in which 
social processes had to be ultimately recognized as has bearing traces or footprints of 
God. This is so because Boyle's rejection of nature's own will does not cancel it out; on 
the contrary, it solidifies both the tension between creator and creature and human 
agency. What can be called the gradual process of human appropriation of nature, 
particularly its own, is, although precarious, also a manifestation of God's omnipotent 
hand. 
For when it pleases God to overrule or control the established course of things in 
the world by his omnipotent hand, what is thus performed may be much easier 
discerned and acknowledged to be miraculous, by them admit in the ordinary 
course of corporeal things nothing but matter and motion, whose powers men may 
judge of, than by those who think there is besides a certain semi-deity which they 
call nature, whose skill and power they acknowledge to be exceeding great, and 
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yet no sure way of estimating how great they are and how far they may extend.49 
 
 Boyle understands nature as being capable of being altered by God; in this case 
this intervention guarantees the rationality of everything that happens. There is an 
immanent order that can be grasped through experimentation but this rationality can also 
be interrupted. What is important for the present discussion is to make clear that this 
notion of nature has “imperial”50 specifications within its theological and physical 
implications. In recognizing nature as God's creature it becomes possible to remove, 
overcome, struggle against the limits to control it and, moreover, to recreate it, and to 
excel its products.  This notion of nature, acknowledging its multiple components, serves 
to remove the scruples to create the necessary conditions to control, conquer, organize, in 
a word, to economize nature under the shadow of a disruptive God. 
5.  Animal Oeconomy 
  Thus far, I have demonstrated that in the constitution of economy it was of 
decisive importance to embrace theological categories and, for Boyle, it was necessary to 
affirm God as creator in order to develop a notion of nature that allows its knowledge and 
dominion. Although it has been often considered part of the relationship between natural 
science and economy,51 the importance of animal oeconomy for the constitution of 
economy should be considered as a particular sphere of investigation.52 The text by John 
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Hunter53 (1728 – 1793) entitled Observations of Certain Parts of the Animal Oeconomy54 
provides important elements to access another influential understanding of nature. My 
presentation focuses particularly on methodological components of animal economy.55  
The first question that has to be pointed out about Hunter's work is his idea of art 
(science) as a process permanently developing itself. Add to that self-comprehension as a 
cure that is founded on a notion of nature as an original form and structure. 
Every deviation from that original form and structure which gives the 
distinguished  character to the productions of nature, may not improperly be 
called monstrous. According to this acceptation of the term, the variety of 
monsters will be almost infinite; and, as far as my knowledge as extended, there is 
not a species of animals, nay, there is not a single part of animal body, which is 
not subject to an extraordinary formation.56 
 
The monstrous, the abnormality that interrupts or damages the original structure 
of, in this case the reproductive organs, was not strictly related to anatomy57 but also to 
observations about behavior and social dispositions. For Hunter the use of anatomical 
parts becomes an indication of sex's natural duties as well as positions within circuits of 
occupations. So, like economy, animal oeconomy is interested in the anatomical whole. 
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Hunter proposes a methodology whose aim is to establish the existing connections, 
arrangements, and modes of action, and uses of the whole, or of particular organs.58 This 
methodology is based on two distinctive habits: observation and inquiry. Nature, in this 
case considered by an anatomist, appears as a phenomenon that can be observed and, at 
the same time, whose understanding implies the necessity of a technique that makes it 
possible to go beyond the mere looking at the parts of the body. This is so because animal 
oeconomy was a practice for the preservation of the individual; therefore it was an 
intervention in nature. The practice of animal oeconomy itself has economic requisites: it 
requires leisure, disposable time to return repeatedly to one's own observations and 
experiments. In this regard, Hunter's methodological remarks contain a proposal about 
the necessary relationship between time, science, and nature in which he maintains that a 
form of social organization in which not just the “men of the church”59 can have the time 
for inquiry must support knowledge of nature. 
 This economy of time is not, by any means, secondary to animal oeconomy or any 
other science; furthermore it is an epistemic feature. It is a type of administration that 
does not assume immediate utility as its criterion of time used can allow the repetition 
and perfection of a science of the whole.  Hunter's explicit definition of nature is 
consistent with his own premises: “It should be remembered, that nothing in nature stands 
alone; that every art and science has a relation to some other art or science, and that it 
requires a knowledge of those others as far as this connection takes place, to enable us to 
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become perfect in that which engages our particular attention;”60 this definition openly 
integrates perfection as a goal or objective of scientific inquiry. Perfection demands 
procedures of self-interrogation, a suspension of one's opinions to provide space to 
explore nature. 
 The stomach itself,61 for instance, does not reveal itself unless there is a 
combination of experiments and its practical application. The animal bodies should be 
subjected to comparisons based on instruments, axioms, and multiple sciences in order to 
create an accurate knowledge of them. From this standpoint, even diseased and dead 
bodies should be closely examined; Hunter understands death and degeneration as bodies' 
states that are, if not controllable, understandable. Nothing remains hidden from animal 
oeconomy so far as it is a proceeding for the institution of nature.  Animal oeconomy 
determines the monstrous not just in the abnormalities on the body's organs or structures 
but also in the forms through which one attempts to know nature. It functions as a 
boundary that divides ignorance from knowledge. 
 The operations of animal oeconomy were also common for the study of 
disorders62 as they used as a starting point the premise that there was a tension between 
normal functioning and the possible disclosure of the monstrous. In this case the curative 
goal and its scientific character are expressed up front. This approach claims to focus 
exclusively on the sensitive nature of the human nerves to distinguish themselves from 
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“futile speculations concerning matters that are involved in the greatest obscurity”63 and 
to explore the suggestions that come from experience. The notion of experience, in its 
multivariate renderings, is again strictly associated with its practical consequences: 
avoiding speculations and rigorously following experience is a part of the will to cure, to 
be effective. Knowledge, to be practical in the sense of transforming, has to recuse itself 
within the limits of experience and the “rational oeconomy of humane bodies.”64 Nature 
therefore is understood as manifested to us, in us, and for us.   
6. Self, Society, and Nature 
 Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752)65 postulates, from a direct reference to the 
letter to the Romans XII: 4-5, that human nature is social at its core. What is of 
importance for Butler is the metaphors of the body that depict the ideal of unity within 
Christ that are presented in the passage from Romans. If with Hunter the animal bodies 
are a whole unceasingly interacting with its own parts, for Butler human nature manifests 
itself precisely in its belonging, as an organ or member, to a larger body. This 
understanding of the social character of human nature is preceded by Butler's bold 
affirmation about “man as respecting self.” In differentiating between these two modes of 
nature Butler incorporates a tension: as self the human being procures its own 
preservation and happiness and as a naturally social being it promotes the public good. 
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The realization or full development of the self is achieved through public activity. The 
public good, as a sum of multiple selves interacting with each other, is the sum and 
manifestation of the self. Nature is dual but tends to its unification through human 
practice.   
Passions and affections tend to public good although some of them are intimately 
related to self-love, whose primary use and intention clarifies Butler, is the security and 
good of the individual. The passionate and affective being inclines itself to society not 
from the autonomous movement of its volition but rather from the natural disposition of 
its constitution. Naturally any human being should procure its self-preservation through 
the satisfaction of the necessities presented in society. 
 Hoping to satisfy this interpenetration between self-satisfaction and public good, 
Butler elaborates on what he calls “principle of reflection.” This principle has two 
functions: first, to differentiate between what should be approved or disapproved in 
human actions; second, more broadly, the principle of reflection constitutes a reflection 
upon humans' own nature. The first function refers to actions while the second to the 
conditions of possibility and goals of the whole human being. 
This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and 
 action, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though sometimes it 
is used so as to take in more. And that this faculty tends to restrain men from 
doing mischief to each other, and leads them to good, is too manifest to need 
being insisted upon.66 
 
 For Butler the expression of tensions produced by the inclinations of the self and 
the call from the social body are natural. Although important, this tension is not 
irresolvable as nature itself provides humans with a conscience that has the ability and 
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duty to regulate the tension and allow the health of the body. Conscience is what makes 
society possible as long as it requires interactions that express confidence, care, and 
respect.  Following out this argument leads us to question of illness, abnormalities, 
monstrosities, and, as Butler explains, also the unnatural, which, in its most decisive 
presentation, he describes as passion's excess. The notion of excess must be distinguished 
from “cool self-love”; the former indicates a state of incapability to be part of the body 
or, more precisely, an ill organ of society.  
“Cool self-love” expresses, more than an image, an actual state of the body. 
Temperatures, movements, shame, and colors he all considered to be manifestations of 
nature.  Society is a living organism that feeds itself of human passions; Butler's theology 
is the intermediary between self and society. His discussions about nature have an 
internal regimentation, and all lead to the question, like that of Steuart, of how can we 
live together? Through which mechanisms is it possible to guarantee the increase of 
happiness? To respond to these questions, Butler draws up a theological economy of 
human nature. This theological economy is an inventory of parts, organs, and passions. 
The economic principle is considered sacred. 
This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what course of life we 
were  made for: not only that our real nature leads us to be influenced in some 
degree by reflection and conscience; but likewise in what degree we are to be 
influenced by it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably to the constitution of our 
nature: that this faculty was placed within to be our proper governor; to direct and 
regulate all under principles,  passions, and motives of action. This is its right and 
office: thus sacred is its authority.67 
 
 This is economy operating its most central activities: dividing components, 
establishing principles of authority, and becoming nature. What Butler does is to puts the 
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entire discussion about conviviality and sociability to the relationship that “man” has with 
himself. There is not an authority more basic than that of something's nature. The forms 
in which humans relate to themselves, to their entire constitution, manifest both the 
sacred and nature just to integrate them in a more detailed functioning, which I have 
called economy of the flesh. Butler goes beyond the exposition about the necessity of the 
care of souls, creation of spirit, or courage to sin to propose exercises to economize one's 
flesh in order to satisfy nature; that is to say to contribute to commonwealth at the same 
time as to the fulfillment of the self. His Sermon IV: Upon the Government of the 
Tongue,68 an interpretation of James 1:26, offers an immanent, concentrated way in and 
through which it becomes possible to economize flesh. Butler's version of the text reads 
as follows: “If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth his tongue, but 
deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain.”69  
First, I shall say that for him the tongue is not a part of the body but an expression 
of the whole. Second, Butler considers that the problem treated in the biblical text refers 
to the question of government as the basic problematic of religious life. The government 
of the tongue is considered as a mark for an authentic religious experience; however its 
effects are not restricted to religion. 
 Butler argues that an ungoverned tongue is the one that talks without restriction, 
one that incessantly makes references, judgments, and leads an autonomous life. The 
problem of the tongue consists in its broadmindedness, lack of organization, and purpose.  
He makes no moral judgment over the contents of what the tongue says, but does critique 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 65-71. 
 
69 Ibid., 65. Emphasis in the original. 
 
61 
 
the lost time and energy associated with an uncontrollable organ, that serves no other goal 
than that of its own satisfaction. 
 For Butler the rupture between action and utility is the center of the tongue's 
government. Accordingly, his understanding of natural activity or activity adequate to the 
rationality of nature is that which, in its dissemination, produces social benefits. The 
problem is the preference over silence when there is nothing useful to express. Even 
secrets become material to the ungoverned tongue; people abandon the most elementary 
reserve and politeness for the pleasure of employing their tongue.  This use of the tongue 
goes even beyond personal leisure as it engages the attention of others, distracting them 
from what is assumed to be their natural relations and preoccupations; the ungoverned 
tongue breaks the natural course of time.  It has, just by itself, a destructive character. 
 As a result of this contention about what he considers an unruly use of the tongue 
Butler introduces a reflection about the faculty of speech70 and the madman, the latter 
being the expression of the counter-natural use of human faculties, as a merely carnal 
disposition. The madman is understood as a tongue without control (fully a fleshy 
corporeality), as pure activity or extension of a damaged self: “[The madman] does a 
world of mischief; and implies not only great folly, and a trifling spirit, but great 
viciousness of mind, great indifference to truth and falsity, and to the reputation, welfare, 
and good of others.”71 Thus, the madman is an chaotic economic being. Incapable of 
contributing to society, its life becomes a subject not just of scrutiny and translation but 
also of regret. 
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 For Butler, the faculty of speech is to be used to communicate purposes in a clear 
and plain form; language is an instrument among others. Its potency resides in organized 
beneficial actions. There are exercises to economize oneself that consists in learning how 
to hear, to see, to feel, to talk, and to wait.72 These exercises are meticulous but not 
simply repressive for their promise is to build a healthy self. Economy of the flesh is both 
regulation of existing energies, organs, structures, and forms and also the creation or 
assemblage of those components to form the natural human. What Butler proposes is not 
a sort of inner-wordily asceticism nor merely repression for the sake of civilization but 
the possibility and necessity of happiness through constant material practices. The project 
embedded in a rational felicity and virtuous enjoyment synthesizes an attempt to achieve 
what Anne Conway (1631-1679) explained as the desire “which spirits or souls have for 
bodies;”73 that is to say a form of existence that does not renounce itself to attain its 
possibilities. Rationality and enjoyment do not require, for Butler, the ascetic ideal, but 
rather economy of the flesh. 
7. Biography, Economy, and Nature 
 Within the aforementioned context it is imperative to approach Hume's and 
Smith's interventions by considering their most fundamental levels of developing and 
communication. From Petty to Butler, economic theory and theory of nature have 
concentrated on what I have called the economy of the flesh. That is to say, they are 
concentrated in the center of the production of life, in life itself, in what makes possible 
the existence of a civilized form of organizing life. Hence what is required to introduce us 
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to the understanding of Hume's and Smith's project is precisely the form in which they 
both treat and create a form of ideally economized and natural life. As with Butler's 
exercises the act of writing is itself a condensation and expression of these authors’ 
understanding of nature and economy. Writing is an exercise that both economizes one's 
flesh at the same time that it proposes a horizon and parameter for a worthy life. In what 
follows I establish the criteria and basic elements for a reading of Hume and Smith. In 
doing so I also delineate the contours of how the concept of flesh plays an important role 
in their thinking. I propose that the notion of flesh appears in Hume and Smith as 
sickness or excess within the social and political body. Therefore most of their project 
consists in the reinsertion of the flesh within the body through a process of 
spiritualization that I shall discuss in the next chapter. 
Writing, Freedom, and Privilege 
 I shall locate Hume's and Smith's thinking within their context of production; 
hence I shall discuss the way in which they created their own life as a literary and 
economic product. I concentrate on the question of literary creation as it is a form of 
relationship which questions issues such as the slave trade, intimate relationships, and 
death. In order to do this, it is not sufficient to comment on those interventions in which 
both of them directly discuss the question of slavery or working people's conditions; 
those explicit texts present only one of the levels in which those political and social 
situations were presented. There are other levels, other forms in and through which that 
relationship takes place. 
 Furthermore, in reading Hume's and Smith's correspondence, lectures, and non- 
technical texts we can access the level of a division internally united: the colonial world 
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is divided but its division also unites or is united by scenes of time, intimacy, and 
domesticity. There is a co-presence of slavery and philosophy that is expressed in their 
letters as celebration, debate, and intimacy. Sometimes the letters even combine timid 
references to slavery with casual greetings. While the time of the slave, servant, and 
worker was beset by the multiple impositions and restrictions of the master, the time of 
the philosopher is personal; it is fundamentally related to his taste, inclinations, and 
projects. 
 The activity of thinking, besides leisure time also requires mobility, and the 
possession of one's own body as the massive control of other bodies is extended and 
deepened. The written texts themselves, their actual physicality, are a scene of time. Their 
content is the manifestation of a type of expenditure that was not universal: what was 
considered to be non-productive time. In this context the production of philosophy is 
rooted in the possibility of using time without constraints at the same time that the modes 
of inhabiting the world with millions of other people are radically interrupted or 
destroyed. It is not just division that characterizes the philosophical time; it is also signed 
and marked by a plethora of corpses floating in the sea.74   
 There is an intimate connection between amusement and violence, writing and 
loss, and physical extenuation and saloons. The following sections will comment on 
slavery, friendship, family ties, and the representation of Hume's life. I consider that this 
representation, in the different versions considered here, synthesized an ideal of life that 
will be transversal and elemental for what follows in the next chapter. Let me state what I 
do with the relationship between biography, economy, and nature. First, I point to those 
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elements of Hume's and Smith's biographies that they just mention without giving them 
particular importance for the conformation of their lives. I maintain that those mentions, 
particularly the ones referring to slavery and intimate relationships, bring to the surface 
aspects of their biographies that were of fundamental importance as well as an ignored 
privilege. In this regard, I affirm that the most obvious or quotidian characteristics of a 
life are by themselves conditions of possibility for the practice of philosophy. While 
ignoring or dismissing certain aspects of their actual histories, both Hume and Smith try 
to recreate their lives through biographical accounts. In these representations we 
encounter some of the most relevant forces to have shaped their understanding of 
economy and nature. 
 In a letter from 1753 written to Robert Wallace (1697–1771), a minister of the 
Church of Scotland, David Hume mentions that “I was told by Captain Rutherford, that in 
New York, they seldom raise black Children in their Cities […] They give them away to 
the People in the Country, who raise them.”75 This throw away comment comes at the end 
of the letter, and does not include any commentary. The giving away of black children 
appears to be for Hume another element of the world, something that happens following 
its historical course.76 By the time that Hume wrote his letter, as Eric Williams has 
demonstrated, slavery and colonial trade were one of the main components of the 
accumulation of capital in England.77 This brief mention of slavery in the letter is an 
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actual recognition of one of the foundations of industrial economy by Hume.78  
But since 1707 what was happening in New York with black children was not 
strange to Hume's and Smith's context in Scotland.79 The slave trade was a common 
practice in Glasgow; it was profitable and extensive.80 In a lecture from 1766, Smith 
makes what can be considered at least a polemic remark: “We are apt to imagine that 
slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but 
even at present it is almost universal.”81 Later, in the same lecture, he will emphasize that 
“there is no such a thing as slavery among us.”82 Though slavery is a permanent presence 
in their lives, it is one that is often overlooked or ignored. In another letter of November 
5, 1765, this time addressed to Adam Smith, Hume writes: “I have now Opulence & 
Liberty: The last formerly rendered me content: Both together must do so, as far as the 
Encrease [sic] of years will permit;”83 opulence and liberty Hume considers necessary 
conditions for the activity of thinking as well as for health. It is clear that comfort, 
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availability of one's own body, and time were for Hume of decisive importance for a fully 
human life. 
 The same occurs with Smith, as he makes evident in an extended letter to William 
Cullen (1710-1790) dedicated to explaining the situation of Scottish universities. There 
he defends that instruction and expertise do not have to be equalized with formal 
university training. People can learn and became experts in such areas like medicine 
without having an institutional accreditation. He concludes: “The monopoly of medical 
education which this regulation would establish in favour of Universities would, I 
apprehended, be hurtful to the lasting prosperity of such bodies-corporate.”84 From this 
perspective it is possible to conclude that Smith understood that any kind of interference 
between oneself and one's own projects or enterprises necessarily implied a diminishing 
of humanity. To pursue one's interest, without arbitrary limitations, was the crux of 
Smith's defense of the individuality of his class. In a letter to William Strahan (1715-
1785) of 1776, to which I will return, Smith makes what can be considered as a purely 
incidental reference: “If my mother's health will permit me to leave her, I shall be in 
London by the beginning of November.”85 But intimacy, family relationships, caring, and 
loving one's mother were not universal experiences; moreover they were, in several cases, 
extraordinary, as confirmed by the following testimony: 
They also stopped my sister's mouth, and tied her hands; and in this manner we 
 proceeded till we were out of the sight of these people. When we went to rest the 
 following night they offered us some victuals; but we refused it; and the only 
comfort we had was in being in one another's arms all that night, and bathing each 
other with our  tears. But alas! we were soon deprived of even the small comfort 
of weeping together. The next day proved a day of greater sorrow than I had yet 
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experienced; for my sister and I were then separated, while we lay clasped in each 
other's arms. It was in vain that we besought them not to part us; she was torn 
from me, and immediately carried away, while I was left in a state of distraction 
not to be described. I cried and grieved continually; and for several days I did not 
eat any thing but what they forced into my mouth.86 
 
 The former account, written by Olaudah Equiano (1745-1797), shows how the 
most intimate and significant ties and belongings were not guaranteed for every person. It 
was a privilege to decide whether to stay with one's mother or to travel. For Equiano 
there was no autonomous decision involved in his loss and sorrow. Every one of his and 
his sister's tears was the result of social and political relationships over which they did not 
have control. Smith's letter, on the contrary, though presented as a normal situation, 
shows a form of caring that was not within the possibilities of the kidnapped Equiano. He 
cares for him and his family by building a narrative about his own life; he is not a victim. 
Yet his intimate conditions were depicted as different or they were simply vanished. 
Biographies are selections of experiences, modes of political intervention whose 
pretension, in Hume and Smith, is not to tell one's life but to give life to one's life. If for 
Equiano everything, including tears and forgetfulness, has to be told, for Hume and Smith 
there are things that have to be repeated in order to avoid telling everything.   
8. Hume and the Pilgrim 
 In his autobiographical text “My Own Life”87 Hume tells that most of his life has 
been spent in literary pursuits and occupations. This form of living his life was not 
separated from those black children in New York; by mentioning them Hume 
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acknowledges their presence in his biography. Even a volatile or cursory presence 
expresses a historical phenomenon. While most of the sold children in New York were 
taken away from their families, Hume's biography begins with an account of close family 
relationships.  Losing one's mother was not an unusual experience,88 neither was the 
tearing asunder of family connections. In the secret of the night Hume dedicated himself 
to reading literature and philosophy; he was using his time to embrace a particular 
cultural tradition, its institutions, value-systems, and ideas.89 His enjoyment was social 
and belonged to social relationships that make it possible as well as impel it. For Hume 
his biography is well expressed in the reception that was reached by his books; but the 
production and circulation of books has is own biography, its own social development, its 
own economy.  
Nevertheless, Hume insists that he had to struggle against certain bodily 
limitations in order to continue with his ardent application. His physical weakness was 
both an impediment and also an opportunity to mature his spirit (not to obey a statesman 
but his own rational pursuits) and faculties. The maturity of his spirit had a primordial 
manifestation: he decided to “make a very rigid frugality,”90 by which he meant he would 
restrict himself from everything except from study. According to this self-representation 
Hume reached a form of control and administration of his passions that permit him to 
produce his life from himself: “Even if one cannot escape death, one can literally make 
up how one imagines it. Nothing about it being “un-representable”; death does not undo 
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humanity but provide the opportunity for free play. Death and dead body are up for 
grabs.”91 The question considered by Hume in his auto-biography is how present his own 
development as a process in which the limitation of flesh and death are overcome by the 
force of composure and propriety and expressed in constancy and regularity.92 
 In his autobiographical text, Hume condenses a nature economized at its core. 
Reading is the exercise that provides equilibrium and sense to this radical administration 
of himself. Its tangible result, when Hume was twenty-seven years old, was the 
publication in 1738 of his Treatise of Human Nature. Nonetheless, the book, according to 
his account, was received poorly. The question of the reception of the book has two 
interrelated constituents: social recognition and self-affirmation. As Butler explained, for 
Hume self and society correspond to each other; they mutually look for each other in 
order to complete themselves in the production of a major figure: the agreeable social 
self. In his writing, Hume is trying to produce benefit to society even if it implies 
disappointments. From 1745 to 1747 he was able to became fully a master because he 
saved “near thousand Pound;”93 this criterion to determine mastery was not definitive or, 
at least, exclusive. Mastery for him would be shown by the eagerness for public 
recognition or, more exactly, for the recognition of his writing as it expressed his own 
self. Once again in this context self has to be understood as made possible by flesh. Hume 
does not reject flesh in his writing, but gives a detailed explanation of how to relate to it. 
  There is a procedure in this autobiography: the book is equated with the self and 
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if the book is sold an increase in the self occurs. But even this has to have a boundary: 
“However, I had fixed a Resolution, which I inflexibly maintained, never to reply to any 
body; and not being very irascible in my Temper, I have easily kept myself clear of all 
literary Squabbles.”94 The emphasis in this statement is on the relationship between 
success and temper or, one more time, on the economization of oneself. This manifests a 
virtuosity that goes beyond the pure printed text, reaching the other's soul.95 Hume's 
creation of his life is above all an uncontainable succession of disappointments: “I 
thought, that, I was the only Historian, that had at once neglected present Power, Interest, 
and Authority, and the Cry of popular Prejudices; and as the Subject was suited to every 
Capacity, I expected proportional Applause: But miserable was my Disappointment [...] I 
resolved to pick up Courage and to persevere.”96 In this description of his new failure, 
Hume introduces a methodological reasoning: to think for oneself, to judge tradition, 
powers, institutions, and conventions with autonomy implies rejection. Reason and 
popularity are presented as mutually exclusive. Hume presents himself as an historian 
who is able to surpass both the limits of a centralized power that demands the 
surrendering of reason and popular prejudice which requires its oblivion. 
 Hume presents himself as a third alternative to these exigencies; his path is that of 
free judgment, autonomy, and individual discovery of truth through rational inquiry. This 
includes, in a manner close to animal oeconomy, a total disregard of fables and religious 
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superstition.97 At the center of this solitary project of a counter-history there is a longing 
for social acknowledgment. So what then is the relationship between reason and 
acceptance? Reason alone, without company, conversation, and enjoyment is an arid 
solitude; recognition is one of the practical ends of reason, and, for Hume, 
acknowledgment without reason is unfounded and lacks transcendence. The development 
of social attachments provokes a fissure in the self; Hume's self appears damaged by the 
absence of public praise. The self ceases to be unified and well structured and becomes, 
in his narrative, desolate and despairing. The experience of this obscurity with all its 
eccentricities is nonetheless luminous:  “Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well 
as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labor, must be delightful and 
rejoicing.”98 The self restores itself in the process of struggling to be recognized. Courage 
and perseverance are, as literary artifacts, expressions of a full embracing of the 
contractual ties of the self. 
 The next years of his life were a continuation of his perseverance for recognition 
based on the use of his faculties without negotiating with anyone. Such a life is a solitary 
and virtuous existence; perseverance though does not go without a reward, at least not in 
Hume's case.  The persona created in “My Own Life” in assuming a firm economy of his 
nature reaches what seem to be the gates of paradise. 
I was become not only independent, but opulent. I retired to my native Country of 
 Scotland, determined never more to set my Foot out of it; and retaining the 
Satisfaction of never having preferred a Request to one great Man or even making 
Advances of  Friendship to any of them […] I returned to Edinburgh in 1769, 
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very opulent […] healthy, and though somewhat stricken in Years, with the 
Prospect of enjoying long my Ease and of seeing the Encrease of my Reputation.99 
 
 It is important to note that the opulence appears once again as a mark of a 
successful life and linked to money (“for I possessed a Revenue of 1000 pounds a 
year”100), so he was fully separated from the physical extenuation and irrational 
exigencies of the working poor. Independence makes reference to a type of occupation 
that allows him to develop his own projects even if he had to face the most shameful non-
recognition. After passing through the luminous obscurity that is an integral part of being 
a social self, Hume can entirely reveal his dream: to have more reputation. It was a dream 
that came true in Paris, a place that satisfies the necessity of good company and 
conversation. Then, once he reached his dreams and found a place in which he could 
meet his fantasies he had a disorder that became mortal and incurable. 
 The autobiography concentrates most intensely on the abrupt transit between the 
fulfillment of a dream and mortality. It is in the face of death that the self reveals the 
consistency of its spirits; that is the reason why Hume can affirm: “Insomuch, that were I 
to name the Period of my Life which I should most choose to pass over again I might be 
tempted to point [to] this later period.”101 The finishing of his dreams and the weakening 
of his body were for Hume the real achievement of his Reputation. 
To conclude historically with my own Character--I am, or rather was (for that is 
the Style, I must now use in speaking of myself; which emboldens me the more to 
speak my Sentiments) I was, I say, a man of mild Dispositions, of Command of 
Temper, of an  open, social, and cheerful Humour, capable of Attachment, but 
little susceptible of Enmity, and for great Moderation in all my Passions. Even my 
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Love of literary Fame, my ruling Passion, never soured my humour, 
notwithstanding my frequent  Disappointments.102 
 
 At the end what we have is a narration from Death itself; a message from 
posterity that closes a life that was able to defeat itself, to go beyond the limits of its own 
nature. What we see is an exemplary management of the soul, a spirit that accepts death 
or, more exactly, full control of death and fear. Hume incarnates a spirit of contention, 
frugality, gaiety that was so praised by Shaftesbury (1671-1713)103 and Butler and the 
coldness that we see throughout the methodology of the animal oeconomy.   
 Although is possible to read Hume's autobiography as an aesthetic attempt to 
create a literary self104 through a writing practice that “exploited, facilitated, and 
epitomized the operations of the commercial society which it persuasively 
represented,”105 I would like to offer a different approach. My approach is also different 
from Baier's understanding of Hume's autobiography as fundamentally an inter-textual 
piece or a case through which to understand Hume's and Smith's sources and 
influences.106 My meta-theoretical proposal is to read Hume's autobiography within the 
biographical narrative genre begun by The Pilgrim's Progress written by John Bunyan 
(1628-1688) as it reinforces the idea that the personal life is the fundamental message that 
anyone can give to another. 
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Besides treasuring personal experience for its evidences of election and its 
disclosures of the kind of rational whole their lives were elaborating, Puritans 
valued their life histories as texts inscribing divine doctrine and imperatives […] 
they understood their “interpreted” life experience to be a secondary scripture or 
logos, a de facto authority by contrast with de jure authority of the biblical 
Word.107 
 
  Hume follows this way of presentation. His experiences are transformed into 
signs of election and his writing becomes the condensation and expression of the 
rationality of the spirit. Hume’s own body is indeed considered as an incarnation of the 
divine in which other persons could and should recognized the logos of the World. His 
authority comes directly from the display or portrait of his life as the encounter of body, 
flesh, and God.  Hume’s life history pertains to this specific mode of presentation in 
which a self-narrative acquires the status of proof and sign. Nonetheless, contrary to 
Bunyan’s self-narrative Hume’s does not long for a different city or spiritual community. 
 The Pilgrim's Progress is, from the start, a reflection on the conditions of writing. 
Its first assertion is that its content does not belong entirely to the memory and clear-
sightedness of the author. It is a product of shadows, dreams, and voices that call from an 
unknown place. The book appears to be an interruption of the author's intentions and 
projects. It happens to the author as he was planning to write something different. 
Therefore the act of writing is divided into two different modes: one in which writing is 
thought to express and affirm the virility and exceptional character of an author and the 
other in which writing disrupts the intentionality of the author. Bunyan's book comes out 
of an intensive and dreamlike struggle against himself. Nevertheless, this struggle does 
not pretend to control the fogginess and dark clouds that enable the full embracing of 
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oneself. Bunyan attempts to expose himself as he writes. Every word locates his life 
outside the limits of respectability and propriety that were requisite for a man of letters. 
He enables the fuzziness and pursues it without knowing an exit. For this reason, at the 
center of his book there is the question of method and travel.108 Throughout the book, 
both method and travel are clearly and permanently connected as forms by which to 
express the complexity of an experience that cannot be regarded as unified and self-
organized. 
 After the introduction to his book Bunyan continues his text with the description 
of a diffuse and elusive dream. In this dream appears a desperate man. While crying, he 
asks about his future and his place in the world. Then the man explains: 
O my dear Wife, said he, and you the Children of my bowels, I your dear friend 
am in my self undone, by reason of a burden that lieth hard upon me: moreover, I 
am for certain informed, that this our City will be burned with fire from Heaven, 
in which fearful overthrow, both my self, with thee, my Wife, and you my sweet 
babes, shall miserably come to ruine; except (the which, yet I see not) some way 
of escape can be found whereby we may be delivered.109 
 
 The fundamental motif of this dream is the relationship between displacement, 
catastrophe, and self-exile. The City is under siege and everything that has been known is 
passing away. The closest relationships as well as the commerce of society appear to be at 
the limits of their existence. The catastrophe is experienced as an imminent event. 
Because of this the dreamer opens himself to the unknown and procures a new place 
within the space of the world. The city is not conceived as containing all the possibilities 
of his life—but then again he is not completely aware of his possibilities. Hume's 
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autobiography reverses this basic and initial idea of The Pilgrim's Progress: an 
exemplary and joyful life cannot be achieved except within the rules and requirements of 
the city, the commercial society as “the Immutable within time”.110 At the conclusion of 
the first part of The Pilgrim's Progress, Bunyan reinserts his text within the realm of 
dreams, thus transforming the text into an interrogation: “Now reader, I have told my 
Dream to thee; See if thou canst Interpret it to me.”111 The text/dream is open to dispute 
and cannot but wait for clarification. Thus, the text/dream is a mélange of images, 
metaphors, and jokes that offer a path by which to fulfill God’s will rather than a 
labyrinth in which the routes by which to exit are not visible. The reader has to deal with 
dreams and to speculate (investigate) the “Gold wrapped in Ore.”112 The self-narrative of 
The Pilgrim's Progress requires the reader to pass through the horrendous and 
catastrophic ambit of dreams and does not promise clarity or security. It invites the reader 
into exile rather than to Heaven.  
Hume and Smith use the attempt to exile oneself from the city or to overcome the 
limits of interpretation as a criterion to distinguish between categories of beings, as I shall 
explore further in the next chapters. Thus the city does not refer solely to a specific 
complex of institutions, monuments, and separations but to a mode of organization of 
dreams and desires. Here, economic theory finds its condition of possibility and also a 
formulation about the frontiers of time and the infinitude of Hume's life. This is the 
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properly utopic113 notion within Hume's and Smith's thinking: for both of them Hume's 
life was an expression of the possibilities inherent in their society. Even the most intimate 
and specific characteristics of Hume's life are considered as immanent realizations 
(incarnation) of the highest components of a proper life. From this utopia appears also an 
anti-utopia: any type of social ideal or dream that openly or implicitly contradicts the 
general circuit that has made Hume's life possible is understood as a deviation from 
nature susceptible of separation, waste, and punishment. From this anti-utopia appears an 
understanding of flesh that has been adequately explained by Roberto Esposito. 
But perhaps a more meaningful term is that of flesh, because it is intrinsic to the 
same  body from which it seems to escape (and which therefore expels it). 
Existence without life is flesh that does not coincide with the body; it is that part 
or zone of the body, the body's membrane, that isn't one with the body, that 
exceeds its boundaries or is subtracted from the body's enclosing.114 
 
 The problem of the non-coinciding of individuals with the different and yet 
interconnected bodies that constituted the social is one of the primordial questions Hume 
and Smith address. Flesh appears precisely as that which exceeds bodies and has to be 
incorporated. The catastrophic dreams or the ardent desires of individuals have to be 
damaged and prevented if they are a subversion against the body and spirit. Flesh is both 
a necessary condition for life as well as a possible sickness. The economization of flesh is 
a central principle for the preservation and reproduction of life. Hume’s biography was 
also a theme of reflection for Smith. It became an important object for philosophical 
discussions about identity, perfection, and history. In this regard Hume’s autobiography 
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has to be considered a condensed piece of Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy.  
Smith and Hume's Life 
 “My Own Life” has itself a biography, a circuit of relationships that make 
possible its existence. From the letter to Joseph Black (1728-1799) to Adam Smith to a 
letter from him to John Home (1722-1808), that is to say from August to October of 
1776, the life of David Hume was a subject of different stages of production and 
remembrance. It was not his character as an individual that saved Hume from eternal 
death115 but his friends and their narratives about his acceptance of death that did so. 
They, especially Smith, created an intimate Hume and also created a way to read him.  
Hume's own autobiographical account inaugurated this form of reading:116: Joseph 
Black,117 informing Smith of Hume's death (letter from Monday 26 Aug. 1776) affirms 
that: “He [Hume] never dropped the smallest expression of impatience but when he had 
occasion to speak to people about him he always did it with affection and tenderness.”118 
The same diagnostic, with more precision and detail, appears in Smith's letter to 
Strahan.119 Smith's narrative about Hume's last days focuses on resignation and perfect 
complacency, both components of their economy of the flesh. 
 These characteristics go so far as to make it appear that Hume controls his own 
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My Own Life: The Persona of the Philosopher and the Philosopher Manqué,” Auto/Biography 14 (2006):  
1–19 
 
117 The Correspondence of Adam Smith, 168. 
 
118 Ibid., 169. 
 
119 Ibid., 217-221. 
 
80 
 
death by his cheerfulness. To enjoy until the end is an aptitude, a disposition that is at the 
edge of the possible. For this reason Hume's words, as rendered by Smith, have a halo of 
reverence. 
He answered:  
Your hopes are groundless. An habitual diarrhoea of more than a year's standing, 
would be a very bad disease at any age it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the 
evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and when I rise in 
the morning, weaker than when I lying down in the evening. I am sensible, 
besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so that I must soon die.120 
 
 Hume's physical decay and filthiness are secondary or almost unimportant due to 
one fact: he had been socially productive. His circles of affection and friendship had 
received everything they could receive from him. His own damaged body was already 
passing away in front of his eyes and he could not scream in pain. From inside death and 
destruction his self remained impassible. Hume himself thus exemplifies the reach of the 
economy of the flesh. He does not dream with a reality other than his sick body, in order 
to demonstrate that he embraces death or, more precisely, that he transforms death into a 
central political and economic concept. Merely the existence of superstition created in 
him a certain despair and discomfort. 
 Smith's narration introduces at this point the notion of what must be considered a 
useful life: one that expects to continue for the benefit of the Public. Talking until the 
destruction of his own body, affirms Smith, was Hume's way of showing perfection and 
dominion over his flesh. Thereafter, Smith establishes a distinction between philosophy 
and character that instead of dissolving philosophy locates it within the relationship 
between economy and nature. While affected by a terrible illness Hume never renounced 
frugality and pushing against his animal oeconomy he maintained the “firmness of his 
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mind.”121 In the context of the relationship of the tense connections between economy 
and nature, Smith represents Hume as the manifestation of the maximum possibilities of 
human nature, as the realization of an economy that permits both the satisfaction of the 
self and society.  The literary and theological representations of Hume's life are not just a 
requiem for a friend but a condensed presentation of a type of economic process applied 
to the self in order to enjoy life beyond the restrictions of the body and against the agony 
of the flesh. Hume showed a form of incarnation in society whose objective is to produce 
social happiness through the best administration of one's life and death. 
 The following chapters discuss the procedures in and through which Hume and 
Smith attempt to economize flesh. I will focus particularly on their politics of spirit and 
its implications for the contention and modeling of the flesh. I argue that for both authors 
the economy of flesh was fundamental in order to conserve and deepen what they 
considered natural. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Spirit, Economy, and Flesh 
 
This is the historical Age, and this is the Historical Nation 
David Hume letter to William Strahan. 
 
 
 This chapter focuses on the characteristics and implications of Hume’s and 
Smith’s philosophy of spirit. In order to do that I propose an approach that shows how 
both of these authors belong to a theological and political tradition whose understanding 
of spirit is primordially related to the economization of flesh. This discussion has both an 
historical and conceptual importance as the question of the relationship between spirit, 
economy, and social domination is still being debated.1 My contribution to this debate is 
to offer a detailed explanation of how the notion of spirit shapes the thinking of Hume 
and Smith and occupies a fundamental role in the economy of flesh. Nonetheless, my 
contribution does not remain on the descriptive level. I also argue that Hume’s and 
Smith’s understanding of spirit can express itself politically as empire.2 
 As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, economizing oneself is a primordial 
component of economy. The representation of Hume's life condenses characteristics that 
were part of the development of an economic theory that did not separate sentiments from 
trade or labor.3 Moreover, such theory refers to the entire dynamism of everyday life and 
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 See Tim Murphy, The Politics of Spirit: Phenomenology, Genealogy, Religion (New York: 
SUNY Press, 2012); Javier Elguea, Razón y Desarrollo: El crecimiento económico, las instituciones y la 
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 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2003 [1913]), 434-447. 
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it was understood as a quotidian relationship with oneself that derives from the 
construction of modes of social intercourse and its institutions. 
 We also saw in that chapter that from Petty to Mandeville there was an elective 
affinity between theological notions and economic discussions; a similar affinity occurs 
with Hume and Smith with the notion of spirit.  This chapter develops my reading of 
Hume's and Smith's theory of spirit by emphasizing that it refers to the necessary 
relationship between public and private spheres, the manifestation of a crucial moment of 
history, and to an active impulse in the conformation of individuals.  
 Precisely because Hume and Smith recognized the contradictions that were 
creating a crisis in their societies, they decided to pursue those contradictions to their 
conclusion and try to provide a rational explanation of them. In so doing they depicted an 
all-encompassing society that is condensed in its modes of organizing history and nature. 
Their thinking holds together descriptions and prescriptions by a principle of totality: the 
spirit.  They both believe that unless there is a full recognition of spirit's truth and 
authority, the whole will collapse. Therefore they propose universal rules presented as 
expressions of spirit of the last moment of history as it was experienced in civilized 
societies.  
 The authority of the facts, as contradictory as they can be, corresponds not just to 
its mere apparition but also to its nature of spirit's expressions. Hume and Smith 
understood that differences were a fundamental part of their societies, particularly the 
division of labor. However, they also supposed that unity was possible by the spirit. The 
effective antagonisms are reconciled or, more precisely, subsumed by the truth of the 
spirit's unity, which is manifested in certain customs and traditions. There are also breaks 
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within the spirit's activity; these social interruptions of the spirit's movement are 
understood as non-natural--although they are the truth of the spirit. The equivalence 
between spirit and nature, as I will discuss in other chapters, is one pivotal assumption 
displayed by the idea of the economy of the flesh. As thinkers of an existing whole that is 
constituted by multiple differences, Hume and Smith focused on how to achieve in and 
through each individual a communication in their most singular actions of the spirit. 
 Accordingly, for Hume and Smith it was of decisive importance to intervene even 
in gender performances, which they understood as expressions of economic dispositions 
and naturalization, carriers of cultural distinctiveness, the possibility and expression of 
civilization,4 and the sustainability of the division of labor.  The notion of women was for 
Hume and Smith a location in which to incarnate their ideals and to depict the 
contradictions of commercial society and the spirit of the age: “In the eighteenth century, 
the image of women became the symbol of commercial society, embodying the ethos of 
transaction and conversation.”5 Both of these authors were part of a large dispute about 
the formation of identities and the distribution of identifications that was central for the 
construction of an image of nationhood and tradition.6 As in the previous interpretation of 
Hume's life representation, the notion of women allows me to present the depth of their 
economic theory. I argue that as a derivation or component of their notion of spirit these 
authors have developed an understanding of women that specifies what the spiritual 
necessities of the whole (society) were and at the same time specifies its products. 
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  The chapter follows a strategy of explanation of the notion of women that could 
be called genetic. The strategy consists of showing how this notion appears as a 
counterpart to discussions on, for instance, security, law, and manners. In this way, 
women are grasped as a political and epistemic concept, which expresses the danger of 
disorder, non-productivity, and unregulated imagination. Nature, in this context, is 
equivalent to constancy, hierarchical organization, and structural asymmetry understood 
as rational. I highlight two basic aspects in this section. First, I clarify what is the 
understanding of reason and self that sustains Hume and Smith's understanding of 
women. Second, I identify the strategies, exercises, and modes through which it was 
possible, according to Hume and Smith, to normalize oneself. Both of these authors 
practiced a way of thinking that focused on agency and practice; theirs was a philosophy 
of activity. Being able to adequately direct one's life was a fundamental problem for them 
because of the multiple intersections of public and private life.  Third, I focus on the 
perception of women's constitutive state as a producer of operations that are brute and 
lack intelligence and so require instruction and guidance. 
In the following section I demonstrate that Hume and Smith's theory of spirit and 
its explicit appearance within their discussions about women share a common inner logic 
with strictly theological texts from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By inner logic 
I mean continuity in the regulatory notions that permit the display of nature, spiritual 
authority7 and spirit. I argue that there is a fundamental interrelation or conceptual 
familiarity between the mode in which theology argues about the relationship between 
spirit and authority and how Hume and Smith relate their understanding of spirit with 
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economy and nature. 
1. Spiritual Police and Nature’s Empire 
The Forms of Prayers written by John Knox (1514-1572)8 is a large treatise 
concerning the administration of sacraments. One of the basic questions Knox addresses 
in his text is the question of the spirit and authority. How to preserve God's government is 
the objective of the book. In the section dedicated to the “Order of the Ecclesiastical 
Discipline” Knox affirms that the fundamental method by which a city, town, house, or 
family exists is policy/ governance. Nevertheless, while explaining the specific form of 
governance of Church Knox introduces the notion of “Spirituall Policie.”9 Besides being 
the foundation of government, this notion includes the idea of the organizing bodies 
conforming to a decent order; that is to say that spirit concentrates its activities in the 
specificity of everybody's differences to create members. Spirit is what unites, frames, 
and models the different bodies within a major unity. Then Knox introduces an analogy 
between the activity of the spirit and the father's natural position in the family as the one 
who castigates and teaches. The “Spiritual Policie” of the father is directly linked to God. 
Spirit's aim is to correct rebellions and to create the same. If the bodies manifest 
themselves as different the spiritual police have to act as a disciplinary force. However, 
Spirit's first and most important task is to extinguish the manifestation of evil differences. 
 John Calvin's (1509-1564) discussion about the relationship between the two 
kingdoms is an introduction to the spiritual and natural foundation of political authority. 
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Ministration of the Sacraments Used in the English Congregation at Geneva: and approved by the famous 
and godly learned man, Ion Caluyn. 
   
9 Ibid., 203. 
 
87 
 
God is the source of every political authority and the spirit of God is what grounds human 
relationships. Calvin’s characterization of man as a social animal that fully expresses 
itself as a civil animal permits him to introduce his understanding of government as the 
set of practices whose aim is to protect the common good. Spirit and law are understood 
as aspects of the same thing: part of God's plan to unify albeit with tension, through its 
spirit, the natural and political law: “But although, as we have just warned, this civil 
kingdom is different for the spiritual and inward kingdom of Christ, we must know that 
the former does not contradict the latter.”10 Calvin does not subordinate the kingdom of 
“civil justice and reforming of morals” to the spiritual kingdom because “already here on 
earth the spiritual kingdom gives us some taste of the heavenly kingdom.”11 
Calvin presents the dominion of the spirit of the institutions and its laws as equal 
to human nature.  The dominion of the spirit or, more precisely, the kingdom of earth is 
what makes possible life and the expansion of the commonwealth. Spirit is the principle 
of light that is not subjected to any authority. Calvin concludes that being fully human 
requires the conjoining of spirit and flesh or heaven and earth. Following on that idea he 
develops a theology of the subject that reappears later with Hume and Smith: 
The first duty of subjects toward their superiors is to have a great and high regard 
for their state, recognizing it as a commission given by God, and therefore to 
honor and revere their superiors as those who are God’s lieutenants and deputies. 
For we see some who are obedient to their magistrates and would not want there 
not to be some superior to whom they were subject, since they know that it is 
necessary for the public good.12 
 
God’s presence is manifested in its “lieutenants and deputies” and from that 
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follows, according to Calvin, an unrestricted subjection to the spirit of kingdom of the 
earth. Calvin’s theology of the subject supposes that the so called two kingdoms are 
united within the logics of law and obedience. In order to prevent rebellion he introduces 
the invisible hand: “First I exhort my readers to consider carefully God’s providence and 
the special way he uses to arrange kingdoms and establish such kings as He pleases.”13 
Thus, human nature fully manifests itself through obedience without discernment.  
 
The terms “Spirituall Policie” and Nature’s Empire refer to four aspects: 
 a) It is the self-established principle of organization, discipline, and differentiation 
that allows the body to economize its own parts and defend itself from “differences.” The 
regime of the spirit is indeed based on the assumption of belief and practical truth. The 
members of spirit's dominion cannot dispute spirit's authority. 
b) Spirit precedes the body and functions as its condition of possibility. Spiritual 
policy as well as spirit’s dominion is generative and creative of life. Thus spirit is what 
links, at the same time that it subordinates, the social, civil, and religious spheres making 
them part of the same historical narrative.  
 c) Therefore its actions traverse every single part of its members and, at the same 
time create them. The function of a spirited body is to permanently create its members 
through exercises of self-creation such as prayer and sacraments.  
d) Discipline, understood as punishment, is not the unique or even fundamental 
activity of the spirit. Even punishment has as its intention to maintain the body as a 
whole. It is not understood as destruction but as the reestablishment of the dominion of 
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spirit over flesh which has both retentive or conservative and also expansive 
consequences. 
 In the text The First Blast, To a Wake Women Degenerate14 Knox demonstrates 
the operation of the Spirit. This text intends to defend the forms in which God's 
ordinances manifest themselves in nature and more specifically to expand one particular 
affirmation: “I affirme the empire of Woman to be a thing repugnant to Nature.”15 For 
Knox women are bodies without spiritual capacities, unable to conduct themselves 
because they are “foolishe, madde, and phrenetike,”16 this is to say unequivocally 
affected by a constitutional degeneration. They lack the “spirit of counsel and 
regiment,”17 which is the natural property of men. 
 At a first literal level Knox writes the history of the distance between spirit and 
women and as a subtext the history of the advance of the spirit. Because of their 
monstrous desires, says Knox, women have to be subjected to men or be under their 
empire;18 their presence itself represents a danger for the commonwealth, order, and 
policy established by God's word. Then, at a second level, the one in which the text 
inscribes itself, the spirit, in its own movement, writes history. In its movement it divides 
and creates life. Its truth is manifested in the “weaker” bodies of women.  
The creation of life, not circumscribed to the biological realm, depends on the 
discipline of the degenerate. Just by respecting the spirit's organization of history it is 
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possible to secure God's precepts. Because of this an economy of flesh becomes 
necessary: “I am not ignorant that the subtill wittes of carnall men (which can never be 
broght under the obedience of Goddes simple preceptes) to maintein this monstruous 
empire has yet two vaine shiftes.”19 It is, at its core, a carnal principle that attempts a 
rebellion against the spirit, a contrary principle of organization that must be 
“repressed.”20 For Knox the political institutions, always animated by the spirit, have the 
responsibility to intervene to secure the natural course of history. Those institutions must 
reorient women in such ways that they will be able to obey nature. Spiritless women are 
“monstres” because they contaminate the world. 
He [God] hath set before our eyes two other Mirrors and glasses, in whiche he 
will that we shulde behold the ordre which he hath appointed and established in 
nature: The one is the naturall bodie of man; the other is the politik or civile body 
of that common wealth, in which God by his own Word hath apointed an ordre.21 
 
  Knox distinguishes this order from the “monstre” in which the organs and parts 
are not naturally placed. What is important here are not just the references to women but 
also the functioning of the spirit's policy and dominion as this will reappear in Hume and 
Smith. In tracing the “march of the spirit” it becomes clearer how it is, at its roots, an 
activity oriented to the economy of flesh. Economy administrates, expends and saves 
flesh while increasing or opening space for the spirit's movement. Hume and Smith 
aggregate to this mutually productive relationship an understanding of nature that reaches 
its limits in the civilized society. Spirit enlightens nature showing its internal 
potentialities and also its necessary forms of surviving.  Both of them understand society 
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as an articulated whole with historical ascendency but this does not interfere with how 
they related spirit and their own history: naturalizing its contradictions and declaring 
them impossible to transform. 
2. Spirit and Economy: Hume 
 The question of the Spirit, as demonstrated in my discussion of Steuart, was not 
an unusual theme of economic discussions. Hume's economic essays also contain 
important references to the question of the spirit. The essay “Of Commerce”22 contains 
various thematic fields and includes a historical presentation about the progress of 
commerce. For Hume, in order to be intelligible, the discussion about commerce has to 
concentrate on what he calls principles. His own philosophical position is that he has to 
provide insights regarding the totality of the conditions that can make a better 
relationship possible between the public sphere and private man. Without the 
achievement of these principles the entire existence of a commonwealth disappears. 
Hume acknowledges that these principles are susceptible to being changed and 
transformed thanks to human constitution: “Man is a variable being,”23 he writes, but 
principles remain imperative. In Hume’s historical account about the division of labor, he 
does not explicitly discuss the various sets of exigencies that the organization of labor 
requires for every member of a society. Commerce, for Hume, designates variables such 
as moral contention, use of time, recreation, and imagination. A commercial society is 
therefore that in which the most intimate characteristics of individuals are united by 
common orientations and everyone is able to dominate themselves in order to develop 
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their intrinsic capacities and historical possibilities. 
These individuals are divided into different sectors in which their situational and 
structural concatenation together contributes to their happiness. Hume presents their 
division into different occupations and duties as a manifestation of history's last stage. 
Hence, their fundamental purpose should not be to transform its actual conditions, but 
instead to promote the sharing of wealth that is allowed by industry, trade, and luxury. 
Therefore there is, for Hume, continuity between the household economy and the general 
economy of society. The channel of communication between these two economic ambits 
is the incarnation of the “spirit of the age” in everyone's body. Commerce is a dynamism 
that involves the “whole” but that derives its most decisive impulse from the strict 
acquisition of humanity. Thus the spirit has to be actualized, embodied, incarnated, and 
made present.  Hume's understanding of economy tends to concentrate on those aspects 
that guarantee the control of what Burke explained as a state of unproductive relaxation.24 
That state, the opposite of labor, affects not only the corporeal constitution of the 
individual but also of the social body.  
               At this point my interest is not to discuss Hume's history of the division of labor 
but to discuss what the principles of that division are. First, the anthropological 
principle,25 which orientates Hume's presentation, is the distinction between savage state 
and a state in which it is possible to have, for particular social groups, relatively 
autonomous time. Second, regarding the question of spirit, Hume recognizes that, for 
                                                          
24 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008 [1757]), 122. 
 
25 Mario Bürmann, Das Labor des Anthropologen: Anthropologie und Kultur bei David Hume 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008), 41-84. 
 
93 
 
small states, it is necessary to create and permanently reinforce among the population 
their will to serve and remain loyal to their states. Then he separates himself from the 
idea of public or people's spirit to promote a direct encounter with mankind. 
Sovereigns must take mankind as they find them, and cannot pretend to introduce 
any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long course of time, 
with a  variety of accidents and circumstances, are requisite to produce those great 
revolutions, which so much diversify the face of human affairs. And the less 
natural any set of principles are, which support a particular society, the more 
difficulty will a legislator meet with in raising and cultivating them […] Now 
according to the most natural course of things, industry and arts and trade 
encrease the power of the sovereign as well as the  happiness of the subjects.26 
 
 By negating the imposition of a certain spirit, Hume recognizes and affirms the 
existence of natural dispositions that are associated with the division of labor. Nature, for 
Hume, expresses certain trends that, if followed, will guarantee the betterment of society. 
Everyone has to obey their own position within the general organization of labor in order 
to satisfy their most elemental passions. Acceptance of spirit is the ultimate historical 
possibility for happiness. Yet accepting one's natural position within the division of labor 
also presupposes various consequences in social relationships. 
 For the worker it implies an increased concentration in becoming more skilful in 
the performance of his duty. Workers have to accommodate themselves to the 
acceleration of time as well as the reduction of their space; from the land they have to 
migrate to the incipient cities to contribute to the public service, to put their bodies 
entirely at the service of the public good: “Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified 
camp, and infuse into each breast so martial a genius, and such passion of public good, as 
to make every one willing to undergo the greatest hardships for the sake of the public”—
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that is the dream.27 Yet this disposition, according to Hume, is difficult to create and 
apply. The problem of regulating the “whole” is that these passions do not promote self-
interest. So instead Hume offers another group of passions by which to govern men, 
whom he proposes to “animate […] with a spirit of avarice and industry, art and 
luxury.”28  
Hume moves from understanding spirit as self-negation to spirit as the affirmation 
of the self. This notion of the self is strictly connected with commodities. The commodity 
is its foundation, and is what provides its flourishing and progress. Hume's individuals 
express their entire development through the appreciation and enjoyment of commodities; 
in and through commodities' fluxing, individuals explicitly show their more delicate 
capacities. In order to create commodities, it is necessary to assure that extended sectors 
of the population dedicate themselves to their production. Increasing the production of 
such commodities requires of the worker a concentrated time of labor each day, while the 
“gayer and most opulent part of the nation”29 become acquainted with objects of luxury 
and their desire of more and newer commodities is awakened. While the workers have to 
accommodate themselves to labor constrictions and exigencies, the rich, the merchants, 
and the adventurers create innovative forms of acquiring more commodities. This 
division, which is fundamental to understanding Hume's idea of commerce and 
sociability, has commonalities that are important to mention. An industrious society or 
nation displays a spirit that combines self-interest and restriction within the 
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acknowledgment of the division of labor and production of commodities as its 
foundation. The different social groups have to act in such a way that their necessities can 
be fully achieved without transforming or deteriorating nature. 
Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in 
three ingredients; action, pleasure, and indolence: And though these ingredients 
ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular disposition 
of the person; yet one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in 
some measure, the relish of the whole composition.30 
 
 Hume's ideal for happiness requires perpetual occupation or work because, 
according to his understanding, in doing their natural duties everyone can acquire 
pleasure and enjoyment. Being industrious protects individuals from unnatural appetites. 
Industry, commerce, and activity are accelerators of transformation even for the aspects 
that might result in non-economic importance. Hume presents commerce as an “encrease 
of humanity”31 that extends itself throughout public relationships. “The spirit of the age,” 
as Hume calls his displaying of the conditions of possibility of sociability based upon a 
strict separation and division between social sectors, embodies itself in techniques of 
government. In Hume's understanding, action incorporates a process of self-modeling 
that tends to construct equivalence between individual's freedom and aspirations and the 
constituted society. For the unsophisticated, the aim is to make the horizon of their 
expectations and labor coincide. Action is in this case a repetition of tasks that are not 
entirely controllable. Pleasure is connected with labor, martial spirit, and discipline; it is 
not separated from the realm of productivity, but emerges from the physical pain 
associated with the production of commodities and the need of subsistence that makes the 
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worker sell his body for labor and his flesh for the mere subsistence of his body. For 
Hume, nevertheless, there is no plausible historical option for a mode of organization that 
requires for its reproduction the closure of the world. Although Hume separates himself 
from Mandeville's understanding of noble sin, 32 he explains that the proper functioning 
of society necessitates the allowance of vicious luxury. 
Luxury, when excessive, is the source of many ills; but is in general preferable to 
sloth  and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its place, and are more 
harmful both  to private persons and to the public. When sloth reigns, a mean 
uncultivated way of life prevails amongst individuals without society, without 
enjoyment.33 
  
 Hence the spirit that manifests itself throughout social relationships but acquires 
different presentations without being divided supports the dynamism of society. For 
“labourers,” this spirit manifests its strength in the disposition to produce the conditions 
of possibility for physical existence and luxury that is necessary for the development of 
fine arts and refinement. What condenses Hume's understanding of spirit of the age is the 
idea of permanent activity oriented to public utility. Being useful and active in the affairs 
of society expresses a spirited individual. It is only in and through individuals that it is 
possible to establish and extend the political society and the division of labor. The 
constitution of individuals is a condition without which “Human nature cannot, by any 
means, subsist.”34 Nonetheless these individuals are forms, manifestations, activities of 
the spirit. For the existence of a civilized society, the elision of differences within the 
limits of commodity production and division of labor is necessary.   
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 To this point I have shown that economy is a type of knowledge that encompasses 
the “whole,” as Hume puts it, from the perspective of a body and spirit dispositions. The 
fundamental assumption of this position is that commerce and trade are manifestations of 
the spirit of the age and that through this spirit it is possible to fully express human 
nature. Spirit is not just a combination of new ideas or the manifestation of nature's 
designs; it is invention.35 Within Helvétius' (1715-1771) discussion about spirit there is a 
chapter dedicated to what he calls “De l' esprit du siècle” that opens with the assertion 
that this kind of spirit does not contribute to the development of arts or sciences. 
Helvetius' differentiations in this section are entirely geared at showing the superiority of 
the men that perpetually and eagerly try to achieve more knowledge and experiment 
beyond the limits of the common experience. Nevertheless he concludes that the 
fundamental pretension of the “sprit du siècle” is being agreeable and charming in 
conversation. In the first chapter I showed that those characteristics are part of the 
economic ideals and ideas about nature of Hume but that they do not encapsulate the total 
significance of the spirit of the age. For Hume, spirit is a way to refer to the present, to 
the actual form of temporal and spatial organization. For him any criticism of the present 
contains within itself the danger of extremism and fanaticism. Hume's philosophy of 
“common life”36 locates itself within universal history, as a culmination of its possibilities 
as well as of its limitations. 
 The universality of Hume's own historical history, its expansive nature, relies on 
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the spirit's movement across differences and particularities to settle and provide 
asymmetric happiness. By asymmetric happiness I mean that as the spirit moves, it 
prompts production, distribution, luxury, arts, the relaxation provided by science, and 
refinement, and that it also establishes positions and functions within the division of 
labor. This process of movement and establishment Hume understands as offering 
happiness and fulfillment of everyone's inherent capacities. 
 When Hume advises that most of the destiny of philosophy is to respect man37 he 
is referring to the limits of the universal as expressed in man's spirit.  Attention to the 
core of clarity of exposition and the avoidance of melancholy is indeed a patriotic 
understanding of philosophy,38 and this comprehension implies that the activity of 
philosophy must communicate and prescribe the means that conform the movement of 
the whole, although that implies damaging or hurting some individuals or not recognizing 
the vast majority of the population who are obliged to obey the customs that keep them 
close to death.39 It constitutes a fundamental misreading of Hume's understanding of 
agency, movement, and activity to interpret it as the movement from an entirely passive 
“subject -subjectum” to a notion of an active subject that, through its own activity, has the 
capacity to develop its own identity. Non-“radical subjectivism”40 affects Hume's notion 
of the division of labor, and its social conditions of possibility, as a requisite for effective 
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humanity.  The constitution of the subject is a subsidiary expression of the establishment 
of civilization and division of labor. Even acknowledging Hume's critique of the 
“sustancialidad de la identidad personal,”41 personal identity remains the requisite of 
nature: that one's “subjectivity” coincide with the whole and its assignation of social, 
economic, and political locations. 
 In expressing one's own duty one is manifesting the spirit or universal history as it 
presents within the specificity of a historical period. Identifying oneself with the spirit of 
the age is the act by which an individual truly embraces his or her liberty. It is a way of 
saying one is acting in accordance with the whole, with spirit42 as the source of one's 
necessity. Hume introduces us to an understanding of the relationship between liberty and 
necessity in which the individual is expected to orientate his or her movements in 
accordance with the dynamism of the division of labor. These are the necessary 
connections that “are not to be controlled or altered by any philosophical theory or 
speculation whatsoever.”43 
3. Economizing Women 
 On the basis of his comprehension and presentation of spirit, Hume offers a 
careful consideration of the economy of women's bodies and fidelity. Economy in this 
context has to be understood as administration and selective expenditure of women's 
“nurturing nature.” Women are required to be available within the household as their 
contribution to political society. They are expected to present themselves as permanently 
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aware of men's needs, understood as an expression of the needs of the larger public 
sphere. Without this female disposition, humanity would never reach its state of 
individuality.  The fidelity to the “marriage bed”44 has utility in one precise sense: it 
provides security to the city and enables the reproduction of the population. In caring for 
and nurturing those in their household, women are useful to the public. Another aspect of 
this female bodily economy is the expectation that women remain chaste; according to 
Hume, to do this, women have to control their imagination as well as surrender 
themselves to silence. 
Even in repeating stories, whence we can foresee no ill consequences to result, the 
 giving of one's author is regarded as piece of indiscretion, if not of immorality. 
These  stories, in passing from hand to hand, and receiving all the usual 
variations, frequently come about to persons concerned, and produce animosities 
and quarrels among people, whose intentions are the most innocent and 
inoffensive.45 
 
 Women's economy of themselves encompasses even the act of writing, reading, 
and talking because these apparently innocent acts contain the possibilities of disrupting 
the gentle and trustful sociability that serves as a base for the multitude of relations that 
happen simultaneously in society. What is expected of women is that they always be on 
hand to educate children and to offer their bodies to their husbands. Even “robbers and 
pirates,”46 remarks Hume, maintain a basic understanding of justice among themselves; 
so there is all the more reason for a political society to elaborate on the most delicate 
aspects of human intercourse if that society wants to subsist. Tellingly, Hume describes 
women's behavior and position within political society in practically the same breath as 
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general rules for drinking, gaming, and traveling. What, then, is an unnatural woman? It 
is one who becomes merely a shadow of her own natural being by being neither useful 
nor social. She must, moreover, ignore her passions, for her most private inclinations are 
in themselves public as far as they are carriers of value —enough reason for them to be 
subjected to public scrutiny.   
 Women generate interest yet always with the understanding that they maintain 
their subservient position to men. The spirit of the age has provided them a value that is 
directly equivalent to their capacity to avoid another bed. The presupposition here is “that 
sex's” proclivity is to indulge secret and indecent appetites. This is a basic philosophical 
position in that it assumes a distinction between women’s and men’s mental capacities or 
women’s intense fleshiness. Women can lose their productive status if they become social 
infidels. Men decree that women are entirely public and that “the smallest failure 
is…sufficient to blast her character.”47 
 Discussion about this question, by writers from Annette C. Baier48to Ann Levey,49 
focused on the consistency of Hume's theory of virtue as well as on Hume's theory of 
regulation50 and the advantages of Hume's characterization of women for academic 
purposes.51 Richard Boyd's consideration of Hume's theory of morals and manners 
clarifies the economic profile of chastity and body discipline. For Boyd there is an 
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intrinsic connection between civility and “the properties Hume attributes to the 
market;”52 this connection effectively functions as a disruptive force that creates 
differences at the same time that it weakens boundaries and common assumptions. 
Without the production of differences, Boyd insists, there cannot be commerce in its 
broad sense of the creation and sociability of individuals. 
 Even if one acknowledges that: “Feminist and postmodernist scholars have 
recently been drawn to Hume because of the challenge his work presents to the fallacy of 
essentialism, which would suggest that there are certain fixed and immutable 
characteristics associated with different races, nations, or genders,”53 this cannot be 
interpreted as an attempt to separate Hume's critique of the self and his economic theory. 
Hume's interventions about women are part of a process of naturalization that tends to 
promote the solidity of the household and intimate relationships, as they were understood 
as one of the nuclei of the spirit of the age.  Hume himself clarified this point in An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: 
The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human 
action  is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the 
action of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the 
agent. The poorest artificer, who labours alone, expects at least the protection of 
the magistrate, to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also 
expects that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at reasonable 
price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to 
engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his 
subsistence.54 
 
Hume's understanding of cooperation and social agency founded on trust establish 
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the limits of Hume's separation from the idea of “naturalness.” Without trustworthy social 
institutions and family relationships, the mechanism that identifies labor with enjoyment 
(and also security and self-confidence) can be damaged. Women therefore have to 
provide security for the sake of the market's and humanity’s functioning. While the 
increase of trade and traveling were considered to be fundamental for the transformation 
of the public and private spheres, the “values of contemporary family morals” were 
assumed as a frontier of the progress of society.55 Economic expectations grew from the 
achievements and sensible experiences of contiguity, friendship, and marriage to larger 
social and national ones. Because men dislike uncertainty in commercial sociability, they 
ensure certainty in something they think is controllable that is women and family.56  
 Economizing women, creating their nature, their “fears and apprehensions,” is 
part of what was for Hume the most necessary condition to the establishment of human 
society: property. In Hume's case there are differences with possessive individualism's 
basic assumption: “that man is free and human by virtue of his sole proprietorship of his 
own person, and that human society is essentially a series of market relations”57 or, more 
than differences, Hume's understanding of property is specified. For women, Hume's 
spirit of the age implies for women an equalization between restriction and agency, an 
operative form of inferiority.58 Men do not allow women to administrate their own lives; 
instead, men considered even those parts of the market, a market under men's control. In 
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economizing women's bodies' appetites and imagination, men through women secure the 
ongoing process of the political and commercial society. For Hume, flesh has evidently 
sex. 
4. Smith, Spirit, and Women 
 Smith understands that there is a propensity in human nature to exchange one 
thing for another. Related to the necessity of exchange is related, according to Smith, 
self-interest. What occurs in civilized society is fundamentally the expression of an 
individual's interest in his or her own subsistence. The permanent relations that occur in 
society are performed by different kinds of proprietors trying to acquire advantages; 
proprietors range from wage laborers to proprietors of land, metals, and small fortunes. 
Hence civilized agents or citizens express in their quotidian exchanges a twofold 
disposition: they have to demonstrate their capacity to develop themselves but to be able 
to do so without the benevolence of others. Protecting their own lives without the 
assistance of intermediaries is a decisive component of civilization. Second, this process 
of individuation does not, in any regard, imply a separation from other productive 
individuals. Indeed, if all of them could take advantage of their differences this would 
allow them to satisfy both their social necessities and their individual desires. This is the 
ultimate sense of Smith's proposal: individuals preserving their existence by their natural 
or acquired capacities without interfering but cooperating with other agents. Since 
everyone wants to preserve his or her own existence, it is preferable to pursue relations 
within the circuit of exchange and to have commodities as a universal form of 
communication. The sustainability of the circuits of exchange and sympathy are made 
possible in part by the public expression of spirit that must, according to Smith, be 
105 
 
imparted to the people. Society that Smith, like Hume, understood as an interconnected 
whole whose primary functions affect its most complex operations, needs to be 
incarnated in every single person. 
 Smith's understanding of spirit is widely presented in his An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations explicitly in Book V, Chapter I, Part I-III, 
Articles II-III in which Smith proposes that “the third and last duty of the sovereign or 
commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions” 59 through 
and in which the great society receives advantage. For him there are institutions, 
procedures, activities, and amusements that due to both their complexity and beneficial 
nature in the work of reproducing civilized societies should be maintained by the 
commonwealth. By beneficial natural I mean that these institutions have as their basic 
orientation and aim the betterment and deepening in every individual of the 
characteristics that are necessary for the functioning of society.  
 Security and instruction intersect each other as both of these activities and their 
respective institutions have the responsibility to form people. The formation of the people 
and the security of the territory are part of the processes that disseminate and expand 
civilization. Instruction of the people as an economic notion used by Smith is understood 
as the means that allows the incorporation of “separated” individuals into society. It is 
necessary to differentiate, at least for now, Smith's understanding of instruction with that 
of formation of souls (A Formação das Almas60) which is related to Petty, with the idea 
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of the formation of traditions61 or as rationalization of property and inequality.62 Smith's 
notion of spirit should be the object of detailed consideration for anyone is trying to 
understand the functioning of his economic theory. For Smith understood his own 
historical time with its spiritual structure as an expression of the end of the time. 
Nonetheless this comprehension is completely separated from Steuart's own politics of 
the spirit. There is continuity from Hume to Smith regarding the question of spirit that is 
developed as an economy of individuals and, more specifically, as the creation of women. 
There is a conceptual configuration that I would like to comment on as it is decisive to 
Smith's idea of spirit: I am referring to the concept of people as the originators of a series 
of differentiations that are part of the fulfillment of historical time.   
Expense 
 The discussion titled “Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Education of 
Youth”63 contains an important affirmation about the relationship between government 
and individuals. It clarifies the ways in which society can be preserved. Smith 
understands his own intervention in society in terms of the creation of the conditions of 
intelligibility and the conditions of necessity. First, he is interested in clarifying the basic 
components of education and its most salient characteristics. Then, he proceeds to locate 
education within what is, for him, the proper form to refer to it. Second, he establishes the 
minimum conditions for an education in a civilized society. Smith's first important 
affirmation is that without a government's intervention a society can degenerate and 
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corrupt itself. Civilized society is not, as can be deduced from the previous affirmation, a 
natural development; its maintenance requires control, protection, and, specifically, the 
intervention of government. 
 Instruction is not related to the acquisition of skills to operate or perform labor as 
labor consists for the most part in the repetition of a few simple operations. It follows that 
instruction has to operate in a different realm than that of labor. The realm within which 
instruction or education of the people proceeds is that of the human creature considered 
as a rational being. Smith recognizes that with the progress of the division of labor there 
is a tendency that combines specialization and repetition and leads to ignorance and 
stupidity: “The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing 
a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender 
sentiment.”64Smith here describes the loss of humanity of a “great body of the people” as 
they live by labor.  
In losing humanity they become a danger to the social body, because they are 
incapable of being obedient and self-controlled. The people, that product of the progress 
of the division of labor, are not just foreign to the most delicate customs of society; they 
are also incapable of defending their country. Living by labor annihilates even the will to 
live, to preserve one's own life, and by extension any desire to participate in the 
improvement of the public sphere. In Smith's philosophy of history the pain, extenuation, 
and diminishing of the capacities of the “labouring poor” are an intrinsically necessary 
component of a civilized society. That was what Hume called “spirit of the age.” This is 
the difference between a civilized society and “barbarous societies:” civilization is, in 
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spatial terms, the absolute limit of human possibilities.  It requires for its living to create a 
massive social sector which it’s disposed from its most elemental features as human 
creature.  
In “Barbarous societies,” affirms Smith, every man is multiple or, more precisely, 
manifests himself in multiple occupations and activities. In doing that his reason and 
ability to interact with nature is continually increasing. Being civilized, if one is part of 
the common people, had a narrow significance. It meant making your body function until 
you reach its maximum level of productivity. However, it is the responsibility of the 
public, which Smith distinguishes from “people of some rank and fortune,”65 to give 
attention to those who offer their bodies in the market. 
 Smith's solution for the risk implied in the process of the division of labor is to 
offer to the common people the most basic parts of education. This elemental instruction 
consists in the acquisition of technical abilities that can be applied in commerce and 
security. 
But the security of every society must always depend, more or less, upon the 
martial spirit of the great body of the people […] But where every citizen had the 
spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would surely be requisite. That spirit, 
besides, would necessarily diminish very much the dangers to liberty, whether real 
or imaginary.66 
 
 Instruction on how to defend society is the regulatory idea that orientates Smith's 
idea of education for the common people. By security he means two disparate and 
particular components: what should be secure and defended is the division of labor, the 
production of commodities, and the inequality between “ranks.” Smith is trying to 
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eliminate the inherent conflict of the process that created the “labouring poor” merely as 
consumers and factors of production. Smith is best understood within the history of 
rebellions and social conflict that occurred in Scotland throughout the eighteenth 
century.67 The imperative tone that characterizes Smith's urging for a model of education 
for the common people corresponds to different incidents in Scotland to do with the 
occupation and property of land. This atmosphere understandably prompted some 
reflection. 
 Hitherto what characterizes Smith's ideas of education are “structures and 
mechanisms of power.”68 So, “Accustoming the poor to social discipline”69 was not 
restricted to schools and parishes; Smith includes its own philosophical work as an arm of 
those institutions or, more accurately, as its theoretical head. The real dangers to liberty 
are historically traceable and although not necessarily revolutionary they could be 
“vengeful and rebellious.” Real dangers to liberty refer to effective and physical acts of 
rebellion from the common people. Smith reads these acts of rebellion as the 
manifestation of a decomposition of the imaginary ties that related the “godly 
commonwealth.”  The physical acts of rebellion have as counterpart what should be 
called a dangerous imagination; Smith interprets it as the fading of the most essential 
parts of the character of a man. 
But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or of revenging himself, 
evidently wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man. He is as 
much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either 
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deprived of some of its most essential members, or has the use of them.70 
  
 Smith here predicates the way in which the body is animated or not by the spirit. 
The spirit manifests itself within the established institutions of society as people's bodies 
are willing (pace Steuart) to offer themselves to its protection and subsistence; these 
people retain their human character. Although they do not have the same political rights71 
their roots as humans are conserved if they defend themselves and their society. 
Defending oneself must not be confused with the preservation of one's individual, 
autonomous life; rather it refers to the relations that make possible one's existence in 
society.  For the “labouring poor” the achievement of a fully developed “individuality,” as 
expressed in Hume's biographies and autobiography is not part of their horizon of 
expectations.  The absence of spirit for such people mutilates them. This has different 
consequences. My suggestion is that the most important comes from a consideration of 
Smith's theory of propriety72 and consists in the impossibility of recognition. The coward, 
the spiritless one, cannot be recognized, and also loses his capacity of self-recognition as 
a human creature. That is the reason why Smith treats cowardice as a disease and the 
coward as an infected organism that can spread its malice throughout the social body. The 
medical imaginary is not, in any regard, simply metaphorical; rather, it is attached to an 
anatomical and biological view of social life that is poignantly expressed in what Smith 
calls oeconomy of nature.73 This economy of nature is at the same time related with what 
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is depicted in Robinson Crusoe as an “evil influence” that carries a person away from his 
or her father's house.74  
The house of the father as an equivalent of the actual and self-generated 
organization of life is abandoned simply because of an external force that takes 
momentary possession of a person. The house is already structured, finished, arranged in 
such a way that the spirit can inhabit it. That is the reason why one of the characters of 
the novel can interpret the abandoning of the Father's house as an act with theological 
implications: 
However he afterwards talk'd very gravely to me, exhorted me to go back to my 
father,  and not tempt Providence to my ruin; told me might I see a visible hand of 
Heaven against me, And young man, said he, depend upon it, if you do not go 
back, where ever you go, you will meet with nothing but disasters and 
disappointments, till your father's words are fulfilled upon you.75 
 
 Smith’s sees the origins of Crusoe's traveling as having originated in his 
discomfort about what Smith considered “useful habits.”76  It was an adventure without 
the blessing of God or the Father, both of them are aspects of what Smith considers spirit. 
Not having spirit implies an anatomical deficiency, a moral failure, and also a rupture 
with the visible hand that arranges the dwelling of the spirit in and through society.  With 
the publication of Frankenstein, desperate imagination, as presented by the character of 
Victor, is also represented solely as the origin of the monstrosities.77 The monster is the 
one who cannot relate itself to society; he is the one who is not useful and has to hide in 
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the forest. Spirit is social or manifest and distributes itself through all social activities. 
Because of that Smith insists on the advantages of offering instruction to inferior ranks of 
people. 
As instructed and intelligent people besides, are always more decent and orderly 
than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more 
respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and 
they are therefore more disposed to respect those superiors […] and they are, upon 
that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to 
the measures of government.78 
 
 To avoid rebellion, monstrosities, and disorder Smith insists on a type of 
instruction that creates a sentimental individuality that manifests itself in the performance 
of obedience and, underlying it, in the recognition of established social divisions. Smith 
presents instruction as a mechanism of creation of individuals and the contention of the 
intrinsic antagonisms originated from the division of labor. Smith interprets instructed 
people to be the ones that allow the fluxing of the natural course of existence, though 
with the possibility of benefiting from the movement of the spirit.  
Though Smith offers this form of instruction for the “labouring poor,” for the 
other ranks instead of obedience and contention he proposes amusement and diversion. 
The most beautiful expression of the spirit is manifested in public diversions, open and 
exultant celebration of the pleasures of life without excess that are performed by the 
gayer ranks of society.79 Then what matters is not that to the “lowest ranks” division of 
labor produces “intelligence [...] for the worker, stupidity, cretinism;”80 instead what 
matters is the overflowing presence of the spirit and how it reproduces itself with and 
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through these “homeopathic doses”81 of instruction. 
 Smith's notion of spirit (martial spirit) 82 has conceptual importance. To grasp its 
implications and reach within Smith's theory it is necessary to locate it beyond the limits 
of martial impulses and dispositions mainly associated with war between nations. For 
Smith, spirit entails production and reproduction of ranks, economizing of energies and 
intimacy, and administration of stupidity.  
Spirit has different levels of significance. It refers to the limits of human historical 
possibilities as well as to the manifestation of nature's most developed state. It is the full 
interpenetration of economy and nature, the closure of historical time. The spirit 
sanctions that the existing society as it is experienced by the different ranks of society 
must fundamentally not be changed. Spirit is the cohesive element that makes the general 
economy of society possible. In this case, the spirit is a force that takes on, or should be 
expressed, through different social procedures, in the life of individuals. It is the force 
that impels the connections and dynamism that exists within the public and private 
spheres, defending, securing, and healing the commonwealth. 
 Spirit is also what gives life in a double sense: it gives or sustains biological life 
as well as social and even intimate life. Without the regulatory presence of the spirit, the 
body/flesh loses its condition as a human creature being; that is to say, it is a condition of 
fellow-creature. The individual exists as it is recognized as other by the whole; thus 
individuality points to a productive source of roles or locations that also produces 
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identifications. Spirit is also a condemnation of death of residual aspects of individuality 
or any individualized reality that is not coincidental with the internal self-regulatory 
processes through which it can mobilize itself throughout the interconnected spheres that 
constitute civilized society. The actuality of individuality is manifested in its reproduction 
of the spirit of its society. Society's spirit is the other in which one is recognized as other. 
The “poor,” as a commentator recognizes, are socially invisible until their vanishing.83 
           Hirschman suggest that, “Smith sees the loss of martial spirit and virtues as one of 
the unfortunate consequences of both the division of labor and commerce in general.”84 
For him, the question of the loss of spirit does not have any connection with the explicit 
references established by Smith between the division of labor, human impoverishment, 
and instruction. Hirschman, as well as recent commentators,85 have maintained a position 
that completely overlooks Smith's concentration on “economic behavior”86 and its non-
intentional derivations has as a condition of possibility for the maximum economization 
or instruction of the “poor”. Hence, the absence of spirit that worries Smith and for which 
he develops his recommendations about education of the common people, is basically 
one: it is the largest sector of society that allows and sustains with their labor all aesthetic 
admiration and gentle conversations in salons; unless they are spirited common people 
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can constitute a disruptive aspect in the economic circuits.87   
5. Women, Nature, and Economy 
 It is from this perspective that the question of the creation of women is discussed 
in what follows. A description of the state of the education of women serves as an 
introduction to the most specific or practical of Smith's observations: 
There are no public institutions for the education of women, and there is 
accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical in the common course of their 
education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or 
useful for them to learn; and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their 
education tends evidently to some useful purpose; either to improve the natural 
attractions of their person, or to form their mind to  reserve, to modesty, to 
chastity, and to oeconomy; to render them both likely to become the mistresses of 
a family, and to behave properly when they have become such.88 
 
First, what appears in this passage is an apparent distinction between the domestic 
and public spheres. The education of women is presented as a domestic activity whose 
contents are necessary for the reproduction of the domestic realm. Nonetheless, in their 
case, instruction entails ubiquitous activity by the physical body, the passionate body, and 
the hyper-economic body. The prefix 'hyper' accentuates that for Smith the body itself is a 
basic economic concept as far as labor, as a producer of value, is an operation of human 
bodies or, more precisely, the operation of the “poor labouring” bodies both in their 
workplaces as well as within their households. The extent to which the physicality of 
women is an economic factor and not just a part of his theory of virtues has to be 
explained within the tension between the idea of the end of time and propriety.89  
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This tension can be expressed as the way in which Smith tries to conserve, within 
the novelty and definitiveness of the division of labor, aspects that will permit the 
conservation and enjoyment of relationships not orientated by the permanent flux of 
commercial society. What Smith wishes to conserve is a social space in which it is 
possible to balance the bodies that confirm civilization. It is upon the women's divided 
body that Smith locates the necessary “reserve” that can make possible the reproduction 
of the transient world with the new and enduring one.  Although this is an important entry 
point to Smith's notion of women, there is also another.  
In trying to confine women at the frontier of progress, without allowing them to 
fully embrace their possibilities, Smith makes explicit a type of economy based on a 
twofold position: first, he wants to reduce women's possibilities to participate in the 
productive market at the same that he pushes the solidification of the idea according to 
which the domestic activities belong to the natural realm. Women's economy is indeed 
understood as expenditure without value.90 Therefore, women's body work is considered 
not as labor but as a manifestation of the spiritual element that unites the different bodies 
that integrate the whole and produces the possibility of profit. The bodies of women are 
considered as that which brings together nature and economy not just in terms of the ideal 
of refinement but also in terms of the necessity of radical divisions91 that were differently 
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experienced among the ranks of society.92 
Economic delicacies  
 A detailed treatment of this question requires a consideration of Smith's lectures at 
the University of Glasgow in 1763, specifically of those lectures that he dedicated to 
explaining the different relations and obligations that must occur within a family.93 The 
lectures about man as a member of a family belong to the series of lectures dedicated to 
the theme of the rights of man. Smith divided these rights into three arenas: individual, 
familiar, and social. The foundation of the family is the relationship between husband and 
wife having sex because of the specific rights and obligations attached to it. For Smith, 
the relationship between husband and wife is centralized in reproduction; any other link 
appears to be secondary to the increase of the species. Smith understood the ability to 
conceive children as a natural process originated in the physiognomy. Nevertheless, 
because it is expected that a family have several children, it is a requisite for a marriage 
to be as permanent as possible. Legality is indeed connected with economy as family, 
since family is the nucleus of economic relationships.  
 The subsistence of the children is bound up to the relationship established in and 
through marriage. What provides actuality to marriage is the existence of the children and 
their helpless state. In their family relationships, women are permanently working to 
sustain their children; they reach the limits of their own existence as they become part of 
their children's lives. The affections that, according to Smith, unite the family are 
expressed by women in the form of expenditure of their lives for the purpose of 
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supplying more prosperity to their country.94 Although Smith presents the relationship 
between parent and children as one in which the children have to yield their will to their 
parents' authority, what occurs in the relationship between mother and children is 
different. In their everyday social intercourse, both mother and children have to “bring 
down his passions” and restrain their will as both of them are part of a larger dynamic: 
the production of “laborers”, as Smith explains in the Wealth of Nation.95  
The intimacy and affection they share threatens to be trespassed by the imminence 
of starvation due to the decreasing demand of their bodies.96 Nonetheless what is of 
importance for Smith are the social bonds to whose vigor and necessity any other 
intimate relationship must be subordinated, especially in the case of workers' families.  
 Smith’s lecture of Tuesday, February 8, 1763 begins with the assumption that the 
previous lectures have introduced the “origin of the perpetuity of marriage”97 but the 
explanation provided combined two forms of explanation. Initially Smith offers a natural 
outlook on marriage, which he includes as a conclusive example of the relationships of 
procreation between species. Then he introduces human procreation and family ties 
within an economy of passions and will that has as a purpose reproduction of sociability. 
Women are both artifacts that produce children and instructors that produce “labourers.” 
This lecture offers a historical view, beginning with the institution of marriage as was 
practiced by the Romans and ending in his own time. Smith's consideration of what he 
calls “license of divorce” is unequivocally condemnatory; he considers divorce a 
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corrupter of the “moralls of the women.”98  
Once again, as with Hume, the assumption is that women have to restrict 
themselves to deepening their natural capacities as well as offer their discretion for 
contemplation by others. Women have an interrupted or limited mechanism of self-
regulation that makes them eager to explore and expand their passions.  If rights are given 
to them, says Smith, they will negate with their actions and imagination the most delicate 
and admirable features of their nature. 
 Women's fluctuating passions are also the reason why Smith criticizes the practice 
of polygamy. According to him, women are not capable of controlling jealousy, which 
makes them potentially unsociable and unproductive. He continues: 
A son is considered as an inferior to his mother and under her command, which 
idea is  altogether inconsistent with that of a husband and wife, where the husband 
is conceived to have the superiority. The marriage of the father with the daughter 
is also very shocking and contrary to nature, but not altogether so much so as that 
of the son with the mother. The affection of a father is without a doubt very 
different from that of a husband and that of a daughter from that of a wife [...] But 
then there is not the same contrariety betwixt their condition in other respects. The 
father is the superior and the daughter the inferior, and this still continues in the 
husband and wife; whereas the mother is superior and the son the inferior, which 
is altogether to the idea of husband and wife, where the husband is always 
considered as the superior.99 
 
The concept of women expressed here should be discussed taking into account 
one decisive factor in Smith's argument: that women are naturally inferior in the marriage 
relationship. The economy of the household is conceived of as a descending hierarchy in 
which women have to remain subjected to their husbands. The members of the family 
function as indicators of social spheres and their connections. Father and sons are 
indicators of the public, commercial, and political space while mother and daughters are 
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indicators of the interior spaces (chiefly the household).  
As long as the asymmetry is maintained nature is respected and preserved, goes 
Smith's argument. Since women are always inferior, regardless of the ambit in which they 
can be found, the criterion to differentiate between natural and non-natural is the degree 
of authority and autonomy that they can achieve in specific societies. Smith assumes 
throughout his exposition that the father, in a monogamous marriage, will guarantee the 
survival of his wife without giving her special prerogatives regarding her life. The father's 
superiority contains a decisive economic implication: he, and his sons, are the ones that 
could achieve, through their public relationships with other agents, the benefits of 
commerce. Their activities, in their most strict physical sense, are the consequence of an 
original accumulation: the unpaid preservation of their lives that they receive for years 
within the hierarchical intimacy of the family. 
The Lecture of Friday, February 11th, 1763 combines a biblical and economic 
argument about marriage. Of importance is to make clear that for Smith the passage in 
Leviticus 18:18 that prohibit marriage with ones wife's sister is entirely rational and, at 
the most, necessitates some contextual clarifications. Religious tradition is not 
dispossessed of its authority as it provides regulations that can allow the functioning of 
the family. Second, Smith commends marriage, as it guarantees the legality of the 
children.  
From these two indications, that indicate the link between religion and law, in the 
next lecture100 he reiterates the most characteristic feature of the family's structure of 
authority: the father's emblematic and unquestionably predominant position. Preceding 
                                                          
100 Ibid., 171-175. Monday February 14th 1763. 
 
121 
 
the introduction of this characteristic is a summary about the nature of monogamous 
marriage. Man perpetuates his legacy in the public sphere through his children as his own 
echoes. Reproduction, in this context, goes beyond the mere biological multiplication of a 
species. It includes also the dreams of the father, and the extension of the structure of 
authority, in which his own self is based, into every relationship. The father's dream is to 
reflect in the public arena the dynamics of his marriage bed. His dream is of a supine 
woman, her legs spread both to be penetrated by him and to give birth. He is the master 
of that territory, the one who establishes its norms of functioning, its trade, and exchange. 
His dream is to reproduce himself as the spirit of the world.  Women do not form an 
integrally visible aspect of the world dreamed up by the father but they are responsible 
for their biological reproduction. Because of that Smith affirms years later that: 
Barrenness, so frequent among women of fashion, is very rare among those of 
inferior station. Luxury in the fair sex while it inflames perhaps the passion for 
enjoyment seems always to weaken and frequently to destroy altogether, the 
powers of generation. But poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is 
extremely unfavourable to the rearing of children.101 
 
 Women are indeed producers of life; that is their fundamental contribution to a 
civilized society, says Smith. The capacity of “women of fashion” to produce enjoyment 
and consume commodities is subordinate to biological reproduction.  For Smith, the 
production and distribution of wealth among women of “superior rank” could have the 
fateful consequence of allowing women to concentrate on their self-sufficiency as buyers 
of commodities, rather than keeping them intent solely on producing the next generation 
of workers or man of letters who will produce those very commodities.  
 Discussions about the question of women in Smith's thought have mentioned that 
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his focus had been the issue of effeminacy,102 that is, the loss of the “masculine” 
characteristics because of the outputs of commercial society. From this perspective, 
women and femininity are considered to be corruptions of the conditions of possibility of 
the reproduction of a civilized society. This argument does not negate what I have 
presented earlier; on the contrary, it shows an aspect implied in my explanation: that 
women should concentrate on their reproduction of life, and that in doing so they provide 
society with an example of self-control not only physically but also in the forced 
constriction of their imagination. 
 The relationship between commerce and traditional restrictions or identifications 
does imply a tension if one considers that the division of labor was understood as 
overcoming all the previous social relationships. This is not the case with Smith and 
Hume. Smith does not simply ignore women or refute their intellectual achievements.103 
He invents women using historical observation and idealizations not without being aware 
of the important and decisive stages of the division of labor: it starts in the division of the 
women's self as subjected to the authority of the father, husband, and spirit. Smith's 
interventions “about the women” are generative in the sense that his intention is not 
merely to propound rhetoric of discrimination. Smith's notion is that women belong to a 
position that is trying to overcome relativism104 through the intensification of 
“commercial intercourse” and the reproduction of stability, security, and familiarity of the 
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household's economy.105    
 Smith's understanding of women is an exercise in the extension of the spirit and 
also a way in which to open oneself to the presence of it. Smithian “knowledge of 
capital” does know the destructive capacities of the division of labor. There is no 
“fantasy” in this regard.106 His thinking tries to close the possibilities opened by 
relationships of inequality. In his notion of women he concentrates on an ideal: the 
absence of struggle or radical changes so the spirit can be authentically universal. 
Women's “independence” is achieved as they express their nature, a nature actually 
determined by men though under the guise of spirit. Because of this, the question of 
whether women are, for Smith, invisible or economic agents107 is a reductive 
understanding of Smith's theory.108  Some studies109 have presented Smith's philosophy 
as a task to “free us from repressive institutions”110 or as a critique of “capitalism.”111 
These studies fail to understand that Smith's thinking combines both movement and 
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repose or, to put it differently, his normative philosophy prescribes the conservation of 
those elements that, in the case of women, were widely discussed as oppressive and 
derogatory.112 Smith's defense of the “standpoint of ordinary life” implies, as I have 
demonstrated, the embracing of traditional facts as teleologically oriented to satisfy the 
requirements of civilization. Smith's “critique of reason's power”113 reintegrates 
masculine domination as nature. His alleged critique of reason belongs to the process 
through which he establishes as a necessary cause specific forms of domination that in his 
case are condensed in the dominion of the father-master and the automatism of the 
division of labor. The rejection of philosophical knowledge114 as a guide for human 
actions and as a parameter to judge virtue makes Smith a describer of the “human cost of 
the division of labor.” He presents labor as normative115 or necessary due to his 
providentialism as it is expressed in his understanding of spirit.116 
6. Spirit, Spiritual Police, and Economy of the Flesh 
 
 There are internal commonalities between theological arguments and Hume's and 
Smith's understanding of spirit. These commonalities are condensed and expressed not as 
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forms of explicit legitimation or vulgar instrumentation of theological notions or 
imaginary. They are both diachronic and synchronic and thus are part of a trajectory that 
manifests itself specifically and with variations according to contextual particularities. In 
Hume's and Smith's case such a perspective supposes that the division of labor, economic 
theory, and theory of morals do not eradicate the theological. Moreover, within their 
project theological motifs and modes of argumentation are developed and metabolized. 
As with Knox and Calvin, Hume and Smith understand that the affirmation and 
dissemination of the spirit is of fundamental importance for the preservation and 
reinforcement of their world. The development and stabilization of the spirit has a 
correlation with the concept of flesh.  Something has to be done with flesh.117 It becomes 
necessary to elaborate modes of approach and delimitation of flesh. Most importantly, 
there is the attempt to rescue or, more precisely, to incarnate flesh within a body or 
bodies.   
 The Spiritual Empire or the predominance of the spirit and nature implies the 
distribution of identifications and roles. At the bottom, in the center, throughout of these 
identifications and roles flesh appears. That is to say life that expands its boundaries and 
detaches itself from its multiple empirical manifestations. Flesh is the condition of 
possibility of life. Also, it overflows its bodies, its incarnations. Being fleshy implies a 
distance with the attributes that make possible the circuit of economy and civil 
government. Thus, flesh is intense life that also moves beyond life.118 It procures to move 
beyond the spirit’s condensations. Every life is carnal; because of that every life is also a 
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struggle with identifications, agency, and personality. Flesh delays or eludes its apparition 
as it is looking forward for its transformation. Flesh is hurts the multiple closed bodies 
that pretend to capture it. Without flesh what remains is pure physicality unable to 
perform economic activities and to fulfil her nature. Thereof, flesh enables modes of 
individuation and spirit’s movement as well as interrupts them in order to preserve itself. 
The preservation of flesh, that is always political, requires a disputation: every empirical 
representation must be contested, revised, and ultimately ignored.  Flesh longs for 
recognition beyond incarnation, without stability, and in the midst of the loss of 
personality or, to be more precise, in the midst of the suspension of an understanding of 
personality that requires the punishment of dissonance and silence. Flesh is wounded by 
the multiple bodies that attach to it. In this regard flesh is always socially disputed and 
constitutes the political.119 Its struggle is not against the body but against body’s 
pretentions to erect itself as Empire. That is to say as closed totality that produces false 
differences and dangerous liaisons.  
What we encounter with Hume and Smith is tension rather than rejection of flesh. 
In the next two chapters, I present a detailed development of the thesis according to 
which Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy has to be presented as an economy of the flesh. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Hume and the Almighty Creator: Nature and Economic Theory 
“To live carnally is to be wholly given over to the sway of the flesh and to be 
averse to the Spirit; to live spiritually is to obey the Spirit, never to abandon faith.” 
Zwingli, De Vera et Falsa Religione 
 
Introduction  
 This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents a methodological 
discussion in which I propose a way to read Hume. I show how there is a fundamental 
tension within Hume’s philosophy, particularly in his considerations of selfhood and the 
conditions that make sociability possible.  Hume’s philosophical tension introduces the 
conditions that made economy of the flesh necessary. Those conditions are eminently 
practical and oriented to the protection and security of common life. My reading 
emphasizes that, although it is important to understand political economy, it is 
insufficient to understand Hume as proposing an ethical or an economic theory with 
hidden metaphysical components. Instead, Hume’s philosophy is constitutively 
theological. Following this thesis, the second part of the chapter reviews and discusses 
the importance of Christian practices in Hume’s thinking. I argue that Hume did not try to 
depart from Christianity in order to construct his philosophy. Moreover, his philosophical 
project remained within the ambit opened by certain Christian motifs and questions. In 
order to present Hume’s economy of the flesh, in the third part of the chapter I offer a 
reading of the question of suicide. Hume’s treatment of the question of suicide reinforces 
and develops his theological discussions as well as connects them to his economic 
thinking.  
Furthermore, his entire philosophical enterprise is possible because of the internal 
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connections that he makes between subjects such as suicide and true philosophy. This is 
so because Hume’s science of man has the pretention of incorporating every aspect of 
human existence within a matrix, including commercial society and its division of labor 
and ranks. Hume believes and longs for a type of universality that does not negate the 
participation of an almighty creator. It is from this perspective that Hume’s humor must 
be received: “I believe I shall write no more History, but proceed directly to attack the 
Lord’s Prayer & the ten Commandments & the single Cat; and to recommend Suicide & 
Adultery: And so persist, till it shall please the Lord to take me to himself.”1 Hence, one 
must remember that for Hume the rejection of theism is scientifically unviable2 and 
politically dangerous.3  
Beyond Ethics and Hiddenness 
I have demonstrated that Hume's and Smith's philosophy is an attempt to resolve 
the question of through which mechanisms it was possible to sustain and expand the 
“spirit of the age” as expressed in what I have called the reversion of the pilgrim's 
progress. By this I mean the understanding of history as an elliptic movement that 
expresses the culmination of its possibilities in, for instance, the representations of David 
Hume's life and the social conditions that make it possible. The culmination of history’s 
possibilities also included the acceptance of the necessary existence of damaged lives and 
a slave morality expressed in the consumption of life.4 It is important to insist that 
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according to both authors there is no contradiction between wealth and wasted lives. 
Moreover, the movement of the spirit necessarily implies the production of life and the 
distribution of death. To let people die is indeed an attribute of the spirit, especially when 
the spirit embodies itself in commercial and civilized societies. From Steuart to Hume we 
observe a constant reflection regarding the question of life and death. For these authors 
the achievement of happiness, honor, and humanity is possible only through the act of 
offering one’s life to the universal principle that makes life possible. This idea is related 
to something proposed by Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007). According to him, one of the 
particularities that appeared in eighteenth-century Europe was that “When exploited, 
labor power is good: it is within nature and is normal. But, once liberated, it becomes 
menacing in the form of the proletariat.”5 Hume thought it better for the wretched to offer 
their lives to the greater whole instead of trying to contradict nature. For the “poor” the 
culmination of their humanity is always closely related to their extinction.  Although for 
Hume the word ‘I’ cannot be an ontological word,6 he considers suicide to offer the 
possibility of an ontological achievement.  
In Hume's and Smith's philosophy the incarnated spirit as well as its condensed 
expressions are rendered as a theory of nature and economy. This theory continues with 
theological renderings of the relationship between spirit, government, and identity 
performances. Furthermore, Hume and Smith continue the theological tradition of the 
Spiritual police and Spiritual Empire by modifying it or, to be more precise, emphasizing 
aspects of it as I have explained above.   
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Rationality, Market, and Ethics  
From this perspective it is important to reference and discuss the following 
remark: 
Market behavior is influenced by rational, purposeful pursuit of interests. The 
partner to a transaction is expected to behave according to rational legality and, 
quite particularly, to respect the formal inviolability of a promise once given. 
These are the qualities which  form the content of the market ethics. In this latter 
respect the market inculcates, indeed, particularly rigorous conceptions.7 
 
The rational behavior explained by Weber (1864-1920) has, as its condition of 
possibility, the delimitation of the agent’s competencies. Or, what is the same, the 
regulation of oneself or more precisely the production of a person (pace Butler). I do not 
negate the importance of instrumental rationality and ethics in order to understand 
political economy. However, as I shall demonstrate, both Hume and Smith openly reject 
rationality as opposed to the dynamism of economy. Before thinking about reason and 
morals, Hume thinks about the person and common life. By this I mean that he was 
completely aware that the priority of an economic system was to create its producers and 
reproducers. Hume understood that in order to create productivity the “promise” could 
not be a legal contract. The contract must be an expression of a previous and deeper 
commitment. What has to be promised is not the obedience to particular contracts; “the 
promise once given” was for Hume the promise of fulfilling one's own nature through the 
condensations of the spirit. The fulfilling of one’s nature implies, for Hume, a radical 
economy of flesh.  
Hence, more than an ethical proposal, what Hume introduces is a theory of 
productivity from which an ethic could be derived but it is not its matrix. In Hume’s 
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theory, production is not circumscribed or limited to the factory but is understood as 
interconnected processes in which individuals are creating themselves in both continuity 
and discontinuity with the past.  This theory of productivity assumes the interconnection 
of nature, economy, and spirit. 
Marx understands the labor process as purposeful activity aimed at the production 
of use-values. It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. 
The assumption behind this explanation is not a radical separation between nature and 
soul8 but the necessity of a permanent metabolic interaction between man and nature.  
For Marx this metabolic interaction is a condition of human existence, and it is therefore 
independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society 
in which human beings live.  
 Hume's philosophical process was also an attempt to produce use-values. This 
supposes a double recognition. As a factor in the production and reproduction of its 
sociability each individual had to “awaken”. If for Marx the labor process activates the 
possibilities inherent in nature or human productions, for Hume processes of production 
are the form in which it is possible to transform “the merely possible” into real and 
effective constituents of the social and political body. In order to produce reality, to 
transform anatomy into life, one has to be “infused with vital energy”.  Hume's vital 
energy is not a content or norm but, as I discussed before, a series of condensations of the 
spirit.  
Moreover, Hume proposes a theory of the incarnated spirit or, to be more precise, 
the processes of how the spirit takes place in the flesh. Here, a use-value is something or 
someone that is spirited and serves the purpose of securing and extending existent 
                                                          
8
 Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, 63. 
132 
 
sociability. In the case of Hume, the process of production of use-values includes levels 
of society not explicitly mentioned by Marx. While Marx imagines that the production of 
use-values consists in the “appropriation of nature” in order to satisfy human needs, for 
Hume it is nature that which appropriates individuals in order to serve the “requirements” 
and health of a commonwealth.  However and above all it is the spirit that, as an 
uncontrollable force, fulfills its own destiny in appropriating nature and human beings.   
The spirit consumes flesh, flesh understood not just as labor-power or nude 
physicality but as surplus life and, as I explain below, as reason. Hume presents the 
division of labor, the society of ranks, and civilization not as a result of a single and 
concentrated immanent principle of organization but fundamentally as the result of the 
intersected movements of spirit and nature. Each social individual has to embrace the 
steps of civilization: progress through exploitation; development of science and 
technology through and based upon wage-labor; the creation of wealth and well-being out 
of and by means of destitution and colonization; the development of culture, on the basis 
of mass ignorance and obscurantism or limited and merely instrumental instruction. But 
she has to embrace those steps not as the result of relations of power and modes of social 
organization but as necessary aspects of civilization.  
Hume's economic theory and theory of nature is the mechanism that interferes in 
order to allow nature, through the spirit's impulse, to be complete in each individual. To 
do so they have to ensure a form by which “the material” (bodies) are not wasted. 
Therefore, what is targeted as material to be appropriated is not just labor-power but, as 
Marx himself explains, life. Nevertheless, this life is not appropriated just as it becomes a 
thing purchased in the market. For Hume, life is appropriated in the process of production 
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of economic agents, in the creation of a framework of recognition in which everyone has 
to recognize himself as the owner of private property. The relationship between economy 
and self or personification is better understood by investigating how, for instance, the 
rationalization of the division of labor and the naturalization of customs are constituted 
by theological tropes. 
The economic person, as a creature of social convention9, precedes and sustains 
the formal reason expressed in rational legality. The productivity of people is guaranteed 
by the creation of a framework or mirror10 that enables individuals to assume identity and 
agency, and to operate within the relations of production and consumption.11 In the case 
of Hume’s science of man what is proposed is not a market ethic but a more complete and 
complex invention,12one that formulates a definitive judgment about the truth of the 
world. A central component of this judgment is a lengthy reflection about the self, 
personal identity, and productivity. For this reason it is not sufficient simply to argue 
about Hume’s conservatism or ethics.  Nonetheless, Weber’s idea of rationalization or 
Marx’s theory of commodity’s fetishism is important for the present discussion as it 
points to Hume’s theory of selfhood and identity. In other words, it is indeed justifiable to 
determine what kind of “subject” is capable to perform its natural/historical duties.  
This discussion has received a detailed treatment by Donald W. Livingstone 
(1938). His argument is that Hume’s entire philosophical project consists in a 
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rationalization of the customs of common life.13 In other words the civilized “subject” is 
the one that tries to embrace and secure the world as it is given to him. Although I agree 
with this argument and have developed it in the previous chapter, I also find it important 
to present Hume’s philosophical anguish and longing for a different “subject”.   
1. The Flesh’s Captivity: Zwingli’s Procedure  
Hume’s philosophy of self has an antecedent in Huldrych Zwingli’s (1484-1531) 
theology of flesh. Both authors discuss the limits of the self. In each case their conclusion 
is that the affirmation of the self conduces only to death and monstrosity. Zwingli 
specifically links self and flesh:  
Ioan 3:6. Christus sic inquit: Quod natum ex carne, caro est. Sequitur ergo quod 
qui ex mortuo nati sunt, ipsi quoque mortui sunt. Nam Adam ut primum ad se 
conversus fuit, totus in carnem degenerative. Ut igitur caro, sic et mortuus fuit: 
hace enim arquipollent, carnem esse, mortuum esse, quatens hic de morte 
loquimur, ut in superioribus patuit. Nunc autem recipe nulla ratione potest, ut qui 
mortus est vivum generare quaet: nequit ergo mortuus Adam generare, qui a morte 
sit alienus. Nunquam enim immutari potest: quod natum est ex carne, caro est.14 
 
The basic assumption of Zwingli’s theology is that human beings have the 
tendency to concentrate on themselves and forget about the Lord and Master. He presents 
this self -love or self-interest as the beginning of a process through which one becomes 
slave (servus) to himself.  For Zwingli, God is the principle that articulates and insists on 
other. The attempt to develop individuality, to concentrate on oneself, is a sin peculiar to 
the “corrupted and fallen man.” This sin is fundamentally the sin of the flesh. Zwingli 
equals flesh with self and death. Turning one’s attention to oneself implies death, distance 
from the matrix of the world, and radical solitude.  A completely fleshy being (totus in 
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carnem) is the same as saying that one has decided to look for oneself outside the limits 
of the Lord’s control. Flesh is dead in a particular sense: it is intrinsically damaged and 
defective. One cannot belong to the realm or kingdom of God if one is a slave to the 
flesh. The alternative Zwingli offers is to be a slave to God the Master. For him, being 
born implies being defective. This defectiveness cannot be repaired except through 
bondage to God. Hume would say that one has to be bound to the metaphysical principle 
of common life in which God incarnates itself. From Zwingli to Hume the alternative 
does not change. One can only be a slave or, as Hume says, a loser.  
2. Flesh and Promise: Hume’s Theater 
The discussion about the “subject” within Hume’s philosophy is understood here 
as part of the question about the characteristics of an economic agent or person.  The 
following lines are of fundamental importance to access what I have called Hume’s 
theater: 
There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately 
conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance 
in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of demonstration, both of its 
perfect identity and simplicity.15  
  
Although an important aspect in Hume scholarship,16 it is necessary to remark 
that Hume combines a theory of an evanescent and fictitious self with another of a firm 
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and stable self. On the one hand he sustains that the self is a presentation necessary to 
regulate and embrace the successive temporal and spatial changes. Self is what retains 
and gives a sense of continuity and permanence to us. It is a practical justification to 
continue the operations of an agent. When Hume reflects on the “destructivity of the self” 
or judges that “all the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely 
verbal,”17 he is questioning the social duties that make the existence of society possible. 
In his first Treatise, Hume does not abandon a sense of uncertainty and paradox regarding 
the relation of ideas that enable the formation of an identity. Nonetheless, the wounds of 
identity are sutured by his fear of flesh:   
I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am 
plac’d in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who 
not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell’d all human 
commerce, and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate. Fain wou’d I run into the 
crowd of shelter and warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such 
deformity. I call upon others to join me, in order to make me company apart; but 
no one will hearken to me. Everyone keeps at distance, and dreads that storm, 
which beats upon me from every side […] When I turn my eye inward, I find 
nothing but doubt and ignorance.18 
 
Hume’s solitude is the result of his inquiry about identity. His philosophy appears 
here as a way of exiling himself from the constraints of being an agent or person. His 
philosophical reflection suspends the validity of duties and engagements. Thus it opens a 
new landscape of possibilities and difficulties. Hume’s philosophy collides with the 
conditions that are necessary to be social. As he interrogates himself, Hume cannot but 
discover a theatrical display in which he is a character that can observe himself as he 
performs. Being one or singular is being multiple or other with respect to particular 
presentations of oneself. Every performance of oneself opens space for other types of 
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performance that occur simultaneously. The simultaneity of difference and unity implies 
the irruption of modes of individuation that are communicating with each other as they 
disappear. Individuation and singularity are understood as movement that detaches itself 
from the security provided by imagining oneself as being a unity without fissures. For 
Hume, human beings are a sensitive niche of mobile gardens. Humans have the capacity 
to be affected by all worldly existence, and, by being affected, their own self becomes 
open, unstable, and fluid.  
For Hume, receptivity and affections that make the self an ongoing process are 
what constitutes existence. The self, at most, is the precise capacity of being affected and 
felt: “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception […] When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by 
sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.”19 At 
the end of Hume’s questioning of his self-representations there remains only a series of 
body experiences that cannot be fully grasped. The simplicity and unity are categories 
created for practical purposes. The labyrinth of his interrogations is a theater in which 
there are only silhouettes and shadows:  
The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their 
appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures 
and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in 
different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity 
and identity.20 
 
 Every self is a duplication of multiple ruptures and failed attempts at 
permanency. Therefore there is no original self that carries with it the authentic or 
                                                          
19
 Ibid., 165. 
 
20 Ibid. 
 
138 
 
substantial truth about oneself. All that exists are duplications, performances, openings, 
sequences of a self that vanishes as it appears. Hume understands himself like a hologram 
that expands and diminishes as it floats throughout the margins of society. Thus the 
monster is that insatiable plurality that reveals itself as multiple ones that cannot be 
completely reached. Herein is the contradiction of Hume’s philosophy and “all human 
commerce”: the rupture with the conception of a united self blocks or obstructs the 
fulfillment of one’s duties and engagements. The monstrous is expressed precisely in a 
use of reason that creates space for the surplus life that dreams of other forms of 
existence. These forms include solitude and repose. Hence, the suspension of productivity 
and commercial exchange is announced in Hume’s storms. 
 Against his flesh, Hume opposes habit and nature. Flesh is understood as a kind 
of sickness, a chimera that has to be controlled by believing “in the general maxims of 
the world.”21 Hume understands that flesh’s impulses to exceed the limits of the social are 
related to satisfaction and pleasure. This is a type of pleasure that comes from the rupture 
with the sphere of common life or, to speak with Zwingli, the kingdom of the Lord. 
Pleasure is opposed to or in conflict with the spirit’s institutions and modes of 
intelligibility. Hume’s despair with the empiric phenomena is the center of what he calls 
his speculations. At the core of his philosophical anguish he foresees the interstices of the 
entire mechanisms that produce and reproduce social relationships.22 His philosophical 
speculations express the discomfort of the flesh not towards a particular political, 
economic, or social form of organization but to an epistemic structure.   By epistemic 
structure is meant the metaphysical assumption of an identity always equal to itself. This 
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metaphysical assumption grounds and reinforces identifications, transforms social 
relationships into identities, and sanctions as monstrous any attempt to move beyond the 
boundaries of one’s natural location within the social divisions of labor, sex, and culture. 
Hume thinks that an absolute that splits itself in pieces does not have the pretention to 
become a fully integrated body. Nonetheless, he prefers to transform himself into a loser 
philosopher: “I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my 
philosophy.”23 Nevertheless, the origin of his philosophy is not the “loss of pleasure” in 
order to satisfy the Lord. The authentic origin of Hume’s philosophy is the conflict 
between flesh and spirit. The origins of his philosophical reflection enable us to grasp the 
beginning of the economy of the flesh.  
It is in his so-called political essays that Hume fully presents his philosophy of the 
loss and death of the holographic self. In his essay “Of the Original Contract,”24 Hume 
distinguishes between two kinds of moral duties. The first kind of moral duties are those 
“to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity;”25 these can be 
considered to be pre-rational. These duties are related, according to Hume, to the survival 
of a person, and include things like love, respect, and pity toward the unfortunate. Hume 
links the second kind of duties with a sense of obligation.  At the core of his distinction 
among duties is the idea of a permanent self, a self capable of fulfilling its bondage. As a 
corollary to this idea Hume states: “It must here be asserted, the commerce and 
intercourse of mankind, which are of such mighty advantage, can have no security where 
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men pay no regard to their engagements.”26 Following Hume’s interest in securing the 
“intercourse of mankind” I argue that his philosophy should be understood as eucratic. 
That is to say that Hume confronts his own philosophical intuitions in order to conserve 
the health and wealth of the social and political body or, in theological terms, the master’s 
kingdom.    
3. Eucratic Philosophy: Preventing Flesh 
It is important to remark that I am not proposing here a sort of overcoming of the 
“religious veil” in order to achieve a fully rational comprehension of human relations. 
What I propose is to approach Hume's understanding of nature and economy as 
theologically dense. The thesis according to which Christianity is a “religious cult of man 
in the abstract”27 is still insufficient to adequately comprehend the theological 
composition of Hume’s philosophy. 
It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, 
therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. 
There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed 
with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with 
the human race.28 
 
 As I have shown, it is not simply and exclusively within “the misty realm of 
religion” that political and cultural practices appear as independent of the conditions of 
production and dissemination. The composition of Hume’s philosophy also presents this 
peculiarity: economic theory, which for Hume is a branch of philosophy and not a 
particular science, has as its background in what Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) called a 
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“rational civil theology of divine providence.”29 For Hume the only solution to his doubts 
about the existence of a closed and immutable self is to link the rationality of social 
relationships with the Almighty creator.  
The meaning of this is that Hume accepts that there are certain aspects of human 
existence that are “hidden from men—the future—or what is hidden in them—their 
consciousness.”30 The invisible is the internal tie that makes the totality of human 
commerce rational and intelligible. Even if the human mind cannot reach and understand 
the invisible, philosophy has to make an attempt to demonstrate how providence “has 
ordered this great city of the human race.”31 This organization does not depend entirely 
on human volition. The result of this perspective is a theory of unintentionality and 
negative providence that enables the progression of Hume’s science of man.32 Hence, for 
Hume the creator guarantees the unity of the world without negating the possibility of 
philosophical inquiries.  
Hume's economic theory and theory of nature is a spiral that connects questions as 
dissimilar as suicide, money, and a theology of providence. His theory of nature and 
economic theory appears to derive from a theological discussion in which it was 
necessary to establish the legitimacy of his philosophy. Hume does not reject theology,  
neither does he propose a superficial form of atheism but a detailed theological program 
in which God is replaced by immanent principles of organization that, nonetheless, are 
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God's own creation. Without this theology other aspects of his thinking lack their internal 
cohesion. 
 As with Knox and Calvin, with Hume we have to understand that his philosophy 
is not only a device of punishment or correction. Instead, he offers his interventions to 
construct a practical way in which to shape true human beings who are not bonded to 
flesh. His fundamental preoccupation is with how to conserve life and its conditions of 
possibility: commerce, free trade and regulation of the different ranks of society.33 In 
order to do so he purposely focused on forming a eucratic philosophy that is a coherent 
development of Hume’s biological and anatomical imaginary. Guillaume de Saint-Thierry 
(1075-1148), following a long tradition, clarifies that: 
Aussi, dans le corps animal, sa complexion propre consiste dans l’association 
première et naturelle des éléments en lui. Si elle est équilibrée et bien composée; 
c'est-à-dire que les contraires ne se combattent ni ne se détruisent, que le chaud 
soit tempéré par le froid, le froid par le chaud, et ainsi de suite, alors il y a une 
bonne complexion, et, la nature étant bien accordée, il y a “eucrasie” (bon 
mélange), c´est-à-dire un juste tempérament des quatre qualités. Tant que les 
dispositions naturelles restent dans état bien tempéré, le corps humain ne peut être 
attaqué par la maladie, puisqu'il est, comme on l'a dit, « eucratique », c’est-à-dire 
doté d’une bonne complexion. Que ce tempérament soit troublé, nécessairement 
le corps en est altéré.34 
 
For Hume, the individual body does occupy the center of his philosophy because 
it is an integral and organic part of a larger and more complex body. The individual body 
itself is considered to be a natural element within the body politic. What is postulated in 
this position is that human art35, a concept that surpasses a merely mimetic capacity, 
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enlists humankind to produce itself and also produce artificial life. The body, understood 
as a machine, can be duplicated. Life itself, and not just bodies, can be extended through 
art. Thus art is presented as both a political and theological operation that consists in the 
repetition of life with the purpose of creating and maintaining a commonwealth.   Having 
as a background the question of the formation of the State, the idea of art as a practice 
capable of creating life and bodies extends itself as a theological and medical concept. At 
this level Hume's eucratic philosophy forms an idea of nature and proposes ways for the 
association of the multiplicity of bodies that make up the social and political body. The 
natural man, including his body, perseveres in his existence in and through the 
artificiality of its creations. All those creations do not contradict the design of the 
Almighty creator.  
The reproduction of himself, according to this perspective, serves one specific 
goal: protection and preservation of the natural man. Hence, art is a concept that 
describes the act of creating and protecting life from itself, from the “kingdom of 
darkness” expressed fundamentally in flesh’s inclination to separate from and expand 
upon what is considered possible. The individual bodies have to undergo a series of 
transformations, and surrender themselves to an artificial man in order to save their lives. 
The artificial body, the political body, is the protector of the vulnerable natural bodies. 
The multiplicity of body amounts to the dream of an all together secured political 
organization. In this understanding, individual bodies are resolutely subsumed within the 
artificiality of its own creations (common life). This subsuming constitutes the 
politicization of animal oeconomy to the point in which anatomy itself becomes an area 
of political intervention. It is what we mean by the “corporeality” of politics, in the sense 
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that the political (its institutions and forms of social reproduction) is understood as a body 
that has to be protected, and the political makes necessary an economization of what 
exceeds or is disposed by the body. This last point introduces the problem of sickness 
(maladie). Sickness is transformed within Hume's philosophy into a reflection of three 
orders: a) the order of the individual body and its relationship with itself; b) the order of 
the individual body and its relationship with the creator; and c) the order of the individual 
body and its relationship with the social and political body.   
Politics is, in this context, a “meta-normative” process whose task is to guarantee 
the equilibrium between regulation and enjoyment, free trade and politeness, industry and 
hedonism. Nevertheless, its most important function is to provide the conditions that 
allow the manifestation of the inherent possibilities of commerce.  I propose that the 
eucratic philosophy of Hume works to avoid social sickness and to secure the social and 
political body. Hume’s eucratic philosophy is not presented as a practice meant to 
overcome the Christian tradition. Indeed, Hume’s philosophical project of protecting 
society is replete with Christian theological motifs. From this perspective I propose to 
read Hume’s treatment of religion as a part of his philosophy of loss. Rather than 
attempting “atheism under cover,”36 his intention is to obliterate the carnal renderings of 
religious practices in order to promote the commonwealth’s security and health.37 Hume’s 
discussion of religion is political and social at its core. Since he is not trying to go beyond 
the given situation of his world his project is geared to avoiding and correcting what he 
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perceives to be dangerous errors of religious practices.38  
4. Hume and Religion 
Hume distinguishes between the foundation and the origins of religion. He claims 
that religion has an entirely rational foundation: “The whole frame of nature bespeaks an 
intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief 
a moment with regard to primary principles of genuine theism and religion.”39 The 
question affirmed by Hume needs to be considered in detail. First, it was not Hume’s 
purpose to do a critique of religion based upon religion’s lack of rationality. On the 
contrary, for Hume reason and religion do not contradict each other regarding the 
existence of an intelligent author or Vico’s rational providence. Thus, it is completely 
rational to assign to nature a rationally accessible design. Hume considers the belief in 
this intelligent author and its design to be the unequivocal marks of genuine theism and 
religion. To the question regarding the rationality of religion
40
 it is necessary to say that 
Hume effectively sustains a comprehension of rationality whose ground is immanent.  
He does not pretend to derive any plausible conclusion about the nature of God 
or, in theological terms, its opera ad intra. The generation and procession of God’s 
intimate life does not belong to Hume’s rational religion. What definitely belongs to it is 
its opera ad extra. For Hume, it is important to emphasize that both opera ad intra and 
opera ad extra are not connected or, to be more precise, God’s economy does not explain 
or manifest its possible internal existence. Hume accepts that the immanent world cannot 
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be in contradiction with the designer’s rational design. His interest is not to prove God’s 
attributes but to develop the consequences of its economy. Hume’s apology partially 
explains his position: 
There is no foundation of any conclusion a priori, either concerning the 
operations or duration of any object, of which ’tis possible for the human mind to 
form a conception. Any object may be imagin’d to become entirely inactive, or to 
be annihilated in a moment; and ’tis an evident principle, that whatever we can 
imagine is possible. Now this is no more true of matter, than of spirit; of an 
extended compounded substance, than of a simple and unextended […] If my 
philosophy, therefore, makes no addition to the arguments for religion, I have at 
least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that everything 
remain precisely as before.
41
  
 
Nonetheless, the importance that Hume gives to natural theology still remains.
42
 
For Hume, the non-epistemic consideration of rational religion does not represent a 
closure in his philosophical inquiries about it. Hume’s philosophical tension between the 
seemly impossible exploration of God’s nature and the importance of natural theology 
has been briefly analyzed and named by J. C. A. Gaskin as “The Immense Abyss.”43 His 
argument begins with the following distinction: “But it must not be thought that Hume’s 
contrast between what we can understand and what is beyond our understanding is the 
same as the positivist contrast between verifiable propositions and all other 
propositions.”44 The distinction is relevant and accurate as it effectively touches on 
Hume’s expectation about the openness of time, multiplicity of memory, and 
changeability of selfhood. Gaskin’s distinction locates Hume’s philosophy as a relatively 
open project for the unknown.  
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The abyss suggested by but not developed by Gaskin contains two interrelated 
dimensions that have been suggested separately in Hume scholarship. These are the 
questions of belief and “a priori.”  Belief has a methodological and epistemic component. 
Methodologically, belief serves Hume to discuss religion without the necessity of 
suspending its rational possibilities. From an epistemic point of view Hume accepts as 
valuable knowledge the invisible truths of religion. In this regard his philosophy 
resembles the starting point of the project of converting pagans “to the phantasm of the 
One, there is always a certainty of possessing, or of having found, an irreducible 
definition of the world, of its origins and its ends—its true and meaning.”45  
Belief 
Regarding the dimension of belief it is important to begin with a comment not 
explicitly related to Hume’s philosophy but that highlights important aspects of his 
comprehension of a minimalistic faith with larger implications for the “commerce” of 
everyday life: 
Theology is searching for a more original interpretation of human being’s toward 
God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it. Theology 
is slowly beginning to understand again Luther’s insight that its system of dogma 
rests on a “foundation” that does not stem from a questioning in which faith is 
primary and whose conceptual apparatus is not only insufficient for the range of 
problems in theology but rather covers them up and distorts them.
46
 
 
Hume’s relationship with the “intelligent author”, the general laws of the world, 
and common life belong to the ambit of faith. Although, as I have discussed, Hume’s 
philosophy beings precisely with a tension with this position; the solution for his tension 
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is to embrace the invisible as given reality. Hume’s faith is expressed in the following 
idea:  if one does not contradict one’s worldly condition one is also moving within the 
creator’s economy. For Hume, moving toward God implies suspending one’s judgment 
about the possibility of God’s presence in the world. Hume’s theological reflection is 
minimalistic at its core. It has but a basic content: there is a creator that manifests its 
reason in the most common phenomena. Any attempt to construct a system of “dogma” 
Hume considers barbaric.
47
 This God almost empty of attributes requires pure faith. For 
Hume, any attempt to understand into God’s intimacy introduces barbarous conceptions. 
His conclusion is that, “The gods have maxims of justice peculiar to themselves.”48 
Nevertheless, faith has strictly material consequences, as Guilles Deleuze (1925-
1995) explains:  
Nous avons vu que la philosophie n’a rien à dire sur la cause des principes, sur 
l’origine de leur pouvoir. Là est la place de Dieu. Nous ne pouvons pas nous 
server des principes d’association pour connaître Dieu comme la cause du monde, 
mais nous pouvons toujours penser Dieu négativement, comme la cause des 
principes. C’est en ce sens que la théisme est valable. C’est en ce sens que la 
finalité se réintroduit. Ella sera pensé, non pas connue, comme l’accord original 
des principes de la nature humaine avec la Nature elle-même.
49
 
 
Effectively, Hume does not want to access first causes through his theology. But 
he does assume God to be the source and designer of the principles that sustain human 
existence. That is Hume’s theism. His theism introduces a principle of organization 
within the immanent world. This principle gives the world not just a contextual meaning 
but also provides the world with finality. God’s design, along with nature and human 
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nature, coincide within Hume’s faith. When Hume affirms that: “The whole is a riddle, 
an enigma, an inexplicable mystery”50 he is only suspending his judgment about the 
attributes of God and not God’s presence in the “more obvious works of nature.”51 
The intelligent author manifests itself in nature’s multiple expressions. There is no 
separation between reason, nature, and intelligent author. In conjoining them, Hume 
establishes his universal and porous notion of human nature and universe:
52
 “A purpose, 
an intention, design is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far 
enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the 
strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author.”53 This basic idea 
allows Hume to develop further his idea of the presence of the invisible in the visible.   
A priori: Visibility of the invisible 
The practical a priori of Hume’s philosophy is that the invisible can be accessed 
through the visible. The invisible or spirit does not hide itself but wants to be known 
through its works. Because of this a priori, one is apt to say that Hume follows Calvin’s 
criterion: “Any use of images leads to idolatry.”54 There is nothing outside the immanent 
and visible creation and human art that can manifest God. For Hume there is no need to 
explore or investigate further the representation of the intelligent designer. For the 
intelligent designer's entire presence is condensed in the common life and complexity of 
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the universe. The visible is the proper ambit of the philosopher because there is nothing 
beyond it. There are two aspects to the visibility of God: the one expressed in the 
metabolism of nature and human practices and the other expressed in the various visible 
forms that seek to represent God. About the first one, Hume insists that such metabolism 
is not contradictory to reason. Regarding the second form of visibility, Hume maintains 
that those forms of representation are purely idols: “How is the Deity disfigured in our 
representations of him!”55  
Hume’s problem with theology or religious practices is that the religious person 
may be an “enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: He may know his 
narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it.”56 The term ‘enthusiasm’ refers to 
expectations that cannot be inferred from the normal organization of the world. Religious 
enthusiasm calls from a horizon that longs for a different reality. For Hume, there is no 
life beyond the limits of the given social organization precisely because he believes that 
social organization expresses God’s own reason and will.57  God is substituted for its 
works and there is nothing else to wait for. Hume’s philosophy turns into a philosophy of 
death in which God is synthetized in the heroic act of suicide. In his essay on suicide he 
develops more fully various elements of his theological reflections, enabling a more 
detailed discussion about his economy of the flesh.  
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5. Suicide 
 Hume's is a radical social philosophy and so is his consideration of religion. 
Hume assumes as a given relationships of control, subordination, and mastership that for 
him are completely in harmony with the Supreme Being’s design and reason. His critique 
of the “philosophers” is that they do not recognize the stability and foundational character 
of the so-called common social forms of sociability.  
Those who have the propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; 
because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure attending such an 
occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common 
life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond 
common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which 
they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations.58 
 
The productivity of philosophy is fundamentally economic as it is oriented to the 
rationalization of common life and the production of machines of death.59 The object to 
be economized is life and what distinguishes Hume’s position on suicide is that he 
pretends to erase the presence of an external sovereign. The question about who can live 
and who must live Hume responds to with another question: what are the conditions that 
fulfill that which can be called life? With this question Hume introduces not the 
possibility and necessity of war between nation/states, but a war against one’s damaged 
life. The decision of segregation corresponds, in Hume’s philosophy, to each individual. 
The most intense expression of autonomy is the decision to commit suicide. In order to 
exercise his autonomy every individual has to embrace the idea that he is his own enemy. 
Moreover, under certain conditions such as sickness and imprisonment he also becomes a 
danger to the common-life. Hume proposes a philosophy whose center is a conception of 
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the different modes of life as an impediment to the realization of the inner-possibilities 
and telos of history.  
The struggle to death proposed by Hume takes place in one’s own body. Suicide is 
a form of achieving the beatitudes of history. The novelty of this proposal is that it 
transforms submission and self-negation into theological virtues, into a fruit of the spirit. 
In Hume’s case the body is transformed into a weapon, not to kill60 but to give life. 
Through the suicide of a damaged life the public receives more life. For Hume, there is 
no final sacrifice, only consumable bodies that pass away without leaving a trace.  
Without Transgression 
When “sound philosophy”61 takes possession of a mind it frees humans from 
superstition. In this regard philosophy is understood as a medicine or, more exactly, as a 
treatment that enables a full control of oneself that should, says Hume, rightly be 
expressed in institutions.  The philosophical activity is understood as a series of 
procedures or exercises whose ultimate purpose is to embrace death. Hume equates 
“native liberty” with suicide in order to develop a theory of individual freedom. His 
philosophical reflection on suicide is a central piece of his understanding of nature and 
economy. 
 The standpoint of Hume's reflection on suicide is that suicide does not constitute a 
transgression. What he means by this is that there are no theological, legal, or moral 
arguments that can interfere with the individual's decisions about whether or not to 
terminate his own life. The sphere of the individual's life is restricted to personal 
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decisions and choices. There is no authority above that of the individual that can decide 
to dispose of his life. No one can have the right to put an end to a person's existence.  
This is the most important political right and philosophical input: our death should 
belong to us. Hume's entire argument starts with a theological discussion that is clearly 
located within the larger debate of theological anthropology.62 In it he admits the 
existence of “the almighty creator”63 as he did throughout his philosophical project, a 
creator who created general laws and immutable rules for all creation. This creator is both 
a designer and administrator who manifest itself in those rules and laws that have existed 
“from the beginning of time.”  According to Hume all events “in one sense” are the acts 
of the “almighty.” In which sense exactly is the creator acting through natural and 
historical events? Just in one specific and restricted sense that has been introduced 
before: the creator has arranged in people the capacity, within the limitations of their own 
constitution and those imposed from the natural world, to organize their own world.  
The creator creates a being that in the process of its own existence is also a 
creator. Although Hume's almighty creator is capable of knowledge, this knowledge does 
not imply, in principle, any moral or political action, although it is its foundation.64 This 
being is in every case indifferent to the world's history, while being the source of its most 
elemental laws and dispositions. Nature's economy is fundamentally expressed in two 
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variables: the general laws of matter and motion. Nature is continually changed and 
transformed by human action. In transforming or resisting nature's laws, men produce 
themselves, says Hume. Humans' interactions with nature are not, in this case, fixed. 
Moreover, for human life to be possible it is necessary to permanently transform nature's 
immediate appearance: “It would be no crime in me to divert the Nile or Danube from its 
course, were I able to effect such purposes.”65 Reason, expressed in the ability to 
transform nature's “first appearance,” expresses an elemental tension and decisive 
philosophical position. The tension is between what is given in nature and the human 
capacity and necessity to transform the world through human activity.  
Human activities effectively modify and surpass the limits that are imposed by 
nature but Hume does not develop this idea politically. In transforming nature, humans 
are also inflicting on themselves a progressive transformation. Although nature restricts 
certain physical possibilities, Hume does not presented these as an insurmountable 
barrier.  Hume's presentation of nature introduces his theology of radical incarnation of 
the deity in the world. 
Do you not teach, that when any ill befalls me, tho' by the malice of my enemies, 
I ought to be resigned to providence; and that actions of men are the operations of 
the almighty much as the actions of inanimate beings? When I fall upon my own 
sword, therefore, I received my death equally from the hands of the deity, as if it 
had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever.66 
 
The almighty creator expresses itself in every action that happens in the world. 
Furthermore, in every expenditure of a creature's power, the almighty is expending itself, 
communicating its life. The whole dynamism of existence Hume presents as a 
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correspondence between the principle of organization and its historical figures. The hands 
of the deity are none other than the many things in the world as they interact with each 
other without a previously established form of organization.  
All of one's own activities correspond to the creator in one specific sense: these 
activities are expenditures of energy. Hume's thinking does not reduce itself to be a 
reflection about empirical cognition. The creator is there for our perception, just in an 
oblique form: it always appears incarnated in the phenomena. This is because 
“Philosophy, like Empiricism, is cognizant only of what is, it does not know that which 
only ought to be, and for that reason is not there.”67 But the creator does not exist because 
it is part of human's sensible existence. It does not appear to humans as a being they can 
immediately grasp. They see the creator not through, but in, its incarnations.  
Thus, Hume does not negate the “supersensible altogether;” rather he names it as 
a condition of possibility of experience. The question of the creator introduces a moment 
of displacement: Hume's idea of the incarnate creator transforms every “finite 
determination” from human institutions to landscapes into condensations of the infinite or 
invisible. Every particularity is bonded with the deity as it is the power source of 
everything in the world. The universal component of this understanding is explicitly 
presented in the syllogism of the correspondence between creator and creation.  This 
syllogism has implications beyond the discussion of suicide; it constitutes an instance of 
how the historical relationships are considered as completely autonomous from the 
divine.  
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Notwithstanding all this, Hume's philosophy does not simply assume that truth is 
what is external if by external is understood the mere immanent appearance of 
phenomena without having connections and relationships. Hume accepts a non-moral 
creator that through its primordial creative actions makes possible the movement of all 
that exists. It is important to clearly distinguish between the creator as originator of laws 
and the creator as a designer of historical particularities. Hume assumes the idea of a 
Being that governs all things not “as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all”68 that is 
everywhere and always present and constitutes duration and space, and he displays some 
of its consequences.  
The Ruler 
When Newton69 (1642-1727) says that the Universal Ruler cannot neither be 
accessed through human senses nor represented by any corporeal thing, he derives from 
this cognitive abyss the Excellency of his God. That is to say that because it is not 
accessible to our senses, the “Being necessarily existing” is a Lord. Newton's creator 
creates but his substance remains unknown to humans. In the case of Hume the emphasis  
of his presentation is not on the unknowable substance but on the immanence of the deity. 
The immanent aspect is also present in Newton but the notion of the dominion of God 
obliterates that immanence.70 In “Of Suicide,” Hume has no space for the idea of a 
creator that could exercise any sort of complete and inscrutable dominion.  He presents a 
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porous idea of providence, one that acknowledges the radical impossibility to transform 
the creator's government at the same time that he affirms that this government does not 
interfere with the disposition of one's own life. Providence does not impose life. Hume 
restricts the Newtonian idea of dominion by accepting the Deity's existence as a creator. 
Because God exists, suicide is permitted.  This is so because suicide expresses just one of 
the possibilities within the laws of creation and the immanence of the divine. 
 However, this liberty for suicide does not imply an opening to transform society. 
Hume observes that, “A man may disturb society, no doubt; and thereby incur the 
displeasure of the almighty.”71 How can Hume’s creator be disturbed by what happens 
within society? After all, Hume's deity does not express moral or political inclinations. 
How is the apathetic creator suddenly capable of being affected to the point of 
displeasure?  
The response to these questions can be divided into three parts as follows.  1) The 
idea of the divine incarnation implies for Hume forms of organization that he presents as 
natural. Society or, more precisely, the constitution of the social, is substantially the 
communication of the creator's economy; 2) within the context of this discussion the 
concept of economy refers to an act of creation and preservation guaranteed by the deity's 
own presence in human's nature. This question has to be discussed as a part of the 
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum: the Humean society expresses the unity of both 
human and divine nature; 3) consequently the almighty is affected when society is 
disturbed because society's organization itself is the Almighty’s body: “Surely God does 
not have blood, does not suffer, cannot be touched with hands. But since Christ was true 
                                                          
71 David Hume, Essays, 585. 
 
158 
 
God and also true man, was crucified and shed his blood for us,”72 then it is in Christ that 
both human and divine nature are united without distinction. Hume radically extends this 
idea; for him the creator is fully present in both the individual's nature as well as in the 
order of society. Hume unites nature and society and in so doing his most important 
problem is how and when life ends. Hume's question is how and according to which 
criteria it is possible to determine when a life is worth living. 
 Hume's development of his idea of the “displeasure of the almighty” has an 
important corollary in which he explicitly introduces the concept of human nature. These 
principles act within humans making them aware of their guilt and blame. Thus, human 
nature designates an internal mechanism of self-regulation to be in charge of 
programming the adequate responses to social interactions and self-understanding. 
Biological life is organized and administrated by this mechanism whose fundamental 
responsibility is to preserve the creator's body (society). Hume transforms the 
relationship between biological life and his theology of incarnation, as expressed in “the 
principles of nature”, into an antagonistic struggle. In this struggle the principles of 
nature are necessarily victorious. The question imposed here is, as I introduced above, not 
how the State exercises its power over individual lives. What is at stake here is how the 
individual itself decides to dissolve its own existence. Hume's following reflection will 
allow me to develop more about the question of the power of suicide. 
But allowing, that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have certainly 
some  bounds. I am not obliged to do a small good to society, at the expence of a 
great harm to myself. Why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because 
of some frivolous advantage, which the public may, perhaps, receive from me?73 
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The question of the power and liberty of suicide belongs to economic theory as it 
is based on calculations whose variables have to do with the cost and benefit of a life to 
the public. The first consideration introduced by Hume in the response to his own 
question is composed by the dyad “age and infirmities.”  The underlying criterion from 
where this dyad comes is an ideal of vitality, action, production. Hume proposes that age 
can be considered a factor in the reduction of one's capacities to perform its inherent or 
natural duties to society. Society's economy requires, for Hume, a strict administration of 
population or, more precisely, useful population capable of reproducing itself. But, he 
does not locate the administration of population within the ambit of any exogenous 
arbiter. His argument entails the necessity of a consideration of one's own limits. These 
limits are not the limits of understanding but those of the fleshy body considered as an 
instrument to serve the public interest. Because of this the variable age has to be 
understood as a public issue.  
This is a coherent aspect of Hume’s ideal of man: “Man is also an active being; 
and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must 
submit to business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot 
always support its bent to care and industry.”74 According to this understanding, the 
impossibility of a person being involved with industry and care supposes the lessening of 
that person's humanity. Hume’s active being is both a philosophical position and an 
economic requirement. Without action “the human race” could not continue its existence. 
To the non-active, Hume offers the cold visitation of death.  
Hume believed that in proving that there were theological impediments to suicide 
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it was not necessary to offer any other kind of alternatives to the useless. The question of 
age introduces a clear reference to population. However, Hume’s essay also raises the 
question of the individual, its body, passions, and, above all, self-ownership within 
society. The variable of infirmities, that could be combined with age, expresses more 
clearly how the question of suicide is a form of dealing with the constitution of a sphere 
of autonomy in and through which it is possible to secure the common functioning of 
society. Infirmities, the malfunctioning of the animal oeconomy, are interruptions in the 
economic circuit.  
For Hume, death is instead a manifestation of natural laws, the Almighty’s 
revelation. In naturalizing suicide Hume was addressing the problem of ending one's life 
as an indirect way in which to not interrupt the public interest. The old and sick are thus 
considered as instances of those whose existence is entirely disposable. Therefore, 
Hume's essay has the goal of becoming an artifact capable of making possible the 
interruption of life as a public service. The idea of suicide is the culmination of a long 
process the basis of which was a strictly economic problem: how much can a civilized 
society expend on damaged bodies? The first phase of Hume's suicidal artifact can be 
condensed as follows: a philosophical understanding of life enables suicide because it 
corresponds to the laws of nature established by the creator. To have a philosophical life 
is also to experience shame and sorrow due to one's own fragility and inability to be a 
useful participant in society. 
 The importance of the productive body in Hume's thinking must be highlighted 
once again. Even if it was a common trend in his epoch,75 for Hume to know the body 
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and to have control over it acquires important and unique characteristics. In the first 
place, Hume assumes bodily experiences to be the origin of conventions and knowledge. 
It is certain, that the most ignorant and stupid peasants – nay infants, nay even 
brute  beasts – improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, 
by observing  the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the 
sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put 
his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is 
similar in its sensible qualities and appearance.76 
 
It is their all-embracing skin that locates all humans in the same realm of 
experience or, to be precise, that makes them capable of experience. Hume understands 
the body as a large and interconnected series of permanent relationships in the world. In 
this sense the body does not require ulterior epistemological mechanisms of synthesis in 
order to establish itself as the center of animal life: moreover human artifacts, such as 
philosophy, are for Hume attempts to respond to the body’s necessities and expectations. 
In attempting to preserve its own body, a given creature expresses its innermost 
attachment to itself. Even while accepting that the body is a “mighty complicated 
machine,”77 Hume does not abandon a persistent echo in his thinking: that the body, its 
movements and projections, resists and struggles for its life. Bodies want to live and 
expand their life beyond the limits and dangers of their immediate world. This desire to 
preserve their lives is, as Hume suggested, an expression of animality.78  
This instinctual disposition to protect its own corporeal and fleshy existence is 
itself economic: “Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches 
a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art 
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of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.”79 In the context of his 
speculations about instincts, Hume understands economy as a practice or series of these 
instincts that want to preserve life. Hume reserves the concept ‘economy’ to the act of 
caring. There is no exchange, trade, or labor included in this basic and decisive 
understanding of economy as expenditure whose sole purpose is to sustain a given 
corporeal existence. This comprehension of economy does not suppose guarantees of 
return or surplus. It is the condition of possibility of social and political existence. 
Developing this argument can conduct to a criterion of rationality: It is reason that 
permits the preservation of the living body and, furthermore, that gives it the possibility 
to recreate its own life. This reading of Hume's delimitation of rationality has been 
advanced in recent readings of Hume's “theoretical philosophy”80 that do not 
acknowledge its theological underpinnings.  
Nonetheless, it is an implication of Hume's position regarding providence and 
creation. In a similar though not as explicitly theological position as that of N. 
Malebranche (1638 –1715), Hume rejects an understanding of the human senses and 
instincts as completely damaged by sin. Moreover, Hume does not even use sin81 as an 
important theological concept.  But in his theology of sovereignty, as I noted above, it is 
implied that human senses cannot be understood as intrinsically dysfunctional due to 
some sort of substantial impairment. The creation, the multitude of bodies that constituted 
the world, as they appear in the “examination of common life,” cannot be adequately 
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considered from the idea of sin. Instead, Hume focuses on the relationship between 
creator and creation. Properly understood Hume's concentration on the topic of creation 
was an attempt to develop a theology without ethical obligations with the creator and 
without a proper soteriology. 
 Furthermore what constitutes Hume's theological particularity is the solitude of 
his world. The creator in its absence is fully present within the world. This world is 
enclosed within its own dynamism and cannot be impacted by any transcendental force. 
Hume does not lack a theology; he does not concentrate on cult or obedience but takes a 
more complex path. He develops a theology of the autonomy of the world, of the 
coincidence between the creator's actions and the creature's freedom. Hume silences the 
rumors of a savior and liberator God as a contradiction to common life. Animal instincts, 
with its intrinsic economy of preservation, require for Hume institutional channels in 
order to fully express their historical possibilities. The tense relationship between animal 
economy of self-preservation and economic thinking introduces another level in Hume's 
understanding of the body that is expressed in “Of Suicide”. 
But suppose, that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of the public: 
Suppose, that I am a burthen to it: Suppose, that my life hinders some person from 
being  much more useful to the public. In such cases my resignation of life must 
not only be innocent but laudable. And most people, who lie under any temptation 
to abandon existence, are in some such situation. Those, who have health, or 
power, or authority, have commonly better reason to be in humour with the 
world.82  
 
According to Hume, the sick, aged, and considered useless has to renounce to 
himself in order to reach the principle of the satisfaction of the public interest. The 
heroism of death, the celebration of self-extinction, and reason are united in this 
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hypothetical condition depicted by Hume. The body that decides to cease its own life is a 
transfigured body without flesh. Between the instinctual and philosophical body there is a 
process of transformation that has diverse and not necessarily interrelated antecedents.83  
However, the nucleus of this transformation is the extinction of flesh.  
Hume continues his suppositions saying: “Again, suppose a malefactor justly 
condemned to a shameful death; can any reason be imagined, why he may not anticipate 
his punishment, and save himself all the anguish of thinking on its dreadful 
approaches?”84 This supposition differs from the previous one in a fundamental aspect. In 
this case suicide is related to the possibility of delay or rupture with the verdict of the law. 
Death and reason are united as death belongs to the condemned. He can retain some of its 
existence through the decision of not giving his last breath into the hands of the 
magistrate. Furthermore, in this case Hume’s question clearly opens the interrogation 
about the differences between justice and torture. He does not question the fairness of the 
legal mechanism. What he does is to introduce the perspective of prisoner. In so doing he 
recognizes that the legal mechanisms are not only formal procedures.  
Hume acknowledges their affective implications: thus, he presents suicide as a 
form of protection from the intensely disturbing outputs of the law. The practice of 
suicide comes from an excess of life that resists its annihilation. Paradoxically, the only 
form of resistance suggested by Hume is suicide, or what is the same, a life of pure 
bodies without flesh.  
Moreover, he transforms the resistance of this surplus of life into its opposite: “He 
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invades the business of providence no more than the magistrate did, who ordered his 
execution; and his voluntary death is equally advantageous to society, by ridding it of a 
pernicious member.”85 Here Hume transforms suicide into the disposal of pernicious 
members of society. Hume understands the life of the condemned as an infectious 
presence that must be disposed of. He leaves aside his first intuition that in which he 
presented suicide as resistance to law’s cruelty. This ambivalence must not be understood 
as a meaningless contradiction.   
It has a crucial relevance for Hume’s philosophy. First, he affirms the 
predominance of the law as the condensation of the spirit’s movement. Second, he insists 
and develops the concept of usefulness, one of the central concepts of his philosophy. The 
condemnation of the criminal is perfectly just and deserves all respect and consideration. 
Nonetheless, if one innocent person decides to commit suicide he is acting according to 
the “Christian dispensation,” says Hume, as he is attempting to use his freedom for the 
benefit of society.  
There is not a single text of scripture, which prohibits it [suicide]. That great and 
infallible rule of faith and practice, which must control all philosophy and human 
reasoning, has left us, in this particular, to our natural liberty. Resignation to 
providence is, indeed, recommended in scripture; but that implies only submission 
to ills, which are unavoidable, not to such as may be remedied by prudence or 
courage […] The power of committing Suicide is regarded by Pliny as an 
advantage which men possess even above the deity himself (Pliny, Natural 
History 2.5.27 in the Loeb edition: (God cannot) even if he wishes, commit 
suicide, the supreme boon that he has bestowed on man all the penalties of life).86  
The strategy Hume follows in this argument is theological.  His rhetorical use of 
the authority of the scriptures is an attempt to circumscribe his defense of suicide within 
the limits of the Christian field of knowledge and power. Nevertheless, he considers that 
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suicide should be considered a gift that belongs only to humans. This is the gift of being 
useful even on the via negativa: in his death the sick and useless person can provide 
society and common life with the favor of his disappearance.  The courage that Hume 
desires is that in which one’s own drive to self-preservation is controlled to such an 
extent that suicide appears as a heroic act. The heroic act is the embracing of the absolute 
as it is manifested in public affairs.   
Theologically this implies that the most radical form of submission is the 
submission to oneself, to one’s desire to protect one's life. Not being slave to oneself is 
achieved through self-dissolution. But this self-dissolution is understood as naïve life: it 
does not resist its annihilation because it acknowledges its precariousness.  At the heart of 
Hume’s meditation on suicide is not the freedom of the individual,87 but the affirmation 
of the political and social body over its singular components. There is no moral 
transgression in Hume’s philosophy of suicide, but rather the fulfilment of the 
individual’s duties and engagements. The damaged, sick, aged, and criminals achieve 
through suicide their process of incorporation into the world. Incorporation and 
incarnation are two different ways to refer to the same process: becoming a human is 
being permanently open to the possibility of self-destruction.  Hume’s belief in 
“philosophical theism”88 implies a celebration of death 
6. The Good Ends of Philosophy 
Although it was also an attempt to criticize Hume’s discussion on miracles, 
George Campbell (1719-1796) wrote, in his A Dissertation on Miracles, an accurate 
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synthesis of an important aspect of Hume’s philosophy: 
Ye ask, ‘How is religion conducive to the exaltation ‘and felicity to the body-
politic or nation? I answer, It conduces to this end in these four ways: By the 
tendency and extent of its laws; by the nature and importance of its sanctions; by 
the assistance which it gives to the civil powers, both in securing fidelity, and in 
discovering truth; and by the positive enforcement of equity and good government 
on the rulers, and of obedience and submission on the people.89 
 
Hume’s philosophy is indeed a proposal to secure and sustain the “body-politic”.  
His questions are also oriented to the satisfaction of the happiness of society. Hume 
understood that the pursuit for happiness was contradictory to the concentration of 
oneself. Hume’s first self, the one that expresses the longings of flesh, cannot but call into 
question the law and its sanctions. Hume was able to see that flesh has the potential of 
subverting the magnanimous language of the Lord. Therefore, he decided to obtrude the 
outbreaks of flesh that came through his philosophical reflections. In exchange he 
proposed a philosophy of loss that pretended to be a crypt for flesh. Hume acknowledged 
that there is a loss in a philosophy whose main concern is to produce fidelity to the 
whole.  
Flesh cannot promise an everlasting fidelity because it carries, without being 
afraid of shame, its vulnerability and necessities. The truth of flesh cannot be reached 
within the strict limits of an immanence that presents itself as God’s own body. Because 
of this, Hume attempts to humiliate flesh, to locate it as the monstrous tendency that 
separates us from the Kingdom of God. Hume’s kingdom requires permanent obedience 
and submission as well as the liminal separation of body and flesh.  
This separation is precisely what enables Hume’s productive being. This 
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productive being, condemned to a premature death because of his vulnerability, cannot 
recognize his own flesh. For him, flesh is something exterior, something that stays 
beyond the boundaries of his body. In this precise sense it is that flesh is monstrous. It 
comes to the productive and active body as the possibility to overcome its imaginary 
unity. Flesh is the possibility of a surplus-life that interrogates the assumption that 
everyone possesses a body.  
The living body, which is not entirely different from the productive or active 
body, can live because of the tensions produced by flesh’s own sensibilities. The good 
government and submission of the people suppose the punishment of the flesh. When 
Campbell says that: “Human laws, for the protection of peace and good order in society, 
may concur with the divine law,”90 he still does not grasp the significance of Hume’s 
economy of the flesh. For him, the distinction between human laws and rational religion 
is merely heuristic. The differentiation serves methodological purposes but it does not 
refer to a practical separation. The contents and thematic fields of rational religion are 
fundamentally expressed and developed within the Law.  
Adam Smith develops the relationship between Law, punishment, and flesh in 
detail. I shall discuss this and other aspects of Smith’s philosophy in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Smith’s Flesh: Sentiments, Savages, and Incarnation 
 
The achievement of happiness is organizing principle of Smith's The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. By organizing principle I mean that even the conflict or tension 
between selfishness and preoccupation with others is inscribed within the assumption that 
each human being procures its own happiness.  The idea of happiness organizes Smith’s 
philosophy as his proposal is based upon the idea of a fully developed humanity and not 
some sort of open justification of social domination. This chapter follows this hypothesis 
through a reading that emphasizes Smith’s theological discussions. Throughout the 
chapter, I demonstrate that there is no contradiction between moral and economic theory. 
Furthermore, I show that the continuity of morality and economy is possible due to 
Smith’s understanding of God. Smith’s project effectively has as its center the assumption 
of God’s immanent participation in history. From this assumption comes his proposal of 
an economy of the flesh. I argue that Smith’s understanding of flesh presents a 
fundamental interpenetration of theology and economic theory. For him, flesh is a vicious 
element that must be incarnated within the human body and the social and political body.  
One of Smith’s basic ideas is that human beings naturally tend to surpass or 
overcome the limits of their nature. Although this can appear at first sight as a 
contradiction, for Smith nature is in permanent digression with itself. The eccentricity of 
human nature, its rebellion against itself, is what makes it possible even for the “greatest 
ruffian” to experience a discomfort within himself. This natural discomfort is the result of 
a “clash:” while trying to affirm and preserve its own life, human nature also at the same 
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time manifests “sorrow from the sorrow of others.”  Human nature splits itself, tries to 
affirm its individuality but, at the same time, moves itself towards the other by attempting 
to carry itself beyond its “own person.” Thus this clash and division is experienced by the 
person as a manifestation of the tendencies of his or her nature. The person does not have 
control of these movements that modify his or her existence from its core. 
Smith presents the person as a sensible topos in which nature encounters itself at 
an economic disjuncture: how to conserve the person's life at the same time that he or she 
moves herself to experience the life of others.1 There is a second disjunctive, namely that 
nature does not have or cannot provide persons with the capacity to fully embrace the 
suffering, joy, or pain of the other person, for “our senses will never inform us of what he 
suffers.”2 The others remain unknowledgeable as sensible beings to a person's senses as 
they are entirely concentrated on themselves. Being a sensible being implies, for Smith, 
being closed off to others. A person is sensible or aware only of themselves and of the 
experiences of their existence. They recollect or capture experiences in order to preserve 
their own lives.  
Smith thus distinguishes between senses and imagination. The senses, because 
they are attached to the immediacy of the person's self-experience, lack exteriority. It is 
only through imagination that a person can experience, or at least have a sense of, the 
intimate life of the other. The distinction Smith proposes seeks to connect sensibility and 
imagination; he states that it is from the data provided by the senses that our imagination 
enables us to “place ourselves” in the other person's situations. Smith's notion of self is of 
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a capsule of sameness that can be accessed only by the power of imagination.3 The 
relationship with the other is always based on a procedure located within the person: as a 
result of sensitive stimulation the self can imagine the sensible experiences of another 
person. Imagining is, in its most basic meaning, an attempt to transmigrate—to relocate 
one's own center in the midst of what is suffered by other persons in their bodies.  
However, Smith also presents an inverse process, one in which it is not the intentionality 
of the person that makes intimacy possible, but their own damaged self: 
Persons of delicate fibres and weak constitution of body complain that in looking 
on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to 
feel an itching or uneasy sensation in their correspondent part of their own bodies. 
The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that 
particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from 
conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches 
whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually 
affected in the same miserable manner.4  
 
Although the hierarchical relationship between sensible experience and 
imagination appears, this description introduces another dimension. What interrupts and 
irrupts within the realm of a person's self-closure is the uncontrollable damaged other. It 
is not the intentionality of the self that constitutes its field of experiences but the lacerated 
body of the “wretched.” The self's secure dwelling in its world is taken into the deepness 
of terror by an anomalous body that resists the apprehension of the self's gaze. Damaged 
bodies, as rebelling angels5 pierce the “delicate” person's bubble of selfhood, rebelling 
against the “throne and monarchy” of the person, distancing itself from anything that 
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surpasses its own satisfaction. Misery and pain concentrated in another person's body 
prompt this immediate corporeal response.  Smith's ulcerated bodies rebel against the 
predominance of the spectator. It is not the spectator who arranges the surroundings but 
the unpredictable smells, texture, and voracity of the wounded other. It is not the 
spectator’s interests and attentiveness that modify its sensibility and imagination but the 
unfathomable yet irruptive concreteness of the “beggars”—Smith's all-embracing 
designation to evoke the foreign and monstrous.6 
For Smith, nevertheless, the beggars are apparitions without context. Their 
wounds and fetidness are sudden irruptions that are thought to be unrelated to the 
landscapes of the “delicate person.” Smith describes the experience of the production of 
pure bodies and corporeal disgust. The beggar is pure battered physicality; it lacks, for 
Smith's spectator, the components of a full person. It is precisely the beggar's condition of 
putrid body, its unrecoverable otherness that produces repulsion: it is a nudum hominem.7 
This notion initially refers to a Christological dispute: was Jesus merely clothed as a man 
or was he an angel with the appearance of a man? Smith's bare man is the one that is 
indistinguishable from its wounds, basically terrenae carnis.8 The bare man enters, 
producing terror into the field of possible corporeal experiences of Smith's spectator 
because it is terrestrial flesh. The spectator is obligated to experience in its own body 
what is commonly not regarded or, more precisely, not experienced. Therefore, Smith's 
bare man (nudum hominem) or beggar causes in the “delicate person” an unintended 
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variation in its sentimentality. The reverse of Smith's bare man is the body of the man of 
God or “uomo di Dio,” and refers to that which is perennially fragrant and clean.  
There was fear and weakness, dizziness and guilt on the one hand, and on the 
other, the yearning for warmth, plenty, good health, and most for all for well-
being and the body’s safety. The delician paradise was a great votive casket full of 
dreams, desires and hidden fears […] The nostalgia for the lost Eden kindled the 
desire for what was missing: above all for the body’s permanence, the total 
efficiency of its working parts: eyes without their worldly spark, strong teeth, an 
abundance of years.9 
 
Camporesi’s description, although not related to Smith’s context or work, 
nonetheless expresses the atmosphere of Smith’s introduction to his The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments with its combination of gazes, odors, and unexpected presences. It points to 
the manifest tensions that permanently question Smith’s project.10  His project is 
fundamentally a daring and permanent series of anthropological speculations and an 
attenuated materialism.11 And these speculations and seeds of materialism have, as I 
argue here, a point of inflection in the emergence of what Smith considered to be its 
exterior, that which signals the limits of its own clean and united self,12 a strong and 
fundamental assumption about the deity’s design of his world,13 and an explicit 
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irrationalism14 that functions as ground for his economy of flesh and, as part of the same, 
to create a philosophical framework that enables the matching between satisfaction and 
punishment. Albeit ubiquitous throughout Smith’s philosophical interventions, it is in 
Frankenstein where another and relevant sentimental texture of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments is most clearly expressed: 
I had deprived myself of rest and health. I had desired it with an ardour that far 
exceeded moderation; but now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream 
vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart. Unable to endure the 
aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the room, and continued a long 
time traversing my bed-chamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep. At length 
lassitude succeeded to the tumult I had before endured; and I threw myself on the 
bed on my clothes, endeavoring to seek a few moments of forgetfulness. But it 
was in vain: I slept indeed, but I was disturbed by the wildest dreams.15  
 
Those are the words of Victor Frankenstein describing a “dreary night of 
November” when he managed to create life. With his “instruments of life,” Frankenstein 
transforms a lifeless thing into a catastrophe that breathes. Smith’s own attempt to create 
and administrate life has a tone of despair and wild dreams. He is witnessing the opening 
of millions of new eyes and the consumption of countless lives at the time that his deep 
ideals of masculinity and commerce appear to be in contradiction. When Smith proceeds 
to create life that intention underlies his continuing and elastic notion of nature, and every 
time he feels that he is achieving it, he realizes that his particular world is dusk, ruins, and 
miserable splendor. Here Smith appears not merely as the untamed proposer of markets 
and domination but as a dream of a dream. With The Theory of Moral Sentiments one can 
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access an unusual zone of social conflicts as they are expressed in the form of 
philosophical inquiries. Form, as important as it can be, cannot be distinguished from the 
combination of formation and dissolution of existential spheres that both embrace and 
reject individuals. Smith is capturing and communicating his wild dreams. He is forming 
plans and strategies to surpass their most dangerous implications and trying to prolong 
their most joyful possibilities. In order to do that he had had to expel the demons that 
haunt the divine character of his society. Although it does not do so immediately, the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments eventually reveals itself both as a lament and an affirmation 
whose center are theological procedures thought to be capable of recollecting and 
suppressing the abnormalities, excesses, and waste of life without destroying it 
completely. The economy of flesh points toward an incarnational mode of life that does 
not negate flesh but subsumes it within different bodies. 
1. The Wretched 
 
It is because of this interest in subsuming differences that the figure of the 
wretched plays a central role in Smith’s philosophy. The wretched being, that laughs and 
sings, is closed, cloistered off in itself, and lacks the language and strength that are 
necessary to refer (to give reason) to its situation. The figure of the wretched one must be 
understood as a form to designate “the pure carnality” insensible to itself, lacking itself, 
hidden to its same presence as a productive unit. The wretched being is possessed by its 
despair and erring; it laughs and sings, according to Smith, because it has forgotten its 
own location. The wretched are infants that cannot access their roots: their pain and 
wounds block and cancel their condition as spectators. As the mother responds to the 
infant's crying, the wretched one, the closed carnality, depends on the other’s gaze and 
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requires its maternal warmth in order to survive. It is a stationary flesh, trapped in time 
and in its mute pain. The wretched is an exhausted physic. It does not have a future; it 
lacks humanity. Thus, because it does not feel fear or anxiety, in significant ways it is not 
in the world. The world, nature, its anatomy possessed it. It cannot even attain the 
condition of despair. It does not know about its mortality; it ignores its future and its 
extinction. Its laughs and songs are screams from the deep and an exposure of its broken 
body. It is an empty body, a deepness from which something familiar arrives; it is also 
part of the spectator. Because of that the wretched does not belong to death of life. The 
sun burns its skin, the light illuminates its face, but the wretched one cannot establish 
relationships. The spectator would say that the wretched one shares the condition of the 
dead, as one who has been deprived of all its sensible experiences, of the company of 
others, of being recognized as life that lives in itself. Hence, the wretched is like the cold 
of the tomb. The textures, cadence, and vital rhythms of life are closed to it; it makes 
noises while it is a prey of its not developed self. That flesh that screams in the middle of 
the streets will not be forgotten, because it irrupts into the spectator’s gaze and introduces 
an anomaly.  
The “wretched poor,” in contrast to the dead, is not in repose. It is in permanent 
movement; it is intense noise, flesh that extends itself to touch all borders. No one 
remembers or suffers on behalf of the wretched, yet its proximity to the world of the 
spectators produces discomfort. Smith affirms: “The most important principles in human 
nature, the dread of death – the great poison of happiness, but the great restraint upon the 
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injustice of mankind; while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the 
society.”16 
The wretched one does not fear death; it cannot because it ignores it as it ignores 
itself. It is not happy; neither does it practice justice, because it is not an individual. 
Because of all this the wretched does not protect or guard society. Instead, lacking spirit, 
it returns all of its weakness to society. Its apparition itself posits an economic question: 
What must a society do with those who lack the condition of individuals? Smith does not 
respond to this question immediately, but neither does he forget about it.  
The mutual sympathy excludes, from the start, the damaged one because it 
supposes the encounter of two individuals, two beings that recognize themselves as 
carriers of humanity. To be more precise, the mutual sympathy occurs within or through 
practices of friendship and intimacy demarcated by the social division of labor. Sympathy 
can be expressed within the limits of intimacy, kept away from the interruptions of the 
different. Therefore, sympathy creates links at the same time that it establishes 
separations: its equilibrium consists in an exchange of pain and joy that can be 
understood and returned. Sympathy belongs to the circuit of exchange; it always expects 
a return, a surplus. Smith’s theory also supposes an abysmal zone in which sympathy 
cannot be expressed. There are certain pains, anguishes, and joy that even inside the 
sphere of one’s intimate circles cannot be embraced because the other’s sentiments 
escape the foundational capacities of the spectator. 
This sorrow or joy that the spectator cannot experience as the other for Smith 
constitutes excess. To him they are expressions of passion that surpass the limits of 
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propriety because they cannot be assumed by the spectator’s gaze. For him, even in the 
intimate sphere, the only sphere in which sympathy can be expressed, emotional 
expression has to fulfill the principle of reciprocity. This principle is the one that makes 
the regulated exchange of emotions possible. It functions as a guarantee that emotional 
stock can be conserved.  
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect 
concord with the sympathetic spectator they necessarily appear to this last just and 
proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the 
case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they 
necessarily appear to him unjust and improper; and unsuitable to the causes that 
excite them.
17
 
The calculated exchange of sympathy has a social importance; for Smith the 
adequate regulation of individual sentiments makes the social continuum possible. The 
rupture of this delicate and primordial economic act holds within itself the possibility to 
create alterations in the spirit’s movement. The propriety of affections is linked to the 
necessity and possibility of recognition and, along with this, to the production and 
reproduction of the social. The tense discernment about what is proper and what 
improper, as it is described by Smith, locates the life of passions as an economic object. 
For Smith the expenditure of sentiments is the condition of possibility of any other 
economic operation or, more properly, of economics. The equilibrated disposition, that 
reaches its paroxysm in the attitudes of the martial spirit, is the state that makes sympathy 
possible. Everyone has to take care of their passions, protect themselves from these 
passions, and take possession of them in order to be recognized as spectators. Despite all 
this, the spectator is not able to sympathize fully with the other that is within its intimate 
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circle. This lack of sentimental formation is the cost of the economy of calculated 
exchange.  
The spectator feels and suffers because he cannot be properly embraced in his 
emotionally limited situations, where he cannot retain his overflowing passionate heart. 
However, the spectator also wants to sing and laugh but he has to do the impossible and 
overcome the sentimental torrent that damages the logic of return. Smith describes that 
vacuum in which the equilibrated sympathy cannot institute recognition. Because of that, 
we can best read his theory of sympathy as a meditation about loss, the lack expressed by 
the other that screams for “a more complete sympathy.”18   To this lack, imposed by the 
limits of propriety, Smith opposes the necessity to tamp down the discomfort that is 
generated by the spectator’s gaze. If there is not equivalence between compassion and 
original sorrow it is not because that is a feature of human nature. Smith does not 
describe a condition; rather he proposes a principle of political economy. The attempt to 
experience the other is blocked, according to his theory, because it incorporates an 
excess: it implies the interruption of the accelerated rhythm of self-satisfaction; it induces 
a break within the circuit of the market’s production and expansion.  
He explains: “In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to 
assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in 
some measure to assume those of the spectator.”19 With this, according to Smith, the 
wound produced by the impossibility of recognition is sutured. Every spectator has to 
assume the inevitable incommensurability of its own sorrow and joy. This is one of the 
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characteristics of Smith’s spectator: to retire from the social life, putting above himself 
his despair and ecstasies, the sentimental excess that can surpass the social concord. The 
spectator is intrinsically broken; he recognizes his own condition of being human by 
trying to ignore that this sentimental economy hurts his life. In trying to suture the lack he 
has, the spectator cannot relate his own sentiments, those which are more significant, 
with his social life. On the one hand he has to depart from himself and on the other hand 
he has to remain in silence with himself and listen, without feeling his sentiments. The 
presence of the other serves as a reminder to him that nothing must disturb the gray tone 
of the firm emotions. The “candid and impartial light,”20 meanwhile, burns the mute 
intimacy of the spectator.  
Being a master of oneself implies ignoring one’s broken sentimentality every day. 
Within the ambit in which each spectator exercises sympathy, conversation about the 
surfaces of everyone’s banalities is allowed. Because of that, the “poor wretched” one 
that screams, and the latent howl that dwells in each spectator, are both beyond the limits 
of sympathy. Smith’s spectator walks on the edges of his own catastrophe and believes 
that it is possible to survive within a society of radically lacking individuals.  The 
spectator, in Smith’s presentation, has to choose sadness and concealment in order to 
produce wealth.  
The spectator wants to be the master of an impossible silence. He wants to quiet 
what is more intimate through words; meanwhile his flesh is being devoured by a death 
that he does not know. This is a kind death that is not the secure one that produces just a 
modest fear. The tranquility of calculation makes the master a servant of the silence and 
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howls at those that are always interrupting the moderate conversations of friends. The 
words without intensity are the condensation and expression of “self-denial” and “self-
government”: control of a fracture that must be cured by engrossment. From this 
perspective, the Theory of Moral Sentiments is a theory of the intensity of the voice.
21
 
What unhinges Smith’s theory of moral sentiments are the demands and laments of the 
“sufferer” because in them the power of the master is revoked. They transform the 
sentimental geography and make it impossible to ignore them. But it is not just the noise 
that produces discomfort and disgust in the spectator; so too does the public exposition of 
fluids and grimaces. The flesh that struggles to express what weighs it down, particularly 
the weight of the prospect of death, represents for Smith an affront to sociability. It is the 
duty of the spectator to make his most intense experiences appear as neutral as a cold 
wind. The other exists just in the measure that this other is a copy of the spectator. Then 
selfishness is not surpassed but rather is located within a calculation: if the other 
maintains its propriety, the spectator can take of her but she will take care of him. This is 
the meaning of Smith’s sentimental exchange and reciprocity.   
2. Love 
Smith does not want to negate Christianity. Moreover, his reflection on love has 
Christianity as a framework.  His understanding of love is central for his project of an 
equilibrated society: “As to love our neighbor as we love ourselves is the great law of 
Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our 
neighbor, or, what comes to the same thing, as our neighbor is capable of loving us.”22 
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Smith starts here with a reference to Christianity, a reference in a strict sense: he does not 
attempt to think of love from its basis in Christianity but to depart from it. He locates his 
own concept of love as an initial instance that announces a non-contingent law of love. 
Nature's law subsumes Christianity’s law and in subsuming it introduces a 
transformation. What is in question is not whether to love our neighbor but to love that 
neighbor as he or she can love us. Love, for Smith, must be contained until the last 
moment, until the other shows of what it is capable. Just at this moment the spectator 
loves. To love is to return, exchange, and exercise the power of a master. If Christianity, 
according to Smith, does not establish a limit to love, nature is a regulator of love’s 
intensity. The spectator loves because it has been an initial gesture, an emotional 
expenditure that must be returned. Virtue is, paradoxically, to love without the 
expectation of return: because of that Smith renounces loving the scream, the echoes, and 
the complaints of the corpses. Virtue contradicts calculation because it expects the 
magnanimous and this is, within Smith’s system, the irrecoverable lost. Because of that, 
Smith maintains that this type of love is impossible for human nature. With this he 
introduces an understanding of love that is relived, at least formally, from failure and 
rout.  
The Christian idea of love is a consideration about how to exist inside failure: 
love is announced when it has failed, it emphasizes that we have been loved first, and that 
there is occasion for retribution. Love is always a response to its own loss. It cannot 
sustain itself because it has fallen. This dirty and muddy love is, for Smith, indecent 
because it attempts the impossible. It tries to unlink itself from nature and society. It 
makes mediocrity tremble. A type of love that does not fear loss is furious passion that, as 
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hunger, is voracious. Every passionate life is fundamentally carnal: “the true cause of the 
peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in 
other men, is, that we cannot enter into them.”23 
Body 
The question of love has effects in Smith’s conception of the body. At the core of 
his conception is the idea of the body as uncontrollable thing that he cannot possess. The 
body is an insatiable assemblage of desires. It desires itself, to touch its texture, embrace 
other bodies, penetrate them and go out, and to wander looking for itself. The spectator 
cannot enter into the jumble of a body that shakes with joy. The spectator is a cold and 
distant gaze that does not boil. The body has appetites because it is alive, it does not 
consume objects but other bodies and the spectator’s gaze. The body, while enjoying 
itself, is not productive. It remains, according to Smith, concentrated on its own sensible 
existence, forgetting about its social obligations, obligations such as the discipline of the 
factories and the marital bed. These bodily appetites are located outside the realm in 
which sympathy can operate.  
The body is a heap of parts that demand to be satisfied. In this regard the body is, 
for Smith, the limited experience of being permanently affected by the world. However, 
the body cannot trespass itself. It makes circles, swings around itself, but it cannot 
recognize anything with the exception of its own existence. It is confined, as the poor 
wretched, to an existence without intimacy. Its insatiability, always increasing according 
to Smith, separates the body from what is more intimate and secret for others.  
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Imagination and Loss 
The body does not know the monetary economy: “The person, who has lost his 
whole fortune, if he is in health, feels nothing in his body.”24 As an empty foundation, the 
body, therefore, does not belong to Smith’s basic idea of sociability. The body’s appetites 
obey a strict code: they do not require money to be satisfied. Imagination, on the other 
hand, says Smith, is attached to the monetary economy. For Smith what excites 
imagination is the absence or possession of money. The lack of money makes 
imagination construct states of radical solitude, shame, and misery. Money, to Smith, 
makes reference to the possession of human energy or life. It is money that provides 
identifications and that guarantees social recognition. Smith understands why the person 
who loses his or her fortune represents this loss as “the loss of his dignity.”25 To possess 
money identifies those who have embraced the spirit of the time.  
The content and activities of imagination he reduces to the accumulation and 
circulation of money. To him, an accumulation of money expresses dignity. In order to 
accumulate money one has to recollect and procure to extinguish one's corporeal 
appetites. From Smith’s position there always will be an irreducible antagonism between 
money and body, between dignity and wounds. Only the one who makes a docile body 
can accumulate the necessary money to ignore its own body. To forget the body is not a 
metaphor: the theory of moral sentiments is a theory for a delicate body that hides behind 
a modest smile.   The monetary economy requires consuming, touching, and dissecting 
bodies. Hence, this economy asks: How can one fight against the body? Money itself is a 
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body, hundreds of condensed and unsubstantial bodies. There is only one alternative to 
winning and that is bowing out without reserves of money. Money is, for Smith, what  
erases memory.  
3. Pain, Forgetfulness, and Economy 
Money is not only an element of economic theory. It itself economizes the body’s 
rage, its excessive flesh. Nonetheless, imagination does not forget the separation and 
clash between body and money. It cannot erase from its profundities that money is bodies 
and that the ones carrying, taking, and dancing around money are also bodies. 
Imagination stalks the delicacy and propriety of the spectator, makes it return to its own 
blocked appetites. In so doing imagination opens economic theory to its social roots. It 
points to the fact that money accumulation is only possible from an exchange: the 
exchange of wounds for coins. Because these wounds are social, this means that they are 
dispersed throughout the social body and concentrate its most terrifying effects there 
where the songs are more intense.  If “a philosopher is company to a philosopher only; 
the member of a club to his own little knot of companions,”26then the only thing 
universally recognizable, the only thing that links while breaking is money. This is so 
because the virtue of a philosopher, for Smith, consists in the creation of hermetic spheres 
that protect him from foreign screams. Money is what creates the territory of the virtuoso 
life:  which consists in accumulating corpses concealed by prisons.  
A prison is certainly more useful to the public than a palace; and the person who 
founds the one is generally directed by a much more just spirit of patriotism than 
he who builds the other. But the immediate effects of a prison, the confinement of 
the wretches shut up in it, are disagreeable; and the imagination either does not 
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take time to trace out the remote ones, or sees them at too great a distance to be 
much affected by them.
27
 
Prisons are patriotic creations because they, like surgical instruments, fulfill the 
function of extirpating the wretched from the public world. A prison's lugubrious 
appearance contradicts its vigor: the edification of a prison is the synthesis of public 
virtue. The prison divides the social territory and so makes explicit the spiritual hierarchy 
of society. If prisons are horrible edifications it is because they take their shape from 
those who inhabit them. The goal of a man of virtue consists in being able to 
acknowledge the beauty in the midst of the putrefaction of a prison, because the prison 
liberates society from its “germs” and stalkers. The walls of that edification are the 
encrypted book that the man of letters should read in the solitude of his room. There he 
can find the message that he must seal in his own sad body: the punishment and pain of 
the wretched are the cost of the security of his perpetual present.  The question is not how 
to appreciate the monstrosity of the wretched but to consider one delimited subject: the 
institutions created to punish them, horrendous as they should be, are based upon a 
virtuoso judgment. If initially these institutions appear to be exterior to society, this is due 
to the agent’s weakness.  
Smith insists that society requires jail cells in which to throw its waste. For the 
philosopher, a prison is the most human of edifices. It condenses and expresses one of the 
nodal points of Smith’s theory of moral sentiments: sympathy and compassion are 
limited, and its most ardent intentions, impossible. Protection by and empathy with 
intimate friends is also affected by this impossibility. Trying to conduct oneself from an 
impossible horizon leads only to destruction and violence. With their iron and stone 
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eating bones, prisons reminds us that the world will never deserve a love beyond 
calculation. In a society surrounded by “wild beasts”28 such places of confinement are the 
luminous pleasures of a humanity that must love its executioners.  
Ranks, Shame, and Punishment 
After expressing his admiration for prisons and punishment, Smith develops a 
justification of the division of social ranks. He admits that there is a relation of necessity 
between poverty and pleasure— clearly not because he considered poverty to be 
beautiful. On the contrary: “we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty.”29 
The man of rank is, above all, an exhibitionist, and expends himself without contention. 
In the act of exhibiting himself he believes that he is swallowing space, time, and souls. 
The primitive accumulation that permits this luxurious expenditure requires unrestricted 
punishment and moderation. Smith writes a nostalgic song to immortality: the great man 
should live forever. This sentiment, explains Smith, necessarily implies the rejection of 
anything that happens amongst the low ranks. Among them particularities disappear; they 
are the ones whose most profound desire is the long life of the great man.  
The origin of the distinction of ranks and the order of society is the human 
propensity of loving the rich and powerful. In this point Smith’s philosophy turns to be 
the lost voice of the “poor wretched”: the philosopher speaks for them in order to affirm 
that, despite everything, their loyalty will be always with the great man. Smith makes the 
low ranks pronounce a word, a promise: that they love hunger and punishment. The great 
man speaks for the condemned to corroborate the thesis that in an equilibrated society 
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conflicts or disputes must not exist. Inside the healthy and pompous body of the 
triumphant man everyone has to find a minuscule space to satisfy his or her own needs.  
Reason, Philosophy, and Order 
Smith continues his justification and exaltation of the class system by saying, 
“That Kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, 
as the public convenience may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is 
not the doctrine of nature.”30  Once again a tension appears.  Smith introduces the public 
equilibrium as the criterion by which to judge authority and sovereignty, reason and 
philosophy, hunger and social and existential despair. Although limited, this criterion is 
political and therefore admits interpretations and applications. It is possible to understand 
that the organization of society will be what prompts political relationships. Therefore 
reason must reach the highest limit of social tensions in order to satisfy its own 
expectations. Rational are those practices that are put into radical debate and can be 
transformed. The rationality of an action follows if it is effective or has a plausible 
capacity of contributing to public wellbeing. It is known that, for Smith, the public ambit 
includes only men from the high ranks. Independently of this, Smith opposes the doctrine 
of philosophy to the doctrine of nature.  
The latter assumes authority as constitutive and inalienable. Once Smith 
establishes the natural (not rational) preeminence of the great man, he advises the “man 
of inferior rank” of how to distinguish himself in the public sphere. All this advice comes 
from what Smith denominates as the doctrine of nature. Reason has to surrender itself to 
the doctrine of nature, he insists, because this doctrine is the foundation of the differences 
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of rank.
31
 This is Smith’s critique of reason. He is not looking for the rational. The basic 
argument of the contradiction between reason and nature Smith develops as an apology 
of nature and divine favor: “By 1776 when he published The Wealth of Nations, he does 
not appear to have moved far from the stance adopted in his Theory of Moral Sentiments 
where he maintains that success in business, like aristocratic birth, should be regarded as 
a sign of divine favour.”32 This apology serves as a structure of his economic theory. As a 
social application of this apology he proposes to those of low rank strategies to achieve 
excellence: they have to improve their technical skills, stretch their physical capacities to 
the limit, and wait with patience for death. Moreover, and perhaps most important, the 
“low ranks” must always be prepared to give their lives for the great man. This new (low 
ranked) man, the public man par excellence, should be ready for the battle because it is 
battle that allows him to be recognized as an honorable man.   
These men have only their bodies to give testimony of themselves.  In the empty 
landscape or war, in the midst of corpses and the halt, the men of “middle and low rank” 
build their bloody future. Not only that, but he insists it is crucial that they die with pride. 
Because of that he develops a theory of sympathy to the miserable. They are the ones that 
will die in the place of the men of letters and monarchs. It is from this assumption that 
come Smith’s cautions about the “man of fashion.”33 Men of fashion lack the physical 
and spiritual conditions to defend society. Yet they are no less for that; indeed, Smith 
insists that we (presumably meaning lowly men, canon fodder) never forget that fashion, 
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the refined language of the salons, and good conversations require the brave and obedient 
masculinity of the men without honor.  
Many a poor a man places his glory in being thought rich, without considering 
that the duties (if one may call such follies by so very venerable a name) with 
what reputation imposes upon him, must soon reduce him to beggary, and render 
his situation still more unlike that of those whom he admires and imitates, that it 
had been originally.
34
 
To those non-recognizable men no noble sin or excess is allowed. Their vocation, 
if they aspire to recognition, is to assume fully the rigorous discipline of the factory, the 
martial spirit, and the shadows of happiness. For Smith the requisite for recognition is the 
obedience to nature. That is to say to forget reason in order to receive, perhaps, a tear.  
4. Economic Objects 
Smith establishes in the first part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments the 
necessary conditions for a healthy and wealthy commonwealth. At the beginning of the 
second part there is a reflection about what Smith calls the “imaginary resentment of the 
slain.”35 His reflection assumes that death destroys life without attenuations. The cold 
corpses cannot say anything to us; it marks the end of our responsibility to them and to all 
they could have desired and cared for. Phantoms do not exist; economy has only life as 
its object. And life is understood as the blood exchanged in the market by warm bodies. 
The dead, because they cannot reappear, must remain foreign to our hearts. An economy 
should not stop its march toward progress because of the unachieved dreams of those 
captive in graves.  We must, Smith says, pay no attention to the vengeance of the 
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offended, to sentiments that sway us in our daily tasks. Indeed, to resist death, or to 
conceive of its annihilation, belongs to the most important secrets of reason, he insists.  
Economy of Nature 
Smith proposes a theory of resentment that does not consider the complaints and 
blood of the dead. What underlies this theory is the doctrine of the just punishment, the 
necessity and usefulness of the punitive structure and its forms of social implementation. 
Without punishment, according to Smith, there can be no society and without accepting 
punishment as some sort of educative apparatus there can be no agents. Sympathy is not 
directed at individuals or specific events but fundamentally at what, for Smith, makes 
society possible. What is at stake in his theory of moral sentiments is the type of 
relationship that must be established between law, punishment, and sentimentality. Every 
law must be inscribed on the body so that punishment can produce intimate satisfaction.  
Smith manages to cancel any possible rebellion against law and the doctrine of nature.  
Smith was able to foresee what Borges declared later: “Ciego a las culpas, el 
destino puede ser despiadado con las mínimas distracciones.”36The randomness of 
destiny cannot determine social life and because of that it is necessary for the masses to 
understand that they inhabit a world that has, for them, just two possibilities: law and 
punishment. Because of this it is necessary to say that Smith’s philosophy is an attempt to 
overcome reason. 
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The Crypt and Writing 
Smith does not propose a rational philosophy. Although he intuits reason, he 
prefers to escape from its conflictive character. Smith’s writing pretends to seduce the 
future: honor is a possibility if one assumes it can protect the condition of being men and 
women. He speaks to the multitudes, asking them to be pure, and advising them that it is 
fundamental to avoid luxury and riches. As an alternative to palaces he offers a common 
place: the city, home, and the places of work. Gray and cold as they are, those are the 
spaces in and through which society grows and becomes interconnected and 
indispensable. Smith’s reflections do not admit ambiguous interpretations: “The very 
existence of society requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice should be restrained 
by proper punishments; and, consequently, that to inflict those punishments should be 
regarded as a proper and laudable action.”37  
The theory of just punishment belongs to what Smith designates as “the economy 
of nature.” Within the context of his presentation “Of Merit and Demerit,” Smith narrows 
the economy of nature to one goal: nature provides humanity with a basic tendency 
toward self-preservation and propagation. Smith understands that human beings want to 
persist in their existence, extend it through procreation (family), and even avoid thinking 
about their own extinction. The authentically human has an aversion to death that, 
according to Smith, lies at the frontiers of thinking. The authentic thinker is the one 
whose orientation is to preserve human life through planning and instruments.  To think 
is to act according to the principle of the production and reproduction of the conditions 
that make life possible. The problem for Smith is that, once again, nature and reason do 
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not coincide. The ends provided by nature reveal themselves as too immense for the 
means (reason) that humans have for reason's achievement. Though Smith’s humans 
aspire in any way possible to continue their existence, they cannot do it by themselves. 
These men of weak reason and obscure futures cannot deal with themselves. The 
vulnerability of their reason transforms these beings into hungry animals. Smith knows 
that desire is not the result of lacking an object but that its dynamism precedes any 
specific object. Desire creates worlds and shadows. In throwing himself towards the 
satisfaction of his desires and the enjoyment of its basic necessities, laments Smith, man 
forgets about the goals that “the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.”38  
In the midst of ardent desire and insufficient reason Smith’s men do not take into 
account the director of nature, the fundamental economist. Smith presents pleasure and 
weak reason as a distraction that transforms means into ends. If man’s reason cannot 
make the future, Smith proposes a complementary economy to nature’s economy directly 
from nature’s director. 
Reproduction and Survival: The Theory of Justice 
Starting with this section I present the most specific theological contents of 
Smith’s philosophy. The complementary economy continues within the path of just 
punishment and it is synthesized in a general principle that Smith calls “the most sacred 
laws of justice:” life, property, and contracts. These principles are thought to be artifacts 
that regulate the factual constitution of society. This implies that they cannot be satisfied 
if the present forms of social organization are or attempt to be transformed. Then, it is 
possible to say that Smith proposes that the laws of justice cannot be fulfilled without the 
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existence of his ideal society. To his mind, society does not have an open horizon. Its 
possibilities have already been expressed. This interpretation emphasizes that Smith’s 
society is, at its core, a creation of the director of nature and that justice is way of calling 
for the defense of society.  
Making Us Social 
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some 
solitary place, without any communication with its own species, he could no more 
think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and 
conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or 
deformity of his own face.
39
 
 
Smith’s concept of human is a part of his complementary economy. It implies a 
strong disposition to work over one’s flesh to produce a natural self. Because of this the 
bare man, the madman that sings, cannot recognize himself and feel shame (for he lacks 
culture). Solitude is, for Smith, an open door through which to become absorbed in one’s 
own passions, a space in and through which one seeks pleasure as an end in itself.  
Communication and language is consequently a defeat, a scar, and a memory of an 
intimate life in which there were other channels by which one could have shown one's 
humanity and been with others, whether that were by a kiss, a scrawl, or by drunkenness. 
The inclination of the head, the tactile playfulness, and the unexpected disasters are 
subjected to a primordial punishment: the mirror and the eyes of the other.
40Smith’s agent 
is broken at his core and divides himself to conclude the procedure of examination. The 
constant divisions and the resultant multiplicity function as the production of capital.  
When I endeavor to examine my own conduct, when I endeavor to pass sentence 
upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I 
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divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, 
represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is 
examined into and judged of.
41
 
 
Smith’s I has the peculiar capacity to interrupt the appearance given by the mirror. 
The I that examines and judges suspends the artifice that allows the agent to participate in 
the social transactions as united. This unity is partially destroyed to make possible the 
judgment over the persona.  This is the physical apparition that moves, makes and fulfills 
contracts, kills in war and exerts effort in the factories, and appears and disappears as a 
shadow exposed to noises. A defeated body and sentiments constitute the person; she or 
he is a labor force, a weapon of war, and a reproductive machine. However, as in the case 
of the bare man, such a person lacks his or her self. In one of the corners of his or her 
room the person, whether exhausted or energized, is taken to trial without knowing 
exactly of what he or she is accused. However, this trial does not occur in a space that is 
time determined; rather it functions as the a priori concept of space-time. The 
productivity of a person presupposes the recurrent and constant judgment. The trial is 
happening always, because the person cannot be absolved.  
The charges against the person continue to grow even if that person is trying to 
obey the director of nature. Every trial is suspended if the accused promises eternal 
loyalty to the director of nature and to its purposes. The division of the I or self is a way 
to maintain a prerogative: there is a point at which the spectator is always united. This 
unity is what Smith proposes for the society divided into ranks and for the social division 
of labor. If he admits that the human essence is the complex combination of its social 
relationships, then it is necessary to say that this essence is an uncontestable judgment 
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against which are leveled secret accusations. The divided society embodies its cuts, 
domination, and modes of production all the while stalking the internalized judge. A. 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) takes Smith’s juridical theater to the level of existential 
condition. Schopenhauer presents sadness and nostalgia without considering their strong 
attachments to what for Smith are everlasting foundations. 
Our existence has no foundation to support it except the ever-fleeting and 
vanishing present; and so constant motion is essentially its form, without any 
possibility of that rest for which we are always longing […] Thus restlessness is 
the original form of existence. In such a world where there is no stability of any 
kind, no lasting state is possible but everything is involved in restless rotation and 
change, where everyone hurries along and keeps erect on a tight trope by always 
advancing and moving, happiness is not even conceivable.
42
 
Schopenhauer’s sad tone is the written version, the condensation, of historical and 
social conditions. This sadness does not know how to ask about its own origins. He 
identifies failure with an unavoidable fate linked to itinerant and elusive time. 
Schopenhauer cannot overlook that sadness is a symptom of quietness and reiteration; if 
the market moves, it is because at the core of the people and their apparent mobility the 
reiterative judgment blocks the eruption of the volatile.  If there is no rest it is because the 
market has to grow and its growing requires extenuation. More than a condition, being 
restless is a result of modes of social organization. These modes of organization should 
produce anger and rage towards the condition of the person. Smith opposes rage and 
offers happiness instead. What we must think about is how to liberate ourselves from the 
happiness of surviving judgment one more day.  
The real individuals of our time are the martyrs who have gone through infernos 
of suffering and degradation in their resistance to conquest and oppression, not 
the inflated personalities of popular culture, the conventional dignitaries. These 
unsung heroes consciously exposed their existence as individuals to the terroristic 
                                                          
42
 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena Vol. II, trans. E.F.J Payne (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), 284. 
197 
 
annihilation that others undergo unconsciously through the social process […] 
The task of philosophy is to translate what they have done into language that will 
be heard, even though their finite voices have been silenced by tyranny.
43
 
 
I do agree that there are forms of individuation that are not completely subsumed 
by the cruel happiness of Smith’s prisons and intimate scaffolds. Nonetheless the access 
to those experiences and finite rebellions cannot be translated into philosophical 
language. Moreover, what exactly is the language of philosophy? Is it not Smith’s own 
language, a language that comes from philosophical techniques? As I have demonstrated, 
it is in the philosophical language itself that tyranny reveals itself, showing at the same 
time paths to radically different forms of individuation. Therefore the task of philosophy 
is to approach its own trajectories and most significantly its own tyrannies. The 
pretension of being a translator of finite voices transforms the philosophical act in a 
mimetic gesture of Smith’s own translation of the loud voices of the other. It is in 
philosophy itself that the tyranny and its multiple counterparts are expressed as a part of 
social and political conflicts that are not translated but rather than enacted by philosophy. 
Philosophical interventions are not simply the communicators of a singular scream or 
command. They always contain, even as scars, the presences that populated the world 
that made them possible.  Philosophical interventions are as sinuous as the relationship 
between agent and spectator. 
5. Agent and Spectator 
The one taken to judgment is the agent, the public figure that everyday lives out 
the doctrine of the creator. The judge is the spectator (the original idea) that acts in the 
world through its copy. Their difference cannot be abridged to “one is cause and the other 
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the effect.”44 The spectator is the perfect version that, because of its condition of 
perfection, cannot relate directly to the everyday affairs of the world. This also has to do 
with its constitution as it does not have a body and therefore does not suffer alterations. 
The agent, copy, or residuum of the spectator is fundamentally a body that just intuits the 
spiritual life. Their relationship is necessary because Smith knows that the new economy 
cannot produce and reproduce itself without bodies. In its most pathetic version, the 
relationship between idea and bodies there is not forgiveness for the body and its needs.
45
 
This is possible because, for Smith, bodies want to be recognized and embraced by the 
idea. 
Religion: A World to Come 
After his apology on punishment and his elaboration of obedience, Smith offers a 
reflection about religion. His objective is to differentiate between true and false religion. 
This differentiation continues his discussion about the limits and possibilities of 
recognition. The first point of his reflection deals with the religion of the desperate as 
they cannot achieve recognition in Smith’s understanding of society. He clearly 
acknowledges that religion plays a primordial role in the rebellion of the poor. Because 
Smith’s notion of recognition is impossible, the masses of condemned bodies look to the 
solace of religion. 
The persons in such unfortunate circumstances that humble philosophy which 
confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, but little consolation.  
Everything that could render either life or death respectable is taken from them. 
They are condemned to death and to everlasting infamy. Religion can alone afford 
them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them that it is of little importance 
what man may think of their conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world 
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approves of it. She alone can present to them the view of another world; a world 
of more candor, humanity and justice that the present.
46
 
For the condemned the constituted world is an irredeemable place. For Smith, the 
condemned ones screams of innocence and rebellion cannot be attended to. The 
organization of social relations does not have space for reparation and doubt. Verdicts, 
judges, and trials cannot be contested. Philosophy, or more precisely the philosophical 
techniques, acts like the copyist of the judge: philosophy writes and proclaims in the 
salons and universities that the condemnation to death is more than rational; it is the 
revelation of the organizer of nature. Yet as Smith recognizes resistance to annihilation 
persists—in the form of religion. Religion offers another world, one in which the legal 
structure trembles. From those irruptions arise, like wild plants, images and noises of a 
justice that does not require division and subjugation.  
The judge that sees everything does not condemn and incites the imagination of 
another world. Within Smith's theory, religion has an anomalous status, but at its core it 
is indecent because it introduces the impossible into what he likes to think of as his 
closed world.  
The Forbidden Name 
The introduction of the religious anomaly helps Smith to emphasize that in the 
real world the religious judge does not have any power. The ambit of the judge is the 
wounded heart of the condemned person who longs for individual consolation.  That 
world does not have the potency to interfere with the world designed by “The All-wise 
Author of Nature.”47 The religious world is evanescent, unsubstantial, a product of 
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weakness and despair. From this perspective it is possible to argue that religion is not a 
complex of beliefs but a horizon that must be practically and partially reached. How then 
does one create a new world? The “Author of Nature” on the other hand makes social 
relationships the highest goal of human life. The author has left the world entirely to the 
disposition of men so they can judge themselves. Politically this means that it has 
sanctioned Smith’s divisions as transcendental. First, men judge and condemn each other, 
and then they condemn themselves. The demigod never forgets.
48
 If the internal judge is 
afraid to condemn itself and this is one of the motivations of Smith’s reflections, a 
demigod rises against it. Against this demigod struggles another root of human nature:  a 
hope and expectation for a coming world.  Smith writes from within an agonic struggle. 
The effective and factual social relationships face the also real and unfathomable 
expectations of a non-calculated and novel space that come from the rebellion of the 
poor. From the ruins and scraps of desperate men appears an afflicted nature.  
As a response to this, Smith proposes to keep loving life: “The poor man must 
neither defraud nor steal from the rich, though the acquisition might be much more 
beneficial to the one than the loss could be hurtful to the other.”49 If the thirsty and 
hungry poor person decides to steal or, more precisely is obliged to do so in order to 
preserve his life, he has to put the love of life above the love of self. Any individual 
necessity, not even the drive to self-preservation, can be considered as more valuable 
than the interest of the majority. The demigod is the one that gives a message: do not 
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resist, be a man. To die Smith considers as divine virtue; it is what makes the poor be 
closer to God.  
6. Deity and Spectator 
Smith’s philosophy of moral sentiments is a theological enterprise throughout. As 
a part of this enterprise he creates his own understanding of a true religion. Therefore, 
religion also has its double. For Smith there is another religion which is part of the 
sequence of law, punishment, love, and death. In this religion it is the deity itself that 
inscribes morality in every heart. Within the realm of this deity there is no other possible 
world.  Smith’s world finishes its cycle: it announces that it start from facts and ends with 
an explicit theology.  Nonetheless, from the beginning of his moral philosophy, Smith 
proposes a theology.  The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ form of exposition implies that 
there has since the beginning been an encounter between nature and deity. In contrast to 
his idea of human reason, Smith’s divinity is all-comprehensive and self-founded.50 It is 
on this basis that Smith writes his philosophy.  Smith’s deity is theological in one precise 
and concise sense: it is a presence whose apparition depends upon and is made possible 
by writing.  It does not differ from the word that represents it. This religion and its deity 
are necessary to reinforce the sense of duty. The obligation is not to the divinity but to the 
happiness of the commonwealth. This deity does not require anything because it has 
deposited its entire being into justice and its “vicegerents.” Smith equates the historical 
and contingent reality with the law of a God.
51
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As a part of this equation Smith locates the vicegerents of God inside every 
person; he understands the social conflicts and struggles as if they were a battle against 
God. In this labyrinth of tensions that Smith is always touching upon and from which he 
wants to escape, his last play is to put God on his side. It is in the immanent heaven that 
everything can be remediated. Smith’s false alternatives are either to cooperate with God 
to achieve happiness or to rebel against it: “By acting otherwise, on the contrary, we 
seem to obstruct, in some measure, the scheme which the Author of Nature has 
established for the happiness and perfection of the world, and to declare ourselves, if I 
may say so, in some measure the enemies of God.”52 And this God is always stalking, 
ready to punish, and eager for revenge. Its body is the body of the philosopher. Smith 
returns to one of the most important questions of his moral philosophy as a result of his 
reflection about God. The question can be considered strictly soteriological. 
Flesh and Savages 
The question to which he returns is: what are the conditions, exercises, and 
economization that everyone has to practice in order to fulfill God’s plan? Smith’s 
response is based upon an alleged “comparative anthropology.” One of the categories that 
organizes this comparison is self-denial.  Smith compares his own anthropological 
situation with what he denominates “savages and barbarians.”53 These are beings that 
close themselves to any risky passion because they are in permanent danger. Their 
primordial condition is that of the weak that hides from the other, and that attempts not to 
be perceived. Their being is always about to be destroyed. They are never satisfied with 
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themselves.  Their misery, that for Smith is congenital, does not allow them to develop a 
personality and societies. In the strictest sense the savages, as the wretched, cannot 
develop such things because of their constitutive weakness. The savage is a solitarian 
without a possible salvation; it is completely turned towards its broken self.  
Such savages cannot have encounters with others because their own life is 
ungraspable to them. Among the savages sympathy has not been developed; they have, 
therefore, another nature.  The savage, says Smith, falls into its solitary silence and does 
not get out of it. If for Smith noise is a mark of damaged humanity, silence is its scar of 
inferiority. If one is fully human, that humanity, the philosopher emphasizes, has to be 
expressed through moderate talking. This means permanently exposing oneself, 
constantly revealing oneself to others. The spoken word is the place in which the person 
is solidified. Through speaking a person exposes him or herself to the judgment of others. 
The spoken word serves as evidence of the state of one’s secret places. Smith introduces 
an analysis of language as juridical device: the act of speaking weakens the security 
artifices within the speaker that introduce a conflict with duty and God. In speaking, the 
agent shows everything to its accusers. Talk is always the economic norm that Smith 
misses in the savages. Among themselves, explains Smith, they are indifferent.  
To silence, savages add distance from every stimuli. Smith, who writes from a 
colonial imaginary, creates what can be called sensible blocking of the conqueror: due to 
the fact that when they are being tortured the savages do not express the natural emotions 
of a person, the conqueror cannot demonstrate his or her own sensibility. For Smith, 
conquest and torture do not affect the sphere of human sensibility because the conquered 
other, given its alleged insensibility, shows its empty heart. Smith understands conquest 
204 
 
as a pre-sentimental activity in which what are being hurt are merely objects, raw 
material. Savages are thus another modality of the bare man. Here a question of particular 
political importance that has been discussed, among others, by Achille Mbembe (1957), 
must be introduced: 
I do not intend to go back over such problematic of continent as “invention”, 
since the history of that imaginary has been firmly established and its wellsprings 
laid bare. I am, rather, concerned with two issues, two sides of a coin. One is the 
burden of the arbitrariness involved in seizing from the world and putting to death 
what has previously decreed to be nothing, an empty figure. The other is the way 
the negated subject deprived of power, pushed even farther away, to the other 
side, behind the existing world, our of the world, takes on himself or herself the 
act of his or her own destruction and prolongs his/her own crucifixion.
54
 
It is clear that Smith’s colonial and fantastic take on others is sustained by a 
ferocious inventiveness. However, Mbembe’s double issue is an attempt to understand 
why the conqueror and his philosophers try to destroy what is not even supposed to exist.  
This is a question about the motivations of a philosophy that declares both the inhumanity 
of savages and at the same time expresses certain nostalgia about its alleged primitive and 
original characteristics. It is more appropriate to refer to the instances rather than 
motivations through which a philosopher pretends both to negate the existence and 
capture a savage or barbarian. In the case of Smith it is, as I shall explain in what follows, 
some of those fixations and fantasies that populate the philosophical delirium.  
The Sound and Fury 
For Smith the basic theological and economic contradiction is between the savage 
and God: “every savage is said to prepare himself, from his dreadful end: he composes 
for this purpose what they call the song of death, a song which he is to sing when he has 
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fallen into the hands of his enemies, and is expiring under the tortures which they inflict 
upon him.”55 Smith’s savages compose songs. Their intimacy and interior appear not to 
be accessible. Their voices remain distant, open to a future that does not belong to the 
torturer. The savage murmurs a melody that guards its life from the fire and also makes 
present the multitude of lives that make its songs possible. All music speaks; it says 
multiple things that are not always immediately understandable. The torturer, whose 
voice the philosopher pretends to be, gets frustrated because the burning body is not his 
property, and because the bloody lips of the savage conceal what is most important. 
Torture has as its purpose to make the condemned live enough to declare that they 
surrender. To surrender to the torturer has a direct relationship with the imperative to 
obey the spectator. In each case what is at stake is accepting the infinite power of God. 
The songs that the savage sing are suspired against death, the songs introduce a battle 
with God. Smith’s dream is that all the impoverished, accused, and tortured learn how to 
defeat their weaknesses in order for them to remain firm when the fire consumes them.   
For Smith, conquest and colonization are hazardous turns of fortune
56
 that 
demonstrate, in the midst of cruelty, the noble character of the savage. To the question of 
the uniformity of human nature
57
 Smith adds this apparent tension: the braveness of the 
savage. Smith laments that it is a feature that has been weakened in and through civilized 
societies. The philosopher keeps the hope that it will be possible to combine the love of 
God and the availability of death. The economic theory and anthropological speculations 
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are linked in order to ask even more of the condemned: “The hardiness demanded of 
savages diminishes their humanity, and, perhaps, the delicate sensibility required in 
civilized nations sometimes destroys the masculine firmness of the character.”58 The 
previous declaration is awkward. The savages are from the outset not considered as 
humans. The relationship between the civilized and the savage, inside Smith’s work, is 
organized from the assumption of a radical difference that is never called into question. 
The angle that interests Smith is not the “loss of humanity” but the question of the 
destruction of masculinity. 
The Gentleman’s Nostalgia 
As we saw in chapter two the concept of women and men is at the heart of 
economic theory. Here, the dichotomy of feminine and masculine is addressed, at least 
momentarily, from a third place: the imagined as savage. In him is paradoxically 
condensed masculine firmness, thirst for blood, and indifference in the midst of terror. 
The savage still has original characteristics that appear to be vanishing inside the 
turbulence of the city. The gentleman feels nostalgia for the combination of discretion 
and fury. His dream is a world in which the agony of the battlefield is covered by blood. 
The savage, a rhetorical figure, provides the place in which the human is a combination 
of laconic heroism and monetary accumulation. The rupture between matrix and body, 
origin and present marks Smith's anthropological genealogy.
59
 As in the case of the 
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division of labor, in which he recognizes its deadly effects on the workers, Smith makes 
the “original masculinity” of the savage an object of philosophical remembrance.60  
This is the reason why Smith’s theory of moral sentiments is an artifact that 
creates differences and encrypts them.
61
 The production of differences, in this case 
concentrated on the savage, is in itself cryptic.
62
 The savage, as a rhetorical place, is the 
intentional oblivion of what exceeds the gaze of the spectator. But Smith does not stop 
there. He estimates that it is even necessary to cancel the nostalgia. Smith turns against 
himself and his fantasies about beings that have the war inscribed in their skin. The 
philosopher creates an itinerary that serves as a philosophy of history: the origin of the 
human, conserved still by the savage, is found in the inclination towards action and care 
of silence. When history, that subsumes savages as ashes, reaches its highest productivity 
the roots of humanity are put at risk.  
Thus, Smith writes a requiem for the savage whom he cannot but condemn to 
perpetual servitude.
63
 At the core of this condemnation is the project to include these men 
by ignoring who they are, and seeing them solely as a labor force: “One who, in flying 
from an enemy whom it was impossible to resist, should throw down his infant because it 
retarded his flight, would surely be excusable; since, by attempting to save it, he could 
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only hope for the consolation of dying with it.”64 Smith interprets the abandonment of 
children, in the context of persecutions and killings, as the expression of an ancient 
tradition.  With this he negates the tension and radical loss that are implied by deciding to 
let a child die. The gentleman reader of so-called historical documents cannot admit that 
while reading about far away tropical people he is also provoking escapes and death:
65
 
“Thus, there is no violence in a colony without a sense of contiguity […] Furthermore 
colonial violence is linked to the exercise of language, to a series of acts, gestures, 
noises.”66 Reading and writing are also those gestures in and through which Smith 
belongs to the imperial and colonial enterprise. 
7. Take care of yourself: Distance and Obedience 
Smith concludes that everyone has to take care of himself.
67
 This maxim meshes 
with Smith’s idea about the constitutive sentimental narrowness of the human.68 To face 
this condition, which for Smith is natural, it is necessary to create small units of care. 
These unities have as their norm to reduce distance and to intensify sentimental 
exchanges.
69
 Besides that they preserve social peace: “The distinction of ranks, the peace 
and order of society, are in great measure founded upon the respect which we naturally 
conceive for the former […] The peace and order of society is of more importance than 
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even the relief of the miserable.”70 This principle is extensively developed in the section 
entitled “Of Universal Benevolence” and “Self-Command.” As a whole these two 
sections conclude Smith’s theological economy by offering the meta-theoretical 
conditions for An Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations.
71
  
Throughout the development of his theory, Smith does not conceal a deep sense 
of unsettledness. He is aware that the solid can and, effectively is, vanishing into the air. 
He is able to grasp and even show some of the conflicts of a world that is being fractured 
by conquest, impoverishment, and commercial trade. The spectacular mobility of the 
world that Smith is trying to contain makes him create a mega-economic criterion: it is 
imperative for everyone to surrender to the Universe. Smith’s model is, once again, that 
of the soldier who is willing to gives his life.
72
 This imperative of cheerful sacrifice has to 
be read as a total politics of life.
73
  
For the condemned, those of low rank, the savages, madmen, and the rebellious 
there is no option but to be the vomit of a drunken Universe. In Smith’s theological 
hierarchy one has to stop, in order to grasp his theological thinking, in the cosmic 
residuum over which Smith passes as a warrior. This distant closeness with the 
marginalized and fools leaves testimony of the tensions of a theory throughout which the 
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author faces an occult enemy. That enemy is a contemplative man, a phrase in the midst 
of flames, and a rumor of war fields.
74
 Smith closes with a circumspect conclusion: “The 
administration of the great system of the universe, however, the care of the universal 
happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God, and not of man.”75 
This position is consistent with Smith’s entire political, economic, and philosophical 
project. There is no rupture between Smith’s moral and economic theories. Moreover, he 
expands his idea of God’s economy in his most openly economic reflections. Morality 
and philosophy embrace themselves in Smith’s idea of the invisible hand.  This idea is a 
culmination of his attempt to create a theory in which the world is presented as a totality 
without fissures.  
The Invisible Hand 
The previous passage announces and explains in advance Smith’s invisible hand 
in The Wealth of Nations: 
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public, nor knows how much 
he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention […] By pursuing his 
own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it.
76
 
Men's sole responsibility is to take care of themselves and their sentimental 
circles or units. The aforementioned passage of The Wealth of Nations accents the 
individual’s actions within the market. As he establishes certain relationships and makes 
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choices, he is creating the conditions of possibility for the invisible hand to lead him to 
promote the security of his society. This invisible hand is none other than the God from 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The God that is in charge of the universe as a whole 
introduces its hand in human society in order to promote unexpected implications out of 
self-interest. The message is the same although presented in different contexts and 
languages. The role of God and the invisible hand is that of conducting irrationality. 
There is in Smith, as in Petty and Steuart, a form of soteriological
77
 longing. But in 
Smith’s case the economic relationships and economic theories are not what directly offer 
salvation. Smith proposes a continuum that could be arranged in such a way that the 
authentic human beings, organized as a society, could achieve happiness not because of 
social practices intended to produce it for everyone. There are irrational and insensible 
beings that remain far from God’s hand. Because there is no rupture between Smith’s 
moral and economic theories,
78
 Smith develops a theory of the incorporation of bodies 
within society. 
Becoming a Body 
Individuals have to become a body, transform themselves into bodies, and accept 
their bodies.
79
 To be incorporated, as flesh, into social dynamics and institutions requires 
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everyone to be a unitary body that works, speaks, judges, and loves its country
80
 but 
fundamentally its own self-interest, which Smith identifies as God´s own providence.  
Now it is possible to see that in Smith’s narrative the poor are precisely those that are not 
possessed by corporality. It was Karl Marx who partially observed this question with 
particular accuracy: 
As a result, therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his 
animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in 
dressing-up, etc; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be 
anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human 
becomes animal. Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc, are also genuinely 
human functions. But taken abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other 
human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal functions.
81
 
Marx did not acknowledge that for Smith there is no such division or dichotomy 
between animal and human. In Smith’s system there is no separation but the presence of a 
body, which is a transparent ensemble that permits the production, distribution, and 
accumulation of life. For Smith, life is the flesh that in Tertullian appears as be provided 
of inclinations and temperatures that make difficult for its capture and control.
82
 Because 
of that Tertullian creates a flesh without action, density, and passion. This explains 
Tertullian’s interest in the question of Mary’s virginity.83 In assigning a passive flesh to 
Jesus (genere non vitio) or more precisely in creating a theory of a damaged flesh, 
Tertullian creates the soteriological body, which is flesh controlled by the divine 
substance. He creates a body that consumes flesh at the same time that he locates it as an 
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accessible and sensible present object. Incarnation, the process in and through which 
flesh is taken by a body, is an agonic struggle against the carnal actus: what Smith does is 
attempt to go to the densest and deepest part of the person in order to subsume its 
potency.  
A body is not something that one carries or brings with oneself; to assume a body, 
as Smith demonstrates, supposes a trajectory: “Man lives on nature--means that nature is 
his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That 
man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to 
itself, for man is a part of nature.”84  The body that Marx refers to is not Smith’s body. It 
is not simply the body of animal oeconomy but another body different from Marx’s 
natural body. Smith’s is a reflection about the body that pretends to transform or to take 
the place of the organic body. The pilgrim walks, advances, but because his body hurts, 
he has a hope inside him. To produce and achieve his hope he has to struggle against his 
basic productive tool: his corporality. He does not go so far as amputation or 
dismembering but he indeed is at the limits of locality and nationality. In his pilgrimage 
he becomes a silhouette, an unrecognizable shadow, a monster that hides in the forest.  
He doubts Smith’s God and its administration of the World and separates himself 
from its economy. Smith’s bodies are thought to be reduced to the performance of basic 
tasks whose projection they cannot decide. Family, friends, and the country are also 
micro-productive bodies. Inside these bodies circulate and produce the words and 
gestures that make the market possible and excited. The market ultimately belongs to and 
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is protected by God, says Smith. Its quotidian life is composed of the different body-
performances, all of them separated by degrees of magnanimity and honor.
85
  
The rest of the spheres of action that Smith assigns to the “weak man” must be 
understood as derivations of self-interest. The limits of the care for others Smith has 
established in The Theory of Moral Sentiments as resignation and honorable masculinity. 
As a wound that spreads itself over the skin the world of Gods, demi-gods, and vice-
regents that Smith instituted as ground for his philosophy reiterates a message: you must 
be a man until the end. 
Economy of the Flesh: Dawn and Vice 
My reading of Smith goes beyond some of the limitations that appear in even 
some of the most critical interpretations. Even when they adequately interpret Smith’s 
project, some readers still miss some of its most important epistemic moves. 
Far from theorizing a self-regulating market that would work best with a 
minimalist state or with no state at all, The Wealth of Nations, no less than the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments and the unpublished Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
presupposed the existence of a strong state that would create and reproduce the 
conditions for the existence of the market, that would use the market as an 
effective instrument of government; that would regulate its operation; and that 
would actively intervene to correct or counter its socially or politically 
undesirable outcomes.
86
  
The aforementioned description inserts Smith’s philosophy into the scheme of the 
relationships between state and market. It is accurate as it highlights the effective 
tendency at the surface of Smith’s political economy. What it lacks is that it does not 
consider the foundational and theological area that in fact prompts Smith’s narrative. 
What is theorized first by Smith is the transition from bare life (plural and moveable 
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flesh) to bodies. Smith proposes an economy of minimal flesh that transforms flesh into 
strong and healthy bodies. These bodies are not all given by nature. What nature provides 
is an anatomical structure and a complex system of affections that must be transformed 
into agents and vigilant spectators. Incarnation becomes in this lineage a decisive security 
and health device to suppress the latent rebellion of impassible flesh: “More than an 
expulsion of flesh, this concerns its incorporation into an organism that is capable of 
domesticating flesh’s centrifugal and anarchic impulses.”87 Although accurate, this 
assertion does not go to what is the precise ambit in which the economy of the flesh 
originates and extends itself: the assumption that there is in flesh a component, ubiquitous 
and intrinsically vicious, that must be identified and economized. This assumption allows 
the development of a series of techniques, therapeutic practices, philosophical 
interventions, and social and political sanctions whose intention is, at least in the case of 
Smith, to accumulate that territory called man. Smith reminds us that there is no man 
without a God. Without a God there will just be flesh. Therein laid the problematic 
relationship between the economy of flesh and incarnation. 
Economy of Flesh and Incarnation 
 
Esposito’s argument will serve as an introduction to the question that I shall 
develop in the next chapter: “With regard to the distinction (and also opposition) vis-à-vis 
the logic of incorporation: while the incorporation tends to unify a plurality, or at least 
duality, incarnation, on the contrary, separates and multiples in two what was originally 
one.”88 The fundamental problem of this argument is that it does not understand that the 
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flesh of incarnation is not “identical to ours;”89 it is indeed a material flesh but it does not 
carry the predisposition for contamination that ours still contains.
90
 It has to be 
subjetivized, reduced to the condition of being one with God. In this sense the operations 
of incarnation and Smith’s economy of the flesh remain within the same space as both of 
them claim to be dealing with an object-subject that requires being, intensively 
economized. The semantic and theological field in which Smith’s economy of the flesh 
exists ranges from questions related to the loss of masculinity to the tone of the voice. 
Thus, flesh is the antipode of the human being, although it cannot be destroyed entirely. 
In this sense, Smith’s project reveals the flesh’s return to God. 
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CHAPTER 5 
For a Fleshy Theology: Birth, God, and Scream 
You see, I was that sun, or thought I was who did believe there was that spark, that 
crumb in madness which is divine, though madness know no word itself for terror or for 
pity. There was an ogre of my childhood which before my birth removed my only sister to 
its grim ogre-bourne and produced two half phantom children. 
         William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! 
 
In the previous chapters I explained that the economy of the flesh rests upon the 
theological assumptions of a constitutive damaged flesh as well as a theology of God’s 
sovereignty that does not distinguish between the social administration and production of 
the world from God’s government of the universe. For David Hume and Adam Smith, 
theory of nature and economic theory intersect in the economy of flesh. Furthermore, the 
dynamism of their philosophies supposes the existence of an element, force, space, and 
natural component that has to be economized, incarnated within civilization.   
Without this fundamental economic moment the rest of their theories remain 
incomplete. Therefore in this chapter I reflect on a theology of the flesh,
1
 which, I 
maintain, continues to have a primary role in the constitution and development of 
economic, political, and social practices. One of the objectives of this chapter is to offer a 
thorough discussion of the most basic elements of a theology of the flesh in order to 
develop what provisionally can be call a fleshy theology. The concept that organizes and 
guides my presentation is birth, a presentation that departs from and is a response to 
Hume’s and Smith’s economy of the flesh. My response takes into account a complex of 
                                                          
1
 José Granados, Teología de la carne: El cuerpo en la historia de su salvación (Burgos, España: 
Monte Carmelo, 2012). 
218 
 
questions that come from their philosophy. First, Hume’s and Smith’s economy of the 
flesh expresses a judgment about the value of live. Throughout their philosophies Hume 
and Smith distinguish between forms of live in order to create the conditions and limits of 
recognizability. Thus, the magma of their theories is not just the question of nature and 
wealth but the instauration of a frame to determine whether or not something can become 
life or, more precisely, when something can be recognized as another being both equal 
and different. For both of them barbarous, savages, madmen, criminals, and “hysterics” 
could not be recognized as fully humans.  
Second, within this question of the institution of humanity and civilization there is 
a moment of positive affirmation: both Hume and Smith developed their philosophies 
within the imaginary realm of a theologically grounded and oriented world. Because of 
this, they sanctioned that the presence of God, its incarnation in their society, functions 
also as a judgment about social relationships and political projects. As a result of this they 
tend to equalize God’s economy, nature’s economy, and humanity. The acceptance or 
negation of social identifications is understood by Hume and Smith as a theological 
problem.  
Third, in order to be recognized and integrated within civilized society it is 
indispensable to focus of oneself and economize the surplus life that exceeds the basic 
and necessary requirements of the productive body. The enemy of a civilized person is 
within itself. Therefore, one has to exercise a permanent vigilance over oneself in order to 
remain within the limits of the theological society. It is important to say that this 
requirement of looking over oneself is not presented as a purely repressive mechanism. 
On the contrary, Hume and Smith presented this mechanism as one of the conditions of 
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possibility for the achievement of social and personal satisfaction: Electio perfecta non 
potest esse sine habitu.
2
  
Fourth, flesh is not merely rejected or suppressed by Hume and Smith. Both of 
them acknowledged that a fleshless physicality cannot be fully productive. Therefore, it is 
considered as a damaged and useless life. Hume and Smith proposed the empire of the 
body over the flesh. Fifth, the economic circuit of production and distribution has to be 
understood as a relationship between bodies that fully embrace their social identifications 
and ranks. The affirmation of the body and its materiality belongs to Hume’s and Smith’s 
idea of the nature of faith. Being a useful, productive, sympathetic, and healthy body is 
one of the conditions to enter into the Kingdom of God.  
In Hume and Smith I found a mode of thinking that subsumes theological 
procedures and categories in order to overcome the uncertainty and mobility of the world. 
They reemphasize the idea that flesh is both a constitutive part of human beings that 
should be studied, controlled and put to the service of a transcendence that makes 
possible the production and reproduction of both biological and social life. Flesh is that 
moveable force and element that is both universal and particular. It expresses itself in 
individuals and institutions. Its movements and trajectories are, at its core, opposed to 
God’s will and economy but could be transformed or redeemed. This position has served 
has a framework to display theoretical positions that make equivalences between justice 
and punishment, economic wellness and starvation, and domination and happiness. 
Nevertheless, Hume and Smith also present their tensions and longings. Their philosophy 
does not hide its passion and political limits. Throughout their discussions there are 
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several openings and cuts that enable ways to develop their labyrinths. Both of them 
introduce a struggle in which nature fights against itself. Indeed, flesh is confronted with 
nature’s economy in order to accelerate exchange, self-interest, and courage. Also, one 
has to encrypt the intensity of his sentimentality for the sake of being a God’s creature. 
Thus, being a subject supposes being under the siege of God’s punishment and enjoy it.  
Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy permanently introduces the dream of consolation 
and the desire of retain the most prominent features of commercial society, the 
vulnerability and contradictions of the flesh. Even when they affirm their society, with is 
subterranean horrors and bloody wars, there is an explicit questioning about their own 
fantasies that even if is not completely developed, give us a glimpse about the interstices 
and ruptures of their paradise. There are several subtractions that Hume and Smith cannot 
completely grasp and normalize. Colonization and social domination are partially 
exposed by them, even against their intentionality. There is a sense of terror and comedy
3
 
in Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy informs the present discussion. 
1. Theology and Flesh 
I shall now discuss theological reflections on flesh in order to provide a better 
contextualization of my position in this chapter. I have mentioned that for Tertullian it 
was of decisive importance to distinguish between Jesus’s flesh and our flesh. For him, as 
well for Zwingli and Calvin, flesh is an intrinsically vicious and rebellious force whose 
primordial tendency is to oppose God’s designs and projects. In Peter Lombard’s (1100-
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1160) Sentences
4
 there is a distinction between the twofold birth of Christ. In first place, 
Christ is born before time and in second place is born in time. This distinction is clarified 
as follows: Lombard sustains that incarnation is for us, and like us, and above us.
5
  
For us, because for our salvation; like us, because he was a man born of  woman and in 
the [usual] time from conception namely nine months; above us, because it was not by 
seed, but by the Holy Spirit and the Holy Virgin, transcending the law of conception.
6
 
Thus, Christ is a person but not to the extent of being a carrier of damaged flesh. Christ’s 
salvific nature comes from his double birth. He is not affected by the damaging heritage 
of flesh as he is the product of human seed. Sin itself is understood as dwelling in the 
flesh (ipsum peccatum dicitur manere in carne).  
The virginal conception was the mechanism in which Christ’s birth was liberated 
from the “tinder of sin” (fomes pecati). Christ’s freedom from flesh was the condition of 
possibility of Christian narrative of salvation. The idea that God became flesh (caro 
facta) does not imply a change in God’s nature. God did not become another nature. The 
third distinction of the book 3 of the Sentences is introduced as follows: “On the flesh 
which the Word took, what it was like before and it was taken”7 and is resolved by the 
argument according to which the Holy Spirit cleansed Christ’s flesh. The Holy Spirit 
immune Christ’s flesh all contagion of sin. Lombard concludes:  
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From these words, what we said earlier is made very clear, namely that the flesh 
of Word was conceived and taken at the same time, and that the same flesh, 
indeed the whole Virgin, with the coming of the Holy Spirit, was made chaste 
from all shame of sin.
8
 
 
The function of the Spirit is to immunize the flesh from sin. Immunity is both a 
device and a process. As device the Spirit protects the flesh transforming it into matter 
without concupiscence.
9
 In this regard, flesh is strictly linked to erotic inclinations and 
sexual practices. Because of that Christ’s is considered to have “the likeness of sinful 
flesh”. It is just the same as our flesh because Christ’s flesh has the ability to suffer and 
die: “And so, although his flesh is the same as ours, yet it was not made in the womb in 
the same way as ours.”10 Lombard’s fundamental argument is that flesh is equal to carnal 
pleasure, apart from the concupiscence of lust and therefore: “so truly is said that the 
flesh of the Word was not in bondage to sin in the case of Christ.”11The immunization 
process protects and reduces life at the same. Theological immunization is the process 
through which the Spirit takes possession of the flesh. Indirectly, being immune from the 
flesh’s influences has a political function. Immunity is the premise for the creation and 
expansion of communities. The ideal of a community is to be an immune sphere. 
Lombard’s focalization on carnal pleasure was further expanded to include not merely the 
bodily appetites “which can be summed up under the head of sensuality, but also of the 
self-assertive instincts which fall more naturally under the head of pride.”12 Karl Barth 
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(1886-1968), started, years before, a similar argument, have said that sin is not a 
particular action or thought. It is strictly an absence or lack that cannot be completely 
explained; it is a rumor of the Other within us. Sin is a matter of belief because it exceeds 
the particular life of one person; it is the constitution of our interiority. Separation is both 
from God and from the “purity” of us; but it is not tangible even if it has corporeal 
manifestations.  
In ‘naturalness’ there is always secreted that which is non-natural, and, indeed, 
that which actually contradicts nature. This contradictory factor waits the hour 
when it will break forth. When, by allowing nature to runs its course freely and 
uncontradicted, God and the world have become confused with one another, there 
comes into prominence a further confusion: what cannot be avoided or escaped 
from becomes confused with some necessity of nature, and this is in very truth a 
demonic caricature of the necessity of God […] Everything then becomes Libido: 
life becomes totally erotic. When the frontier between God and man, the last 
inexorable barrier and obstacle, is not closed, the barrier between what is normal 
and what is perverse is opened.
13
  
 
In this movement of confusion the center is the predominance of the erotic and for 
Barth that is the fundamental manifestation of the sin. How can life be totally erotic? The 
erotic is related to the eye, the visible and the invisible. It is the eye, which is not just a 
physical organ, that which organizes our world and desires the apprehension of sensible 
forms and also produces imagination. A totally erotic life is that in which the 
voluptuousness of the visible/material – specifically other’s or our own flesh – is 
exchanged for the invisibility of God. The concentration on the visibility of the flesh 
damages our eye to the point that it becomes useless.   
Eroticism is for Barth the last form of idolatry whose intention reaches God 
through the satisfaction of our own appetites. The orgasm is always the joy of one, the 
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closure to the Other. The real openness to the Other cannot be erotic but that of self-
negation. Each look into my flesh is an assault on the glory of God. A totally erotic life 
supposes that even the human becomes a thing in itself.  For Barth, human desire, in its 
deepest reality, does not belong to us but has autonomy and permanently tends to control 
the alleged freedom or free will of the human being. Furthermore, there is no such a 
freedom but a constant movement towards the ‘No-God’. Barth suggests that the 
acceptance of our sinner constitution produces in us a certain joy that could be regarded 
as a Dionysiac enthusiasm.
14
 The whole idea of self-negation and recognition must be 
read from the perspective according to which “The Son of man proclaims the death of the 
son of man”15 and that death is the disclosure of the world and the real being of the 
human being. Thus, the perverse flesh has to be radically controlled in order to receive 
the gift of God.  
Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) has introduced a slightly different interpretation 
of flesh (carne).  His proposal is to consider flesh the fundamental mark of the creature’s 
sensibility (sensibilidad de la creatura). For him, being a creature of God implies 
recognition of the creature’s necessity to have a relationship with a transcendent God. 
Segundo links “Israel’s” religion with Paul and concludes that flesh: “Far from being a 
negative element or animal zone within the person”16 flesh designated an attachment to 
God. Nevertheless, the implications of incarnation, according to Segundo, relativize this 
attachment to point that after Christ’s manifestation “everything is accessible to 
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humankind […] Humankind is no longer under the law.”17 In his perspective, Segundo 
identifies flesh with bondage to law and refusal of freedom and immaturity. Being fleshy 
or carnal is a negation of human responsibility to create its own world and to risk its life 
in the midst of its historical projects. Curiously or not, flesh is identified as a limitation. 
Because of that Segundo’s theology proposes a spiritualized flesh as solution to the wild 
inclinations of flesh. Therefore, freedom and liberation are the result of living according 
the spirit. Segundo proposes the government of the spirit as the mark of a liberated 
humanity. 
2. Birth 
The question of birth locates itself at the antipodes of Hume’s and Smith’s 
philosophy. Both of them have death as one the central categories of their economic 
theory and philosophy of nature. Moreover, one of their main philosophical goals is to 
propose that being willing to death is an unavoidable mark of civilization. Exposing 
oneself to annihilation and torture are considered by Hume and Smith as expressions of a 
type of masculinity that is able to retain the most important trans-historical or spiritual 
values. To offer one’s body in order to immune and protect the commonwealth is 
regarded as the achievement of honor and civility. Thus, be conducted by the spirit of 
death and dispossession is considered as virtue. Smith effectively “wished to explain and 
to secure the unhampered progress of a limitless accumulation of wealth”18 nonetheless 
this wish requires permanent activity and different forms of immunity, he and also Hume 
thought that the will to die was a fundamental economic and moral concept.  
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Both, Hume’s and Smith’s political project does not consider birth as a philosophical or 
economic problem at all because birth supposes the possibility of the new
19
, birth 
“excorporates, exteriorizes, and bends outside”20and divides the unity. Birth is 
expenditure without return, surplus of loss and multiplicities. Birth introduces our 
constitutive precariousness
21
 but not as damage. On the contrary, birth introduces the 
necessity of thinking about an economy of not return because being born supposes the 
interruption of self-interest and money exchange. Birth introduces a vacuum, pain, and 
disorder. Because of birth we loss ourselves.  
Not only has birth been relatively neglected as a fundamental concern in Christian 
theological discussion, its marginality within Christian theology has impeded an 
interrogation of the dynamisms of political economy as they presuppose the absence of 
birth and the preeminence and celebration of death. That is to say that political economy 
is a practice that requires the abolition or concealment of the pure nakedness and repose 
that characterizes birth. Hume’s agents and Smith’s spectators appear never to have been 
born; we see them only as producers, consumers, men of letters, bodies that perform 
tasks. In order to be so they have to distance themselves from their own beginnings as 
such beginnings apparently imply the impossibility of action and production. Political 
economy necessitates that we erase our beginnings and create a sensation of a temporality 
in which nothing from the beginning is retained.  
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Opening 
I would like to open myself, and I am already open, to the opening and exposed 
body that in birth is calling me beyond myself, against myself and, perhaps, for myself. 
In birth the strength and strictness of the spectator is suspended to the point of silence. 
Because of this, I cannot be Smith’s spectator or agent. It is the contradiction of flesh that 
occurs in birth that interrogates me; because one cannot always avoid facing one’s 
condition, one cannot say forever: do not touch me.  Now birth is almost on me, with me, 
within me. It is touching me, but remains invisible; in this moment I feel I am born, but 
suddenly the only thing that I can hear is the calling of the open and exposed body that I 
am starting to smell; and it smells like many nights in a distant/past place: “From the 
point of view of the “being who is born” or the engendered one, birth remains always 
obscure, or unclear. I have no perception of it, nor any memory of it.”22The obscurity of 
birth does not imply that it remains outside our memory. The fact that we are alive now 
indicates to us an economy of care that has made our existence possible. There are also 
smells and voices that put in our midst the beginning.  
Those nights I was not expecting, like now, a thread (filo
23
) that could help me 
find the unexpected and not purchasable. I want to feel my birth but I should first attend 
to the call of the ambiguous fleshy body that, since before I was born, has been calling 
me, and embracing me and from whom I am separated. So, in being called for my own 
beginning I cannot, like Hume and Smith, use biography as the adequate genre to sustain 
my theoretical position. Because in thinking about birth we are at the limits of the 
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biographical and non-biographical. It is a space that delays the affirmative possibilities of 
writing. Writing cannot be a form of self-affirmation but an explicit questioning about 
what is still loss and wounded without having been noticed.  
My truth is outside me and not in the totality of my synthetic capacities; I 
presume it is this call itself but it is not enough just to follow it. One should ask why, in 
this specific moment, is it possible to hear it? Why now and not earlier or later? What 
happens to us when we hear this call? The calling maintains its intensity and I realize that 
its persistence, its strength, does not depend on me. I could ignore it and continue; but the 
call seduces me irremediably.  
This call is the inauguration of a time on time that comes and passes through us 
and we can only receive its posterity, but that is sufficient to remove us and bring us into 
a search without foundation. This time was not yesterday, it is not today and will not be 
tomorrow but it is always hidden or inscribed on that body that does not cease to call, or 
on those tortured lives that are not considered life anymore or never were considered life.  
I shall look forward to caressing that call, letting my body and letting my condition of 
being born be, letting me be taken for its elusiveness and its bloody multiple presence.   
This looking at is always a way toward something, a glimpse of what is 
objectively present. It takes over a “perspective” from the beings thus encountered 
from the very beginning. This looking itself becomes a mode of independent 
dwelling together with beings in the world. In this “dwelling” [“Aufenhalt”] – as 
refraining from every manipulation and use – the perception of what is 
objectively present takes place.
24
 
 
The search to embrace birth is, effectively, just acknowledging that it is already 
there instead of tending to avoid it as we do. As mentioned in the previous quote, in this 
movement toward something (birth) we are not going outside of the inner space in which 
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we are encapsulated, but moving within our condition of being always “outside”, split, 
and divided. Nevertheless, one is not so much looking at birth as feeling a call or an 
invisible touch. There is not “perspective”, nor intuition, but flesh trembling when one is 
facing the loss of his birth. All locations – in the epistemic sense – are second-order 
expressions
25
 of the reality of birth: “The real is a closely woven fabric. It does not await 
our judgment before incorporating the most surprising phenomena or before rejecting the 
most plausible figments of our imagination”.26 I am aware that birth is the appearance 
and therefore could not be exhausted by any description of it.” However, what is calling 
me, the trace that appears with birth could not be erased even with the most powerful 
machine.  
This is a paradoxical situation in which Adorno (1903-1969) brings clarification 
when he notes: “Thoughts intended to think the inexpressible by abandoning thought 
falsify the inexpressible. They make of it what the thinker would least like it to be: the 
monstrosity of a flatly abstract object.”27 What Adorno is saying is that only through the 
hard experience included in the act of thinking – when we are trying to conceive of 
something—can we talk about the inexpressible. It is not enough to refer to our alleged 
resemblance to God
28
 as the be-all and end-all of a theological consideration of flesh. For 
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flesh is not a substance but an intricate junction of presence and poiesis, labor and life, 
gift and struggle.
29
 Rivera explains this idea and develops it: 
Rather than seeing individuals as self-contained entities that can be placed in 
discrete categories, we can learn to see the ways in which we are connected to 
others through the ties in which one life extends in time as well as space. 
Although the societies that we live in put us in categories and those categories 
affect who we might become, we are not reducible to such categories. No name or 
category can possibly describe all that a person is.
30
 
 
Although in some ways Rivera’s explanation about the limits of representation is 
adequate and relevant for our present discussion, her explanation also contains a limit. 
She is right that we cannot fully represent a “person.” But precisely the concept of person 
assumes flesh
31—that flesh is what makes us animals. Hume and Smith would agree that 
to become a human person requires a violent embracing of a series of behaviors and 
inclinations whose tendency is to subsume the excess, that which is not strictly personal 
or that has been fully incorporated. I argue that we should advance into a direction in 
which an interrogation of the concept of person. The importance of this attempt consists 
precisely in the fact that the concept person plays a similar role to that which the 
categories of human and spectator have in Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy: they could 
dissect, divide, subordinate, and rationalize violence and domination. Thus the problem 
for a reading of a theology of flesh is not the limits of representation but more profoundly 
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its categorical net. Rivera correctly affirms: our discussions have as a horizon “new births 
of blood and flesh”.32 
3. Opening and exposure: Flesh without viciousness 
Birth is the painful opening and exposure of a woman’s body and our own 
unknown and non-recognizable presence. Birth is contained in the wailing, blood, desire, 
and struggle with death of that exposed body. Hanna Arendt (1906-1975) explains that: 
The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, “natural” 
ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically 
rooted. It is, in other words, the birth of new men and the beginning, the action they are 
capable of by virtue of being born.
33
 
Saving the world does not refer to the continuance of the existing social forms of 
organization and its theological frames. Saving implies passing through the experience of 
being active against one’s own identifications. Just the nearness of our touch to the body 
giving birth makes us able to hear those wailings, to smell that blood, to desire that 
strength, and to struggle the same struggle. Nevertheless, not even our nearest touch puts 
us in an adequate location to tender an offering to a body that, in front of and for me 
exposes its vulnerability and vigor completely. There is a discontinuity between that open 
and exposed fleshy body and our kindest touch, the thin skin appears firm and 
ungraspable, her urgency begs for our presence but her flesh announces that we remain in 
the distance. Thus flesh is life, world, and environment that receive us not to a family or a 
household but to a realm of possibilities and danger. Saving flesh should not be thought 
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as an operation of cleaning achieved through our reunion with God.  Nancy Pineda’s 
reflection about salvation is relevant for the present argument: 
How the practices created by those who have lost loved ones to the feminicide 
carry theological insight into the meaning of salvation. Through the practices of 
resistance, we discover that two dimensions of salvation take on increased 
importance. First, salvation is necessarily actualized in history, albeit not fully. 
Second, salvation necessarily entails making visible the elemental social relations 
of all humanity and all creation.
34
 
 
What appeals to me in Pineda’s reflection is her idea of what can be described as 
understanding of salvation against the closure of history that comes from those “yet not to 
be born”35. Although in the previous quotation the emphasis rests on the historical 
character of salvation, throughout her book Pineda presents salvation as a series of 
practices that pretend to stop the current and hegemonic mode of producing of history: 
that which kills and forgets women under the cold sand of the desert.   Salvation does not 
just happen in history but implies a contradiction and confrontation of modes of creating 
history, to make us historical. It entails a pause in the furious spirit of the epoch and a 
reconsideration of what should be considered as history and historical. There is a form of 
producing history that expels and violates those considered the residuum of civilization, 
the wretched. It was like that from Hume and Smith. The dreams of those yet to be born 
or those who have been killed announce the necessity to give us another form to be 
historical or even to go beyond history as a closed entity.  
Birth and Negativity 
In birth, when the open body is an offering to us, and we offer our care to such 
gratitude we feel the solitude paradoxically in the same act of resisting distance and 
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obscurity. In the face of birth, it is fundamentally our weakness that reveals its vastness 
and that of the opening fleshy body. This negativity constitutes the unforgettable and 
without its potency we cannot be open to the world. It is precisely because this negativity 
affects us that we can say with F. Hölderlin (1770-1843): “So komm! dass wir das Offene 
schauen, dass ein Eigenes wir suchen, so weit es auch ist.”36 We can have no notion of 
space or feeling of belonging without together going through the experience of struggle 
against our own limits,
37
 which is the opposite of Hume’s and Smith’s economy of flesh 
as it consists at its core in an ambivalent naturalization and spiritualization of  historical 
limits.  
If the fear of death cannot produce anything but a conservative politics, and 
therefore be the negation itself of politics, it is in event of birth that politics finds the 
originary impulse of its own innovative power. Inasmuch as man had a beginning (and 
therefore is himself a beginning), he is the condition of beginning something new, of 
giving life to a common world.
38
 
  Her open body, of the women giving birth, fractures my identity and forces me to 
go into the openness and to hear that which is calling me beyond myself, in my borders, 
in the exteriority of my possibilities. It is in the midst of the liminality that we can take 
care of ourselves without ourselves, without an invulnerable “identity” that is capable 
only of looking at itself, as Hume and Smith propose. But this proposal of vulnerability 
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has to be distinguished from Granados’ idea of flesh´s fallibility.39 For him, in contrast to 
my proposal, flesh’s vulnerability is read as its natural inclination to fail and with the 
rupture between God’s original plan and our own history. Granados calls this rupture the 
“rejection of the mysterious logic in which our existence is called to be developed”40 
which is the same as the rejection of the spirit and “the rejection of our belonging to the 
world”.41 This theology of the flesh continues Hume’s and Smith’s idea of incarnation as 
it reinforces the idea according to which the carnal, as synonymous of sin, expresses itself 
in the struggle against the given conditions of the world: sexual obligations, relations of 
hierarchy, and economic roles within the division of labor. In Granados’ theology Peccat 
caro (the flesh sins) is understood as an inherent conflict of the flesh that pretends to 
overcome its body and through it the social and political bodies. Once again the body is 
understood as a receptacle that allows the production and reproduction of the necessary 
conditions for the existence of civilization. Against this idea of the fleshy body it is 
necessary to contrast the relationship between the fleshy body and the witness.  
The witness 
When, in birth, the fleshy body is open, it is not just exposed to the sight of others 
but it is exposed to itself. The boundaries of the skin, since they are broken, let the blood 
and excrement perch on the legs, arms, and toes. The vagina is transformed into a mixture 
of fluids that are commonly ignored and then the desire of propriety pretends to supplant 
the dirty body. Exposing the fleshy body to itself, to its depths and surfaces provokes, as 
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the Costa Rican poet Jorge Debravo (1938-1967) suggests, the pain of all the fires. 
Everything that gives us light, warmth, pause, and nourishment is pervaded by pain. 
Poetry, trying to recount the moment of birth, calls to mind only the crucifixion.  
Mujer, toda mi sangre está presente        Woman, all my blood is present 
contigo en esa lucha que sostienes. with you in this struggle you maintain 
Contigo está mi amor incandescente with you is my incandescent love 
y en tu llanto y tu duelo me contienes.   and in your cry and your pain you contain me 
Nunca en la vida estuve tan de prisa Never in my life had I ever been so hasty 
tan lleno de relámpagos y ruegos,  so full of lighting and begging 
como ahora que ha muerto tu sonrisa like now that your smile has died 
y están con tu dolor todos los fuegos. and with your pain are all of the fires. 
Nunca estuvo mi amor tan a tu lado, Never has my love been so close to your side, 
nunca como esta noche de tortura never like this night of torture 
cuando sufre mi amor crucificado when my crucified love suffers 
en el mismo tablón de tu amargura.42 In the same plank of your bitterness. 
The poet wants to be there –in the struggle that the woman is struggling—and he 
is offering his awakened blood to the blood of the woman; but, in birth the bloods are 
different. His blood is weak, unable to endure her struggle. However, he is offering his 
nearness although he recognizes that her tears and mourning are what sustain him. The 
power of tears consists in condensing and expressing the richness of that/those 
which/who are always giving us its/their ephemeral presence, not to think about it/them 
but to tilt our flesh towards it/them.
43
 Why does the woman cry? For whom does she cry? 
Why is the poet crying in the face of the offering? She cries because she is being tortured 
or at least that is what the poet feels. She is crying for herself and because she is doing so, 
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the poet cries. But, actually all that we have is the humidity and the ambiguous 
consistency of the poet’s tears. Thus, the exposed fleshy body of the woman remains 
unreachable to us unless we trust the testimony of the witness.
44
  
The poem returns us to the crucifixion, to the extermination, and leaves in silence 
what comes after that. For the poet, the truth of birth is just one (crucifixion) and it is 
written in the opened and crucified body of the woman. This prompts us to consider two 
questions: 1) What/who is a witness of a crucifixion? 2) What type of testimony is the 
testimony of a crucifixion? First, one can suggest that being a witness of a crucifixion is, 
primarily, the experience of being overcome by an excess of experience and emotion. 
The witness knows that his/her testimony will always be lacking something fundamental. 
Debravo said “Never in my life had I ever been so hasty.” This unusual condition of 
being completely incapable of being in repose, of feeling a shivery power cutting through 
our body, is an experience that cannot be adequately described to another person.   
The crucifixion is unique but it is not happening to the witness. Though one could 
conceivably keep a tear of the victim as his/her testimony, but once one has it, it is gone 
forever – that is what is missing; finally the witness is someone who is able to stay45 or 
not to be crucified. This is the condition of writing: being a signal of distance and 
survival.  The radical absence of which he/she is witness is always absent. Having been 
witness of a crucifixion, moreover, prevents the infinite aporia of what is missing to be 
transformed in silence or irresponsibility towards those we have radically lost. The 
testimony that comes from this witness is inevitably fragile and perishable: 
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After all, there is nothing in creation that is not ultimately destined to be lost: not only the 
part of each and every moment that must be lost and forgotten- the daily squandering of 
tiny gestures, of minute sensations, of which passes through the mind in a flash, of trite 
and wasted words, all of which exceed by great measure the mercy of memory and the 
archive of redemption – but also the works of art and ingenuity, the fruits of a long and 
patient labor that, sooner or later, are condemned to disappear.
46
 
Despite this possibility of the nothingness as a horizon that comes for us, the 
testimony of the crucifixion – that of the birth – is a lament that seems not to reserve a 
further message. The lament is itself the message. The gestures of the witness, the form in 
which the images of the crucifixion take place in his/her hands, eyes and voice give to us, 
perhaps, more than just the facts without the pretension of being pedagogical or 
instructive. Lament is an uncontrollable language through which it is possible to bring 
into presence the painful path in which we are never sufficient. Through the lament one 
says: here “I am” and because of that at least now not everything is lost; because of these 
gestures and this pale presence – remember that according to Debravo in birth all the 
lights explode - we can imagine what complete absence is, what we have lost radically.  
4. The New and the Possible 
Jorge Debravo reminds us in his lament, the possibility of this redemption, the 
apparition of the new/different, the opening of the political sense, all that is possible, is 
given to us in the tense muscles, warm fluids and thick blood that are crucified – and 
continuing with the use of the testimony of the poet- with the open body of the woman 
that we could not forget neither could be forgotten, as Pineda insists, the cancelation of 
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the political operated through and in the massive administration of social death.
47
 One 
can ask what is underneath the blood and explore/imagine the density of the separation 
that happens to her in birth. Instead of that or before that, one should be sure that she/he 
has been immersed in the blood and touched sufficiently by dangerous environments.  
Arendt considers that “Since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, and 
not mortality, may be the central concept of political, as distinguished from metaphysical 
thought.”48 But when we approach her body, even if it is just through the testimony of a 
witness, natality becomes not just the opposite of mortality –as a metaphysical concept- 
but a unique experience that occurs in the interstice between the categorically elusive and 
carnally potent.  In the interstice of natality and mortality, in the suspension of our 
categorical anxieties and metaphysical impulses, birth – as a distant smell and rhythm 
that is in our presence in her body – puts us into the “ambit” of the holiness.  
Birth, Holiness, Space 
To put one’s life – her life – into deathly risk for the other, for the unpredictable 
that comes with the new – why it is new I could not be sure – is holiness but not because 
a natural obligation is being fulfilled.
49
 Her exposed fleshy body is protecting the 
possibility of interrogate the world with her tired tendons and she is remembering that the 
same vagina that now is being manipulated by “antiseptic hands” and compulsive 
instruments before and later will be caressed by her own and other hands until she is wet 
from pleasure, exhausted from joy.  Thus, “carnal lust” cannot be separated from live.  
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Her joy: holiness. Holiness, in birth, is not just the disposition to offer her life to another 
but the intention to have joy, to enjoy and recover her body. To reopen or to close her 
body even to separate her from that salvation that was imagined by Arendt and reinvent 
or forget about salvation. In this regard it will be opportune to expand the political 
understanding of natality as it is possible to do from Pineda’s conception of communal 
resistance and its various modes of expression. From her perspective birth is also the 
multiple processes in and through which we can constitute a project to transform even the 
most basic elements of the economy of flesh such as the form in which pain and 
mourning are expressed.  There where Hume and Smith sanction the necessity of silence 
and forgetfulness, Pineda proposes, as Jorge Debravo, public lament and celebration. One 
of the primordial political outputs of birth consists in the opening and disruption of space: 
Just as the tortured and murdered bodies of the victims have been strewn throughout the 
city to mark territory, on the most overt level practitioners have marked and reclaimed 
territory by painting telephone poles with black crosses throughout the city, one for each 
murdered victim […] The practitioners have recognized and resisted the ways in which 
women’s bodies themselves have been used by the murderers as territory marked through 
mutilation, violation, and ultimately destruction.
50
 
A new birth for the women’s bodies that had been killed implies also a 
reorganization of the space. The conjunction of bodies and space gives birth to a new 
form of body: the spectral, mobile, ungraspable body that is expanding and occupying 
memories and public places. Birth is in this regard a way to subvert fatality and another 
form of sense and sensibility. 
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Exposure: Happening to us 
Birth introduces another form of a sense.
51
 We break out of the body of our 
mothers while we are emerging, covered by unfathomable blood, to another surface. We 
emerge to the temperatures, to the hands, to another ambience. The notion of ambience in 
this case, is not referring just to an exterior or natural environment (what I prefer to call 
the emergence into temperatures). Ambience is the widening of our affects 
52
 and the 
movement to the others’ affects toward us (sense of recognition).  Because we are 
affective we are constantly increasing and losing our energy – every affect gives and 
takes energy from us – being born is the ability to experience a drastically different way 
to be affected. What emerged in birth is our flesh that is, contrary to Spinoza (1632-
1677)
53
, the same possibility to think. We are there, coming and, in that moment, and 
today, we “[…] do not know what the Body can do, or what can be deduced from the 
consideration of its nature alone”.54 In the context of this passage Spinoza is referring to 
what the body can do without the orders of the mind, when it follows only its own nature. 
But there is another way of interpreting the unknown or unexpected possibilities of the 
body: “When practitioners act in public, placing their bodily selves at risk, they reclaim 
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their subjectivity and self-possession as embodied, female human beings who demand 
that public space be emancipatory space for women”.55 In this perspective the question 
about what the body can or cannot do is posed as a political problem: are the dead 
completely lost and separated from us? Pineda’s response is that the testimony of the 
killed women persists and we do not know of what their flesh is still capable.  
Messages and Eternal Life 
This liminal incertitude, which at least should give the eschatological imagination 
something to think about, is condensed in our body when we tear the stretched skin of our 
mothers and the resistance of women stalked by structural violence.  If we accept that this 
flesh—about whose capacities we know so little— is the body that appears in birth, one is 
obligated to say that our body never follows only the laws of nature, but is always 
intimately pervaded by all our experiences. Moreover, this suggests that it is perhaps the 
mind that now should be interrogated, as Tertullian reminds us when he says that, “Omne 
quod est, corpus est sui generis”56. Spinoza said later “I add here the very structure of the 
human Body, which, in the ingenuity of its construction, far surpasses anything made by 
human skill.”57 This complexity is the context in which birth happens. The new, then, is 
new; is outside us, is different in its same ingenuity, in its same condition of destructible. 
Flesh can be damaged; however, its emergence surpasses or maintains distance with 
everything. Because of that, every new body already possesses eternal life.  
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Whatever specific body emerges in birth always has, besides particular affects, also 
particular stature, weight, dimensions, tremors and, synthetically, place.  She/he reveals 
him- or herself to me as small, fragile, and infinite. The specificity and pettiness of 
his/her place is impossible to encompass –looking through its profundity – by all my 
skills. She/he, in his or her emergence –which is the same as ours, but always different—
is carrying the weight of a constellation of expectations. Looked at synchronously, birth 
happens in a specific social and historical moment; there is a before and an after the 
event. But diachronically looked at, in our birth there is the expectation that, in some 
way, we are taking on and taken on by all the legacies from the past and bringing them 
into a new possibilities.  
The Ghost and Death 
Because of this in every birth a child should be killed.
58
 Let me explain the last 
phrase by introducing a question: how is birth annihilated? It is by tracing its meaning to 
the “fantasme” of the law, tradition, or reality. This happens when we do not allow a 
newborn to be new instead of integrating it or re-inscribing its novelty within the 
“inalterable route of History.” All of us have our “fantasme” and, while we are recalling 
our emergence, we insist on defining it. So, one can say that it is impossible to receive the 
new as new since we are part of a structure, tradition, or world of life from which we 
respond to all newcomers or apparitions.  
5. Becoming  
Birth is the very possibility of everything according to Arendt and Pineda as we 
saw previously. Birth happened to us (advenant) and because of that we could devenir 
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(become)
59
 a being that, in an irregular process, takes care or, in other terms, we are 
generated and because of that we are part of a generation and we could also generate 
world.
60
 It is necessary to insist on that birth happened to us and, because of it, our 
intention was exceeded. So, we could, in this case, introduce ourselves into a question 
about the existence of a particular experience: 
To the phenomenon that is most often characterized by an effect of intuition, and 
therefore by a deception of the intentional aim and, in particular instances, by the equality 
between intuition and intention, why would not correspond the possibility of a 
phenomenon in which intuition would give more, indeed immeasurably more, than 
intention ever would have intended or foreseen?
61
 This question opens the ambit of the 
everyday epiphanies, something that happens to us, in which it is our intuition that gives 
us nearness with its terrible presence. To let our birth be requires us to “take off our 
sandals” and to risk being burned; to not allow it is to maintain the distance and scream 
“Do not touch me!” put our clothes on, and go into the “green prairie.” Avoid the 
fantasme and allow the touch of who or what is emerging – be touched by my own 
emergence- is the possibility of the surprise. In birth it is the blindness of the other that 
destabilizes us, his/her inability to return us a look. Furthermore, it is the presence of all 
his/her flesh that completely weakens my intention. In birth, it is not me seeing, it is not 
the other – me – seeing but radically he/she not seeing me. There is that fleshy presence 
that is not seeing us, but appearing, making place and I just have the intuition that it is the 
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caress that could give us place together without sacrificing her/his otherness and without 
leaving her/him in the intemperateness. What happens when the one who is emerging 
cannot speak? What happens when actually there is one that can speak and another that 
cannot?  A common solution will be to speak about that silence, its meaning, and 
epistemic range.   But, another path – more difficult for our sonic way of communications 
– is to let the other be from another way of speaking. Will our responsibility be to receive 
this non-speaker as a call?  
Saturation and Birthing 
Birth: inaugurates a new possibility for the senses; the opening of our mother’s 
body is the same opening of worldliness. However, it escapes from us. The densest 
instance that passes through us does not belong to us; it is always calling us outside our 
reachable ambit.  Birth can be considered as a “phénomène saturé”, in which the flesh of 
the other comes to us, as an unexpected donation, with its invisible visibility and 
infinitude. The concreteness of the presence of the other’s flesh – and the political 
responsibilities that this concreteness supposes- does not unveil all the possibilities that 
are introduced by the new. There is always a rest, the invisibility. The invisible brings 
with it the useless; the absence of product; to overcome the viscosity of the commodity is 
an attempt to re-find the true texture of the blood that is combined, in birth, with tears and 
excrement. The annihilation of the invisible by the hegemony of fetishistic character of 
commodities and accumulation of wealth leads us to instrumentation and suicide.  
Commodities and Flesh 
To regress from this situation, to try to move its foundations, supposes not just a 
containment of our “ontological ingratitude” but a containment of the objects that 
245 
 
constantly try to hide their new flesh or even more to affirm that the invisible has a 
surplus of invisibility. To the worship of commodities
62
 and money that is constantly 
referred to in Hume and Smith we should not put up a superior object, but instead the 
scandal of the invisible, the hidden invisible or the double invisible. Is not the hug of the 
son transient—and yet it remains? Are not the pink crosses of Ciudad Juárez the presence 
of the absent and killed?
63
 The invisible is not a resource but rather a course (decurso), 
and excess. Speaking on the question of visibility and invisibility it is necessary to 
discuss the following: 
At the first glance, a commodity seems a commonplace sort of thing, one easily 
understood. Analysis shows, however, that it is a very queer thing indeed, full of 
metaphysical subtleties and theological whimsies […] It is obvious that man, by 
his activity, modifies the forms of natural substances so as to make them useful to 
himself […] But as soon as it [the commodity, JP] itself as a commodity, it is 
transformed into a thing which is transcendental as well as palpable.
 64
  
 
What Marx is discussing here is how the invisible struggles with the invisible. 
The transcendental (invisible) character of the commodity not only hides the visibility of 
the workers (they and their labor remain forgotten in the concreteness of the thing) and 
the general social relationships (that became shadows of things) but, most important, their 
fleshly condition. Marx, then, raises the discussion about what the social process is that 
allows a form of invisibility to conceal other form of invisibility. The latter, in this 
“conflict of invisibilities”, remains doubly invisible. The critical analysis of the fetishist 
character of  commodities tries to penetrate into its transcendental world not just to show 
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that they are “the material expressions of the human labour”65 but also to go into the 
invisibility of the human condition: “We are concerned only with a definite social 
relation between human beings, which, in their eyes, has here assumed the semblance of 
a relation between things”66, just “drilling” on the invisibility of the commodity is that we 
can acknowledge our own invisibility.  
The situation is that the combination of all our social relations are impossible to 
look at completely but they are irreplaceable for the production and reproduction of our 
concrete life. Just the critique of the invisibility allows us to perceive the invisibility that 
makes our life possible. But I am also talking here about another invisibility that I would 
like to call on: the invisibility of all the social relations that occur within us. With this I 
express that we are not uni-dimensional, not even multi-dimensional, but social flesh. We 
are beyond every role or performance; what we do does not exhaust us and, at the same 
time, we are inside a carousel of demarcations that begins in our own skin.  
6. Invisibility 
The dispute between commodities brings us to oblivion and murder. But the 
invisible, I should repeat is not a sedative; we already commented that it includes its own 
specific negativity, and it remains with us, and besides that it is a permanent reminder of 
our instability. Invisibility: is not elliptical, it does not represent anything, could not be 
represented, and does not locate an essence in our anxious hands. The invisible requires 
an act of anthropological faith, a faith that is not possible to see but which we can intuit.   
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Each aspect of a person’s identity develops in relation to realities that transcend her or his 
particularity but also in which she or he transcends: community, race, gender, sexual 
identity, and so on. For instance, the realities of my own community – its history, its 
language, the geography in which I feel most at home – all embrace me not only as past 
realities but as things that I continue to relate to, be transformed by, and transform. And 
yet I never grasp them, just as they never completely define me.
67
  
As I have shown the relationship between visibility and invisibility in Hume and 
Smith supposes the practical suppression of the invisible. Everything that appears is the 
incarnation of the invisible. The invisible does not have any other mode of exists but that 
of direct apparition. The visible fully contains and expresses the invisible. Politically this 
implies that any attempt to go beyond the visible is idolatrous. The mechanism through 
which Hume and Smith identify the invisible with the visible is an extreme form of 
incarnation: it consumes everything without leaving open space or future. In losing the 
invisible the visible becomes a useful thing and loses its capacity of being scandalous.
68
In 
not recognizing the invisible is committed “an assault on the integrity of the majesty of 
matter.”69 
Care 
Being-in-the world is taking care of things
70
 but in birth we are not taking care of, 
we are received by and taken care of by others. When we are born we are not able to 
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move or direct ourselves toward things or others. We have a lack of position or location 
in the world. The Gospel narratives, especially those that refer to the assassination of 
infants ordered by Herod
71
, show us that in birth we experience being taken, put, left and 
even killed. We feel the power of whomever comes toward us, perhaps we even expect 
their coming, but we are unable to repeat that movement. What does this basic weakness 
that we find in our beginning suppose? Is it in itself, this other mode of being significant? 
Could this basic event confer a particular shape to economy? I argue that it is especially if 
we consider that economic theory, since Hume and Smith, presupposes vigor, delicacy 
and permanent awareness in order to participate in the commerce of society. 
The Angel 
There are residues in our traditions among everything that has been and still is 
being said there is a rest, something left over. My attempt is not to displace the 
shortcomings of this tradition; but to think about it trans-topically. Thinking about the 
residue, the imperceptible remnant, leads us to open ourselves. It is not always at hand, 
even if it is present; because of this, to think about the residue is a dance with the potency 
of the tenuous. The residue is a presence that cuts and unhinges the trajectory of the 
tradition; ergo gives us the possibility of slowness.  To try to think about the tradition 
from its residues requires keeping close to the abysm and the negative. We are not 
looking for offal; perhaps it is our “ritual of expectation”. The residue is not “our trash” 
but that which, incredibly, had been in silence. However, this is a bustling silence which 
allows our voice. Because there is a silence, something present and expecting, is that we 
could offer our screams. In everything said there remains what should have been 
screamed but that was postponed, left for us as a legacy and requirement. So then, 
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tradition is, in its most radical sense, that silence which suggests another landscape which 
is not its own. 
What I am suggesting here is that in order to move, not necessarily forward, it is 
necessary to hear, or more precisely feel the silence. Responding to the residue is 
definitely a position in which we face the problem of the possible future, but from an 
interstice: that which remains unsaid and demands us to stop in our tracks. The unsaid, 
that which has not yet happened, perhaps, only suggested or shouted loudly but despised, 
is not just in the past but is always among us in the whip and rebel flesh of those who, in 
this precise moment, are hungry and thirsty (for justice as well). What does it mean to 
repeat the tradition? It consists in re-embracing it as a part of an effort to discern our 
necessities and capacities from our (multi) present and with the courage to project 
ourselves (again not necessarily forward) and not to memorize, remember or understand 
the past as already happened or dead in time.  
Repetition is a particular action towards something that is singular and unique, 
without equivalence or being duplicated. It refers to the act of deployment, leading to its 
final consequences, a radical act or event. Every repetition requires a transgression or 
profanation. From everything mentioned it is understandable that to repeat is the opposite 
of making a commentary or an aesthetic adaptation. What is repeatable is that which is on 
the cutting edge. When one is trying to repeat tradition he/she will be unfaithful with its 
surface but, perhaps and because of this apparent fact, could be faithful. 
7. Reading with Flesh 
In the case of Tertullian, whose principal concern is the birth of God, birth 
appears as the same occurrence as the Christian event. If, as he sustains, the testimony of 
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this new movement supposes a cosmological discontinuity or heterogeneity and not just a 
new traditum, this is primarily due to the great potency of birth. Christianity is a 
testimony of the potency of this eruption, without it there is just a tradition without truth. 
Tertullian’s idea of truth is rooted in an angel’s announcement, more precisely in its 
absence or concealment.
72
 What is this announcement about? Who is capable of hearing 
it? What is exactly the absence or concealment of the angel?  The angel (Gabriele) of 
birth and its concealment leaves us in the midst of the announcement. Tertullian’s 
distinction between phantasma and carnis (flesh)
73
 is the affirmation of the possibly 
redemptive condition of flesh and, furthermore, the impossibility that a redemption could 
come from an angel or phantasma. The angel’s announcement is its absence; because in 
the moment it pronounces the promise of birth it leaves us. After the announcement we 
just have the flesh of God, our flesh and the flesh of the others
74
, the angel remains in 
silence, there is nothing else it can say to us, except for that silence that is an intense call 
from the flesh; the angel sent us to the flesh.  
Redemption is fragile and we could not encounter it without passing through, and 
being permanently aware of, the dense concealment of the angel. Just those who move 
toward the flesh are in the condition to hear the proclamation of birth. But birth is, despite 
this necessary inclination toward the flesh, donation, especially our own birth. The angel 
leaves us between donation and desire; there is no more struggle (Jacob and the angel) or 
terrified look that gives us a message (Angelus Novus) but a terrible pain and 
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expectation. The concealing of the angel is necessary; we just can keep the memory of its 
gesture of radical remoteness. It is precisely within the empty space left by the angel 
where the possibility of its own redemption is found. It is so, it and the announcement of 
redemption depends entirely on the fact that this empty space remains empty, that the 
amazement and pain produced by its absence will not be supplanted by a phantasma. The 
following is an insightful commentary about the concealment of the angel: “This means 
that what will save the world is not the spiritual, angelic power […] with which humans 
produce their works […] but a more humble and corporeal power, which humans have 
insofar as they are created beings.”75 
Tertullian is even more incisive when, perhaps overwhelmed by his own 
rhetorical ecstasies, declared “Nullum mandatum de salute angelorum suscepit Christus a 
patre”76 so, it is not just that the angels will not save the world, but its same salvation had 
been forgotten or, perhaps, postponed. We are humble because we are born beings, 
although the angels are waiting for us. In its birth even God was put in the middle, in 
ambient and, as I suggested before, birth does not imply the solution of any dislocation or 
disruption; on the contrary, it expects to be collocated in a contradictory existence. 
Because it itself is heartrending and has located us in the frozen.  Birth is painful and 
“lousy”.  Tertullian enjoys this condition - the awareness of shame - and locates it in a 
privileged epistemic location. He is prepared to endanger the “cleanliness” and 
“clearness” of God for the desire to hear and love the birth, the flesh. In order to continue 
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being unfaithful to Tertullian it is important to remember an observation made by George 
Bataille (1897-1962): 
We have arranged the world us in such a way that if the “filth” were not 
constantly thrown out of it, the edifice would rot […] We tear them [our children, 
JP] away from nature by washing them, then by dressing them. But we will not 
rest until they share the impulse that made us clean them and clothe them, until 
they share our horror of the life of the flesh, of life naked, undisguised, a horror 
without which we would resemble the animals.
77
 
One could suggest that received from Tertullian, the birth of God shows shame 
proudly, in all its grotesque condition. By grotesque I mean that in birth the sublime 
appears to us completely covered by blood and in its nakedness, it is itself what is giving 
birth.
78
 He tries from different rhetorical movements to not clean or clothe the Verb of 
God and with that the “edifice” of flesh’s perversity entered into a crisis. What should 
wash us is the birth blood or, more radically, with Tertullian we attend to the suspension 
of washing and immunity; and lead into the aperture of the caress. De carne Christi is an 
opportunity to rest inside the flesh, naked and full of “filth”.  This theological book 
completely dedicated to repeat constantly that we are in the openness, possessing nothing 
but nakedness to those around us. The edifice is not just the security provided by culture 
but, in the context of a theological discussion, a God which is too fresh, dressed and 
“human”. The otherness of God is manifested precisely in its decision to destroy the 
“human person” with its offensive dirtiness.79 The apparition of an unexpected difference 
is the disperse matrix of the Christian imagination.  This strange condition, which is the 
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conflict of all conditions, its absence, is obligating a way of thinking that can only come 
true in its nakedness in which flesh cannot be rejected or divided into vicious and 
immune flesh. 
Finales  
Let’s return to idea of the end of the “humanity” and the end of “God”. This end 
is actually a beginning, an opening thanks to which it is possible to go on our search. 
With Tertullian we are in a territory in which it is possible to not try to activate the notion 
of “humanity” or “God” but bring them into its depletion. This means the opening to a 
new (conflictive) passion, politics and joy. But it is necessary to stay in the end and not to 
try to quickly get to the other side, stay in its happening, which is what Tertullian brings 
to us. In this end one can embrace not only the animals that we are but also, according to 
Bataille, those that we fear or with which we are fascinated.  
God is flesh and because of that our glory is cannot be understood as the process 
of simply controlling or cleaning. Something, however, is still missing in these 
discussions –the ignorance of the residue- and this is the question about the possibility of 
God giving birth. Moreover, what kind of God cannot give birth? I am proposing an 
exploration into this residue, an exploration that procures to be repetitive. As lead by the 
maelstrom Tertullian affirms that:  
Crediderat Eua serpenti: credidit Maria Gabrieli. Quod illa credendo deliquit, ista 
credendo correxit. ‘Sed Quod illa credendo deliquit, ista credendo correxit. ‘Sed 
Eua nihil tunc concepit in utero ex diaboli uerbo’. Immo concepit. Nam exinde ut 
abiecta pareret et in doliribus pareret, uerbum diaboli semen illi fuit. Enixa est 
denique diabolum fatricidam. Contra Maria eum edidit, qui carnalem fratrem 
Israël, interemptorem suum, saluum quandoque praestaret. In uuluam ergo dues 
uerbum suum delutit, bonum fratrem, ut memorian mali fatris eraderet. Inde 
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prodeundum fuit Christo ad salutem hominis, quo homo iam damnatus 
intrauerat.
80
  
From this passage, which deserves a thoroughly critical discussion, I would like to 
stop and comment briefly on the phrase “In uuluam ergo dues uerbum suum delutit”. 
Following the translation of Ernest Evans the phrase says: “So then, God brought down 
into the Womb [vulva, JP] his own Word” 81, the transitional ergo is related clearly to the 
idea that Mary believed the Angel (credidit Maria Gabrieli) and because of that God 
chose her.
82
 Is not the past action, reflected in the verb brought down, a form of giving 
birth?  When God gave its word was it not giving birth? Is not Tertullian’s carnal 
ontology the ontology of the God that gave birth? God took out something from itself, 
something that was/is different from it. In the act of “brought down” the same smell of 
fluids like those that we smell in the giving birth appear. Here we are talking, in a strict 
sense, about a first birth. Tertullian does not meditate on the action of bringing down
83
. 
This action requires one to open oneself or to have a deep cut. The verb brought down 
indicates an effort, energy expenditure, fatigue and emptiness. All of this makes transit 
possible, one which is just apparently short, from one part of the body (upper) to another 
part of the body (lower) specifically to an orifice. Due to the carnal effort required, in 
                                                          
80
 Tertullian De Carne Christi XVII, 6.  
 
81
 Tertullian, Treatise on the Incarnation, ed. and trans. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K, 1956), 
61.  
 
82
 For a criticism of God’s « choosing » of Mary see Jane Schaberg, The Illegitimacy of Jesus: A 
Feminist Theological Interpretation of the Infancy Narratives (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995); 
Gerd Lüdemann, Virgin Birth? The Real Story of Mary and Her Son Jesus, trans. John Bowden 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1998).  
 
83
 Jean Pierre Mahé translates: “Ainsi Dieu fit descendere son prope Verbe dans le sein dans le 
sein d’une femme” see Tertullien “La Chair du Christ” Tome I, trans. introduction, text critique and 
commentary Jean Pierre Mahé Sources Chrétiennes 216 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1975), 283. His 
translation (Dieu fit descendere) also implies the action of take out something from oneself but not 
necessary inside oneself.  
255 
 
birth the regulation of the fluid’s circulation suffers a weakening that transforms every 
muscular contraction in a shower of fluids.  
Besides these factors, is the lack of control of that which is being pushed out. 
Every push implies less and less control and more ambivalence. He/she who is emerging 
takes the energy, cuts the flesh, and suspends the regular anabolic activities of the body. 
The verb brought down designates fundamentally a catabolic action, one in which the 
energy is reduced. The economy of birth is not productive; it consists in the donation and 
removal of energy that could not be recovered.  
When one suggests that God gave birth, he/she is indicating a destabilization in its 
same composition, a lack of security and, at the same time, a different power texture. The 
act of giving birth includes an accumulation and expenditure of great power. But this 
power is not constant or permanent; it is particular in that it is finite. It is used for a 
period of time and then is exhausted. The power of giving birth could not be permanently 
emulated. After the expenditure of energy/power implicated in birth it is necessary that 
others give God energy/care. In this case Mary did not just give birth to Jesus; she took 
care of God as well, even without asking for it. 
In birth there is also a loss of verticality and the sensation of vertigo that re-
collocates the entire world. The change from verticality to horizontality supposes not just 
a change of perspective or the form we are present or absent to others, but a new form to 
take space and to perceive the temporality. While we are in vertical position, especially 
walking, we have the sensation that we are going toward the space. We feel that 
everything is motionless and is available. Verticality is the position of every empire 
enterprise, “time is money” means: you should be vertical. Otherwise when we are 
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horizontally collocated the sensation that we feel and the experience of the relation with 
others that we have vary importantly. While one is lying, things are approaching or not 
and one is expecting. The space, then, does not belong to us but because we are within it 
our motion is possible. The vertigo of God consists in this new disposition in the space 
(cosmos) in which it is not just a creator but also who awaits and desires. And this clearly 
supposes a radical transformation of Hume’s and Smith’s theology. There is, as well, a 
paradox in the vertical position of the biped mammals that we are: we just barely – and 
through an object capable to reflect us – can see our backs and that is our first limitation. 
We lost or leave behind, almost always, half of our body. This signifies, among other 
questions, that we are, almost all the time, susceptible to be surprised from behind.  So, 
the existence of position referring to God implies also the possibility, for us, to touch its 
back. We are able to bring a novelty to God.  
Passing Through 
The Verb came out from God, so it lost something that was within it or with it or 
perhaps it lost itself. It is the birth of the Verb and its passing through the vaginal canal, 
mouth, rectum or other orifice of God; its naked and exposed body of God unveiled for 
us in this rapid action of brought down. This is the first solitude of God and its tears are 
still warm. However, this is a particular solitude, specifically, one that turns against itself. 
It is precisely because of this detachment, by the act of taking out, that there is 
companionship– friendship. 
Every companion, if it is so, supposes a differentiation between those who are 
there for each other. The verb “brought-down” designates the suspension of an intimate 
relationship, a form of “alterity inside”, necessary to go into openness through which the 
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Verb can extend until the point of the tactile (touch) dissemination. While the Verb is 
within the Womb of God it is primordially sonic. It exists because it is sound, its waves, 
tones and intensities reach us through our ears. We can even touch, in the texture of other 
flesh, its decibels. The Verb is never absent but when it came down from God its sonority 
decreases and its skin availability is intensified. Because the Verb turned radically 
touchable, God’s sonority is intensified and its sonic wages turned particularly liquid. 
This liquid sonority allows a fading of its presence and, as I mentioned before, sonority is 
also touchable. The sound has the quality of a high elastic velocity and thanks to that its 
harmonies could be transmitted to wide spaces. Because of birth we also could taste God, 
specifically its birth blood. The flow of its blood, is not just present in the Eucharistic, but 
also in our circulatory system which irrigates air in our lungs, or stops our bleeding.  
Because of birth God became dislocated because birth introduces a change in the 
sensorial abilities or capacities.
84
 God became more sensitive because it gave birth. This 
sonority of God that I am mentioning it is not from its logos but its screams while it was 
giving birth. There is also silence of God that appears to us as a transitory smelliness.  
Ripped Veil 
Brought down implies both separation and encounter. In this case when the Verb 
comes from the bloody orifice of God it is received by a community in which it takes 
place. The God that gave birth has had its veil ripped, stained with blood. If one believed 
in Tertullian’s God, God itself rebelled against it in the moment in which left its veil, 
opened its legs and pushing brought down its Verb. Let’s believe in Tertullian’s words: 
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“Denudasti puellam a capite, et tota iam sibi uirgo non est, alia est facta”85, since God, 
in its own shower of blood, has had to unveil itself completely in order to give birth, will 
be different from itself forever. So the God that once was, now is constantly changing 
into others because of its carnal excess shown by the act of giving birth. Creatio ex 
sanguis: creation and salvation are composed from the mixture of our and God’s blood. 
This is labor’s blood, hard, warm, and fused with excrement and urine. It is painful blood 
that unveils and hides. It is not the blood of sacrifice or murder; but they are linked, they 
are inseparable. Faith comes, also, through the smell of birth blood. 
8. Caress 
Birth is hidden from us; moving away inevitably, entering into thick fog. There is, 
apparently, nothing of it within our reach. We have just the rumor from others, its 
hermeneutics. Birth appears properly as that which resists the conceptual apprehension 
or, more precisely it is completely unveiled and, in spite of that, results intimate and 
irreplaceable to us. To think birth represents the challenge to overcome a radical paradox. 
The paradox of a disclosure that, precisely for its seminal character, appears just as 
conceptually unreachable. Although, since it did happen to us and we were, without 
intentionality, put into the world we could not be in silence about our beginning.  
I would like to suggest in a path opened by Tertullian that, because we are born, 
we are sent to the caress, not as an ontological structure but as a political possibility. This 
is the possibility of not being, as Ernesto Guevara (1928-1967) said reminding Hobbes, 
wolves for others. The politics of caress, understood in its political-economic reach, 
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struggle against a world in which “One can win only at the cost of the failure of others”.86 
The caress is not already finalized and it is not easy, the road until the flesh of the other, 
even if it appears longitudinally close, is politically difficult. Ernesto Guevara, with an 
intensity that I am looking for, said once: 
At the risk of seeming ridiculous, let me say that the true revolutionary is guided 
by great feelings of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine revolutionary 
lacking this quality. Perhaps it is one of the great dramas of the leader that he or 
she must combine a passionate spirit with a cold intelligence and make painful 
decisions without flinching […] In these circumstances [the solitude of the 
revolutionary, JP] one must have a large dose of humanity, a large dose of a sense 
of justice and truth in order to avoid dogmatic extremes, cold scholasticism, or an 
isolation from the masses. We must strive every day so that this love of living 
humanity is transformed into actual deeds, into acts that serve as examples, as a 
moving force.
87
  
 
Guevara’s comment included an implicit assertion: revolutionaries are those who 
intensely and permanently love. And this is so because without love, which does not 
exclude for him the armed struggle, the revolution turns into bureaucracy, cold 
procedures which conceal the “living humanity”. To love is a form of producing a 
revolution within a revolutionary process; it is not enough but vital, because it “leads us” 
directly to the flesh – the surplus living- and to the necessary abolition of the socio-
philosophical conditions that prevent love. These conditions are produced and reproduced 
socially and are manifested in all our relationships in the form of different dominations.  
Cold and Birth 
The absence of an adequate speech performance to explain – perhaps I should say 
the inadequacy of a pure explanation – about what, in birth, appeared to us and the 
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apparent silence of who appears without name and finite infinitude obligates us to the re-
beginning. To learn again the sounds, textures, fragrances and colors that make the world 
habitable to us. Birth requires us to touch, to be touched, to expose ourselves publicly, to 
be available. It is the proximity of flesh that protects us from the frozen, it is the sharing 
our fluids that gives us pleasure and our hands that donate repose to others. The caress is 
an adventure inasmuch to restore and fulfill the apparently habitual.  To caress the other 
is fundamental, to let the other take care of us and this is so for at least two reasons. In 
birth it is the blindness and lack of speech of the other that allows me to re-begin my 
existence.  
9. Economy of the Flesh 
The theological tradition have emphasized that flesh is damaged and damaging. In 
order to sustain the idea of God´s incarnation throughout the centuries theologians have 
explained that Christ’s birth and flesh was not contaminated by flesh’s impulses, 
viciousness, or inclinations. In this regard, theological reflection has function as a 
machine of immunization. It had repeated a condemnation to flesh in order to develop its 
Soteriological and Christological narratives. Flesh was the monstrous that have to be 
economized. God’s internal life was understood as clean from flesh. As a result of this 
position Spirit has become as the basic principle of government. One has to live 
according to the Spirit and accept its materializations. Hume’s and Smith’s also assume 
flesh to be a zone, element, and surplus of life that has to be considered an economic 
object. Their investigations on human nature and economy constantly return to the 
question on how to subsume flesh within the productive body. Thus, they develop an 
economy of flesh without creating a rupture with theological discussions. Moreover, they 
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fully developed a theology of flesh that is expressed through and through in their 
philosophy.  
My proposal in this chapter was to initiate a reflection capable to interrogate the 
tradition of the economy of the flesh. First, I started with a consideration of birth as an 
alternative entrance to think economy and theology. The concentration on death, closure, 
and permanency has obtruded the space to think the necessity and possibility of an 
economy founded on care. Second, from this perspective I offered a reading of Christ’s 
birth. My reading emphasizes God’s full assumption of flesh as well as its radical 
exposure in order to propose an understanding of incarnation not as a form of strict 
incorporation but participation and love. It is possible to think in an economy of flesh that 
does not negate or subsume flesh but aspires to protect the possibilities and dangers of the 
new.  The new is both a promise and political project it requires social mobilizations and 
the interrogation of epistemic models. More than a theological development I have tried 
to embrace songs and screams that have not yet passed through us. 
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CONCLUSION 
A golpes alejás lo que no fue y te fue. 
Juan Gelmán. 
 
I began this investigation with a serious joke: only theology can grasp the 
absurdities of political economy because theology is even more absurd than political 
economy. Thus, theology does not possess any other thing but its naked madness. And 
even it cannot be understood as theology's property. Theology resembles Smith’s bare 
man, a sad song, the voice of Sarah Vaughan (1924-1990) refracted and forgotten. The 
joke also contained an insult, a dismissal.  Political economy and theology meet each 
other in the territory of shadows and precariousness which, if one follows the joke, is the 
evidently natural territory of theological speculation. If one asks: Is Marx alive? The 
response is undeniably that he lives in the ridicule of theology. Another question can be 
asked: Is theology alive? Certainly it is, in the seriousness of political economy. The 
jokes continue from Tertullian to Marx. The particularity of these mockeries is that they 
do not stop until they reach the tenebrous or horrendous. The horrendous itself contains a 
sardonic and painful humor. It introduces the abnormal, abject, and delirious in order to 
express limit situations. The metamorphosis, decompositions, and atrocities are deployed 
to confront us with the irrationality of the rationalized or the exchange of reason for 
obedience. Our laughing at the horrendous is itself an insightful joke. For the “critique of 
political economy” is also the reconsideration of theology: it requires that one get 
involved in debates that resist in our midst.  The ridiculous link that unites economy and 
nature (heaven and earth) is effectively flesh. The political economy is not ashamed to 
reenact the economy of the flesh.  
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I followed the joke's consequences by examining a complex of questions that I 
tried to transform into problems. First, the origins of political economy were clearly 
formulated within a theological realm. Moreover, the articulation of political economy 
and theory of nature was possible thanks to the a priori of God. It was from this 
“perspective” that it was possible to imagine a totality almost without fissures. The only 
fissure was, to make us laugh, the “original debt of the flesh.” Because of that the 
transition between Butler’s corporeal disciplines to Hume’s autobiography is the 
prolegomena to a philosophy of money, and the doctrine of international trade is a 
theological anthropology. The first object of political economy is the body and the first 
content of philosophy is the diarrhea of the philosopher. The concentration on the body is 
explained by the assumption that the body is such because it is composed or, more 
precisely, inhabited by flesh.  
The flesh is an indispensable, constitutive aspect of the human being and also the 
enemy of her happiness, the stalker that menaces commercial society. Flesh is imagined 
as something that fluxes and exceeds the rules of connivance in society because it dreams 
another world. Because of it, Hume’s and Smith’s philosophical scenario has as its center 
the personae of Hume. He condenses the achievement of the economy of the flesh: 
reversing the anguish of the pilgrim, Hume’s philosophical personae resists until its death 
without attempting to become another. As a part of the same theatrical presentation, 
Hume and Smith sanctioned that the conditions of possibility of their philosophical lives 
were neither possible nor desirable to overcome.  Thus, they make slavery and 
kidnapping compatible with politeness and measured conversation.  
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Second, the “original debt of flesh” transformed their philosophies into Spiritual 
Police. At the core of this comprehension of the philosophical practice is the conflict 
between spirit and flesh. The spirit’s movement condenses and actualizes itself in its 
multiple incarnations. The Spirit is nature and nature is the spirit incarnated. The 
functioning of the “spiritual body” requires immunization and security. Hence, Hume and 
Smith identified sexual and rank divisions not simply as social conventions but as a form 
by which to pay the interests of flesh’s debt. Flesh appears to be the multitude (the poor 
laborers) and the inconsistency of women. Therefore, it is understood as an 
undetermined, viscous, and mad monstrosity that has to be both controlled and 
congratulated. Hume and Smith do not simply offer hell, but instead they promise we will 
be part of the Kingdom of God. The only prerequisite that the amorphous mass of 
workers, savages, and women has to fulfill is to give their flesh to the spirit of the time. 
The eroticism of the spirit is also its cruelty. To live according to the spirit signifies to the 
multitude to live on the brink of death since the fruits of Hume’s and Smith’s spirit are 
death and suicide. The “Spiritual police” fully express themselves in Hume’s motto:  
always be a man—which is the same as to say: always reject the rage that situationally or 
structurally produces the so-called common life. In this precise sense God becomes a 
fetish.  
Third, Hume is a theologian in the most intense sense. His philosophy 
presupposes that God is fully incarnated in the “general laws of nature and society”. 
Accordingly, the “science of man” is theology and economic theory without 
contradictions. Natural theology is rational because everything that exists is rational. 
Believing in God is rational because God’s rationality is purely immanent. God’s 
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incarnation Hume takes as primordial fact whose consequences have to develop not 
within the realm of God’s internal life but uniquely within its visible body. Nonetheless, 
for Hume the invisibility of God is visible in the movements of its spirit. From this 
perspective it is possible to affirm that Hume proposes that God has to consume human 
flesh in order to sustain the unity of its world. The way in which God consumes flesh is 
Hume presents in his early philosophical anxiety. In it, he presents flesh as a clash 
between rationalities. Hume’s dubieties about the rationality of his personae he addresses 
as an idolatrous inclination and as rebellion to the Lord. Therefore, Hume’s embracing is 
the economic act in and through which he becomes a subject. The freedom of Hume’s 
subject, once he becomes sick, aged, or useless, can be manifested fundamentally through 
suicide. The wretched, that monstrosity within the monstrous multitude, is understood by 
Hume as a disease, as a danger to God’s body. Consequently, Hume’s philosophy 
understands flesh not only as hybris but also as sickness. The political economy indeed 
wants to decide when a life is worthy to be lived. But it does so from the theological 
perspective of the required immunization of God’s body from flesh. God’s gift of 
freedom is suicide. Once again, God has to be immunized from flesh in order to perform 
its economy.  
Fourth, Smith partially follows Hume in that he separates from him in one 
fundamental respect: for Smith God remains invisible. But this God is not the omnipotent 
God of Boyle. Smith’s invisible God intervenes in history only to extend its immanent 
logic. Properly considered, Smith’s moral philosophy and economic theory have to be 
comprehended as a theology of incarnation. This theology of incarnation assumes the full 
incarnation of God in commercial society. Thus, what has to be incarnated is flesh within 
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bodies. Smith’s moral philosophy presents the different steps of this incarnation: initially 
there is sentimental chaos (flesh) that through spiritual exercises is confronted with its 
vacuum and futility. Then, it is confronted not with singular and particular institutions but 
directly with God. In Smith’s theology of incarnation the decision of being a unit, a 
member, and a vigilante of oneself is presented within an agonistic scheme: if one 
decides to multiply or break oneself, one has to understand that this is tantamount to 
erecting God as one's enemy. The confrontation between the fleshy being and God is of 
decisive importance for Smith’s notion of wealth. Because only the one that obeys God 
can be also a self-interested and useful member of the economic body.  
From this standpoint Smith argues that it constitutes a virtue to give oneself up to 
rationality. Thus, the Glory of Smith’s God is the suffering of the multitude. The 
multitude’s God, for both Smith and Hume, is a social and political buffoon--someone or 
something that does not have philosophical seriousness or rigor but that prompts ridicule. 
It is a fool that tricks. Because of that neither Hume nor Smith are atheist. The question 
of God, or as they understand it, of religious practices is a “public problem.” 
Consequently, the administration of Gods is part of the primitive accumulation’s secrets 
that are always visible though covered by rags.  
Fifth, I tried to assume some of Hume’s and Smith’s challenges and then expand 
them. There are some aspects of their philosophical texture or certain labyrinths that they 
trace but abandon that should be further explored. Style is not, as they both proved, a 
mere extravaganza but a political position and a “non-subjected” disposition. I argued 
that in order to navigate, to use a Swiftian image, through Hume’s and Smith’s economy 
of the flesh there are two basic discussions that I should initiate. One is the discussion 
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about flesh and the other the discussion about birth. I did not try to formulate a theology 
of the flesh; instead I proposed a speculation (an investigation looking for clues) about 
how intense meditation on birth could transform my understanding of flesh. Also, I am 
interested in how a fleshy consideration of birth could transform my understanding of 
God’s incarnation. Accordingly, I was not trying to grasp the nucleus or structure of birth 
but to receive the furiousness of its elusiveness in order to formulate the following 
questions: If instead of thinking from the perspective or realm of death we think from the 
event of birth, might it be possible to question an economic theory that assumes as a 
danger the unexpected and not incarnated novelties?  
Clearly, in order to pose questions about the necrophilia of political economy we 
cannot think of birth from the theological model of immunity. Birth has to be embraced 
as a fleshy occurrence, and hence as disorder, exposure, poiesis, and risk tensioned by 
mortality.  Flesh has to be considered as the possibility of possibilities that cannot be 
separated from body performances but that is not completely vanished if the body delays 
its apparition or even if it despairs. In this regard, flesh is not considered as an 
intrinsically damaged part of our image of God but as damageable life that has to be 
cared for and caressed. From this perspective I proposed a reading of the incarnation that 
focuses on contagion without damnation: God itself giving birth without protecting itself 
with veils. In the midst of God’s birth blood I attempted to make a joke about Hume’s 
and Smith’s impeccable God. Beware of the jokes.  
If one of the knots of political economy is the theological idea of “original sin,” 
then I should affirm that the destruction (understood it as transformation through the 
renovation of reason) or destructio of the idea of flesh’s debt is an adequate introduction 
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to produce an economy that perhaps our language is dreaming about. The aforementioned 
destructio can no longer be an attempt to rescue any sort of imagined pristine and 
unpolluted center of the Christian tradition. We have to fully accept the socially 
damaging and monstrous character of the flesh and to not expect salvation from it. Only 
in reinforcing our own horrendousness can we finally cut into pieces the invisible and 
visible hands that still are chopping out flesh. Beware of the laughable monstrosity. 
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